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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bismarck would have turned in his grave, if he had seen what was happening to pension
schemes in the second half of the 20th century. Otto von Bismarck was German Chancellor
from 1871 to 1890. He was the ﬁrst to introduce a country wide social security system.
The socialist party became strong during this time period and Bismarck’s vision of a social
security system may have been accelerated by this development. Nevertheless, Bismarck
was rather conservative and in some respects liberal in his political orientation. He also
had a strengthening of the economic system in mind when he pursued the social security
system. His social security system included a health insurance, casualty insurance and a
disability / retirement insurance. The latter was granted as of age 70. A few years later
it was adjusted downward to 65. In the early 20th century life expectancy at birth was 45
and 47 years for men and women, respectively. Thus, retirement insurance was meant for
people, who were unable to work.
Many European countries followed and adopted social security systems in the early
20th century. In the 1970s social security systems became very generous in Europe. A
remarkable feature that originated in the 1970s has been the “early retirement window”,
which enabled many people to retire two to ﬁve years earlier than the original pivotal age of
65 without incurring any actuarial adjustments. At the same time, it also became common
to generously grant people disability status to facilitate early retirement in their middle and
end 50s (Gruber and Wise 1997).
1
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1.1: Labor Force Participation Trends of Men Aged 60-64
These ﬁgures are taken from Gruber and Wise (2005). They plot the proportion of 60-64 year old
men in the labor force over calender years for several countries.
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This had dramatic eﬀects on labor force participation across all countries. Figure 1.1
depicts the negative trend in male labor force participation at age 60-64. In 1990, 72% of
the Dutch males and 65% of the German males were retired. Parallel to the decreasing
labor force participation, we observe an increased life expectancy at birth in Europe as
illustrated in Figure 1.2. While in the 1970s life expectancy was 71 years, it has increased
to about 76 in 2010. This is 30 years more than people were expected to live at Bismarck’s
time. Moreover, health has also improved. Mathers, Sadana, Salomon, Murray and Lopez
(2001), for instance, ﬁnd healthy life expectancy at birth to increase to more than 70 years
in Europe by the late 20th century. Similarly, Crimmins, Hayward, Hagedorn, Saito and
Brouard (2009) show that disability-free life expectancy has signiﬁcantly increased from
1984 to 2000 in the US.
As people expect to live longer they invest more in their human capital. As simulations
of (Borghans, Dohmen and Golsteyn 2009) show, this increases their wage and the years they
spent working. However, it has also positive repercussions on the desire for leisure, which
reduces the time spent working. Following their simulations, the net eﬀect of increasing
conditional life expectancy from 78 to 81 for 60 year old men in the Netherlands is a
retirement age increase of only one year. An argument against labor participation of elderly
is often decreasing productivity. However, this is not necessarily true. As Borghans and
Nelen (2009) argue, the speciﬁc skills and the combination of diﬀerent skills of people
accentuate over age. This makes older people valuable to their own company but reduces
labor mobility. Also technical innovations as the introduction of computers at workplaces
has proven not to be a diﬃculty for elderly workers (Borghans and Ter Weel 2002).
Figure 1.2: Life Expectancy in Europe
This ﬁgure is based on the UN world population prospects, 2008. It plots life expectancy in Europe
across calender years for men and women.
The ongoing early retirement wave despite good health was certainly not in Bismarck’s
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interest as his ultimate goal was, apart from reelection, a prosperous economy. The awak-
ening came in the early 1990s when the increasing life expectancy and decreasing fertility
rates and consequently an increasing ratio between the retired and working population was
recognized. An extensive multinational research campaign led by Gruber and Wise (Gruber
and Wise 1997, Gruber and Wise 2002, Gruber and Wise 2005) and covering 11 (later 12)
countries came to the following conclusions.
Phase I (Introduction):
1. There is a decline in labor force participation of males aged 60-64 in 1995 in all
countries. The decline in Europe ranges from 70% to 20% in Belgium to from 83% to
58% in Sweden.
2. There is a strong connection between people’s early retirement age and labor force
departure. This correspondence remains strong across gender and countries with
diﬀerent legislation.
3. Apart from eligibility ages, social security incentives, as for instance the implicit tax
on work, play an important role in determining labor force exit. Much of the cross
country variation of retirement ages can be explained by diﬀerences in institutional
backgrounds; more speciﬁcally replacement rates and improper actuarial adjustments
of beneﬁts for deviating from the normal retirement age. The Netherlands has a very
high implicit tax at age 60 (141%), a high capacity of unused labor capacity of worker
(58%) and consequently a high percentage of males out of the labor force at age 59
(47%) in the early 1990s. The ﬁgures for Germany are somewhat lower (35%, 48%,
and 34%, respectively).
Phase II (Micro Estimation):
1. Regression analyzes of micro data in each country demonstrated that retirement incen-
tive variables such as social security wealth, the option value of postponing retirement,
and the implicit tax on work signiﬁcantly drive labor force departure.1 These ﬁndings
support the ﬁndings from Phase I and strongly suggest a causal relationship from
incentive variables to labor force departure.
2. The impact of the incentive variables is very similar across the countries despite cul-
tural diﬀerences.
1Social security wealth is deﬁned as the discounted sum of all future retirement income minus the future
contributions to the social security system until retirement. The option value is the utility of the cash ﬂow
that follows from retiring at the highest utility yielding retirement age less the utility of the associated cash
ﬂow from retiring now.
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3. A hypothetical reform that increases eligibility ages (early and normal for all pro-
grams) by three years decreases the fraction of men aged 56-65 out of the labor force
on average by up to 36 percentage points. In the Netherlands it decreases from about
75% to 50% (a decrease of 25 percentage points) while in Germany it decreases from
about 40% to 10%, i.e. by 30 percentage points.
Phase III (Fiscal Implications):
1. The same hypothetical reform leads to a reduction in net ﬁscal burden of 27% on
average. In line with the previous magnitudes, the decrease would amount to 32% of
net ﬁscal burden in the Netherlands and to 36% in Germany.
2. These reductions are heavily dependent on the status quo of the countries’ pension
systems.
At the same time, policymakers in Europe became aware of the ill incentive structure
in social security. We will focus on Germany and the Netherlands as this dissertation
deals mainly with these two countries. In Germany, actuarial adjustments to the normal
retirement age have been set in place as of 1992 and a multi-pillar system introduced in
2001. The Netherlands has historically already relied on a multi-pillar system. However,
its high implicit cost on working at age 60 (141%) demonstrated that something had to be
done about their “early retirement window”. In 2006, the Dutch government abolished the
entire public early retirement program and introduced the “Levensloopregeling” instead, a
private savings scheme.
It is diﬃcult for policy makers to know reforms’ consequences a priori. Therefore care-
fully deducted research as the international social security project help to estimate the
reforms’ consequences. But the world keeps changing. Healthy life expectancy is expected
to increase further and human behavior can diﬀer between today and tomorrow. As a result,
continuous sound research is needed. To evaluate future retirement pay and state budgets,
we need to keep an eye on three questions:
1. How should and how do people save adequately?
2. When should and when do people retire given oﬃcial retirement regulation?
3. How should and how do people dissave adequately in old age?
The normative aspect of the questions (the “should”) is typically addressed in a life-cycle
(LC) framework. In the LC framework, we assume agents to be rational in the sense that
they decide upon their actions such that they maximize their lifetime happiness subject
to, for example, an uncertain wage path and returns on investments. Lifetime happiness is
5
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measured in terms of utility, which can take several shapes. Because of its mathematical
handiness, researchers often use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function:
U(C) =
T∑
t=S
βT−t
C1−γt
1− γ , (1.1)
where S is the current age, T the horizon end, C consumption, β the discount factor,
and γ relative risk aversion. More consumption makes the individual happier. Due to the
relative risk aversion parameter γ the agent dislikes ﬂuctuations in the marginal utility
of consumption, that is in the incremental value of consumption. The discount factor β
describes the agent’s time preference. If he is impatient he prefers consumption today over
tomorrow and if he is patient he may prefer consumption tomorrow over today. We can
augment this simple utility function with a reward for leisure time to capture human’s
preference for leisure or with a reward for wealth upon horizon end. The agent has to
decide subject to a budget constraint
Wt+1 = Rt(Wt + Yt − Ct), (1.2)
where Wt is beginning of period t wealth, Rt the gross return on wealth in period t and Yt
income in period t. Whatever the agent does not consume from his income remains in the
wealth account. Thus, the agent implicitly also decides about the savings rate. The optimal
solution is where the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of savings (the
rate of return) equate. In this simple model, the agent would optimally consume a constant
fraction of current wealth and income. As in case of the utility function, we can augment
the budget equation by, for example, changing Yt to the oﬀered wage and multiplying it
with the time the agent is willing to work.
We can answer Question (1) by using (1.1) and (1.2). To separate Question (1) from
Question (3), we replace utility from consumption during old age by a ﬁnal wealth measure
that summarizes consumption during this time period. We can also include another decision
variable Xt that allows the agent to decide upon the portfolio allocations in his wealth
account. Question (2) can be answered by introducing a decision variable Nt that captures
the amount of work that the agent is willing to supply. Once it remains zero we can call
the agent retired. Additionally, we have to model the social security design in this LC
model. Question (3) can be answered analogously to question (1) by starting with a certain
wealth amount in old age and let the agent decide how much he needs to consume from his
savings every period to maximize his utility. Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Browning
and Crossley (2001) provide an excellent overview of the application of the LC framework.
The empirical questions (the “do”) are usually answered by regression analysis. Given
explanatory variables that are motivated through implications from the LC framework or
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through behavioral regularities, we aim to explain (1) the savings rate, (2) the retirement
age and (3) the dissavings rate. To estimate the retirement age (Question (2)), two concepts,
the social security wealth and the option value of postponing retirement as introduced by
Stock and Wise (1990), have proven to be useful in explaining early retirement.
The prevailing conclusion from comparing (complex) LC framework implications and
empirical analyses is alarming. Numerous ﬁndings in a book collection by Lusardi (2008)
demonstrate that the majority of the people are not only saving too few or in an inadequate
manner, but they also do not even know their pension plan type, let alone their pension
wealth. Reasons for this lie in, amongst others, ﬁnancial illiteracy, the triangle dilemma,2
or simply ignorance or a myopic attitude. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) show that people are
able to save responsibly if they receive help.
I address the ﬁrst two questions in my dissertation. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 deal with
savings. Chapter 3 covers the retirement age. Moreover, Chapter 2 and 3 cover pension
issues in Germany, while Chapter 4 and 5 deal with the Netherlands.
Whether people believe that they save adequately and what inﬂuences this judgement is
investigated in Chapter 2.3 We look at German elderly in eastern and western Germany in
1992, 1995, 1999 and 2003. The dataset “Alterssicherung in Deutschland” (ASID) comprises
multiple income sources at the household level, demographic information and the perception
of (future) retirement income. Policy reforms have reduced the generosity for future retirees.
We ﬁnd that younger generations understand this. There are negative cohort eﬀects, which
demonstrate that the younger generations feel worse prepared for retirement than the older
ones. Despite its importance for younger generations, these individuals only recognize the
beneﬁt of additional income sources to a limited extent over time, once we correct for the
income level. Lastly, there are major diﬀerences in the magnitude of the eﬀect of income
and age on the adequacy of retirement income between eastern and western Germany.
Chapter 34 discusses the consequences of female labor supply changes on individuals’
retirement decision. While men’s labor force participation proﬁles take on an inverted “U-
shape”, women’s historically took on an “M-shape” due to very common and long maternity
leaves (especially in western Germany). However, labor force participation proﬁles of young
female birth cohorts have been becoming more similar to men’s. Related to this change are
emancipation, higher opportunity costs of work due to higher education, fewer children and
higher divorce rates. As a result, women in western Germany are changing their retirement
entry behavior. We undertake an analysis similar to that of the second international social
2This refers to the problem that very often there is an intermediary between the agent and the ultimate
supplier of a product. The intermediary, a ﬁnancial service provider for instance, is supposed to advice the
client but at the same time receives a provision from the product supplier if he sells the product.
3This chapter is based on joint work with Peter C. Schotman.
4This chapter is based on joint work with Tabea Bucher-Koenen.
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security project. In calculating the option value we exogenously take into account future
unemployment and disability risk but diﬀerentiate between the former generous and current
stricter interpretation of disability. Regression analysis based on the administrative records
of the German public pension provider (GRV) shows that cohort eﬀects related to the
average number of children signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the retirement entry decision.
In Chapter 4 and 5, we analyze the saving decisions again (Question (1)) by looking at
individuals’ behavior with respect to the newly introduced life-course savings scheme (Lev-
ensloopregeling) in the Netherlands. This savings scheme was set up after the Dutch gen-
erous pre-retirement scheme, the “VUT”, was abolished. Thereby, the government shifted
responsibility for early retirement from the state to the individual. People use this scheme
in order to ﬁnance maternity leave, to take a sabbatical, or to retire up to three years early.
We focus on the latter in these chapters. The state stimulates this savings scheme by tax
deferral, tax reductions and subsidies. One year after the introduction the participation
rate remained low at 5.5 %.
To characterize people for whom tax deferred investing is a suitable we set up a life-cycle
model that is tailored to the Dutch life-course savings scheme in Chapter 4.5 Interestingly,
the implied participation rate is almost invariant to initial wealth levels. Participation
steadily increases after age 45. Complying with intuition, participation increases with the
degree of impatience. But there is no clear pattern with respect to the preference for leisure.
Our simulations show that people are better oﬀ using the scheme (versus no scheme) by
up to 1.5% of certainty equivalent consumption, which amounts to additional consumption
of e3000 to e10,000 on average over the lifetime. The exact amount depends on the
parameters chosen. In the base line case, it is about e5,600. The government loses at
the same time almost 15% of prior taxes or about e12,000. We conclude that individuals
shift most of their savings from the regular to the tax deferred account and do not create
additional savings. This allows them to increase their leisure and retire early, while the
government is paying for this.
In Chapter 56 we analyze the participation decision of the Dutch life-course savings
scheme empirically, given a dataset of Dutch civil servants. Our analysis reveals that the
use of the scheme (i.e. sabbatical or early retirement) plays an important role for the
participation inﬂuencing factors. Once we eliminate the people who are likely to have a
sabbatical or maternity leave in mind, participation increases in age (and income) as implied
by LC theory. It also proves to be independent of wealth. Conditional on participation, we
look at people’s portfolio choices. In line with LC theory, a participant’s portfolio weight
on bonds increases with age and that on equity decreases with age. However, their portfolio
5This chapter is based on joint work with Frank Lutgens and Peter C. Schotman.
6This chapter is based on joint work with Peter C. Schotman.
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weight on a life-cycle fund, which is constructed as age-invariant, also decreases with age.
Consequently, we see that people still need help in making the adequate savings decisions.
Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Subjective Financial Well-Being at
Retirement in the Light of Pension
Reforms in Germany
2.1 Introduction
Happier people earn higher incomes, are more likely to get married, and have a higher life
expectancy (Diener and Seligman 2004). Subjective Well-Being (SWB) is a relatively new
quality of life measure, which goes beyond economic indicators but yet does not ignore
them. Consequently, SWB measures are a useful tool for policy makers. Not only is it
important to know past or current SWB, but also to learn about the driving factors of it
in order to understand and estimate people’s reactions to future political reforms. In this
paper, we analyze the drivers of people’s sentiment towards their ﬁnancial situation, being
one component of SWB, in old age.
Germany, as most countries, underwent severe political reforms of its pension system to
deal with the retirement approaching baby-boomer generation, generally lower fertility rates
as well as increasing life expectancy. From the reforms in 1972 until 1992, the German state
pension was extremely generous and actuarially unfair. It hardly punished early retirees,
nor rewarded late retirees suﬃciently. Moreover, retirement income was indexed to gross
wages rather than the cost of living as in the US (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke 2004). As
Bo¨rsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001) point out, the German
state pension was so generous that individuals did not have to save for retirement on their
own account, leading, amongst others, to a ﬂat (positive) savings proﬁle over age. This is
referred to as the “German Savings Puzzle”.
In 1992, major pension reforms took place. With regard to retirement incentives, the
11
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regular retirement age was raised for women and disabled and unemployed people as well
as actuarial adjustments with respect to the retirement entry age were introduced. The
implementation, however, only started in 1997 and most noticeably as of 2001. Analyzes by
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) and Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) reveal that these
amendments were not suﬃcient. In 1998, the demographic factor was introduced to adjust
the replacement rate according to a function of life expectancy. But it was revoked only a
year later. Also in 1999, the special state pension arrangement for women was abolished.
The retirement window of the public old age pension (GRV) was thus substantially reduced.
Only long-service life pensioners still have a retirement window. The following Riester
Reform in 2001 became famous for a cut in the public pension replacement rate and its
promotion of funded occupational and private pension schemes in order to arrive at a more
stable multi-pillar pension system.1 Additionally, it has set a boundary on contribution rates
of 20% until 2020 and 22% until 2030. Some institutes come to the conclusion that the real
rate of return to the German Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system may even become negative
for single males. Ottnad and Wahl (2005) ﬁnd the real rate of return steadily decreasing
until birth cohorts 2010.2 For around 85% of the German population contributions to the
GRV are mandatory. Consequently, the majority of the German population is aﬀected by
these reforms.
This paper analyzes how Germans’ subjective ﬁnancial well-being (SFWB) at retire-
ment varies across several characteristics. SFWB of survey respondents is given by their
perception of their ﬁnancial situation in old age.3 We look at SFWB in the sense of retire-
ment income adequacy and especially investigate how it is determined by individuals’ birth
years as the pension reforms since 1992 caused the return of the public pension to be cohort
dependent. In order to analyze individuals’ perception of their retirement income and there-
fore the role of savings as a function of the other characteristics, we argue from a life-cycle
theory perspective. The life-cycle framework is a powerful tool to analyze rational behavior
of individuals. A variety of empirically observed saving motives, such as precautionary sav-
ings and life-cycle savings (i.e. borrow when young, save for retirement when getting older),
1Reforms after the Riester Reform such as the reforms following the proposals of the Ru¨rup Commission
are irrelevant for this paper due to data constraints.
2Wilke (2005) provides real rates of return until birth years 1980 and ﬁnds them to be small but positive.
The predicted returns of the Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2004) lie substantially above the predictions of the above
studies. The main reason lies in diﬀerent calculation approaches. The latter use a deterministic approach
while the former two use a stochastic approach. Other diﬀerences stem from assumptions about the economic
and demographic situation.
3In the survey, individuals were asked how well they thought they were ﬁnancially prepared for old age
(=Was wu¨rden Sie sagen: Wie gut sind Sie im Alter ﬁnanziell gesichert? ). Respondents were asked to check
“very well” (=sehr gut, 0), “good” (=gut, 1), “rather not so good” (=weniger gut, 2), “rather bad” (=eher
schlecht, 3) or “very bad” (=sehr schlecht, 4).
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can even be explained by the most standard life-cycle model of consumption4 (Browning
and Lusardi 1996). To accommodate the empirically observed positive correlation between
(expected) income growth and savings growth, which is at odds with the standard version,
Carroll and Weil (1994) introduce habit formation to the standard life-cycle model. In this
model, utility does not only depend on the consumption level but also on the relationship
between current and future consumption. We base our hypotheses about the determining
factors of SFWB on this life-cycle model.
The hypotheses are tested based on data from the survey “Alterssicherung in Deutsch-
land” (ASID) in 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2003. In each of these years, a representative sample
of approximately 30,000 individuals was interviewed regarding their subjective ﬁnancial
well-being, numerous income sources, and assets. The cross sections do not coincide over
the years, which renders classical panel data analysis impossible. To identify cohort eﬀects,
we construct a synthetic panel as suggested by Deaton (1985). Following this, we use in-
dividual data in a cross-sectional regression to dig deeper into the eﬀect of various income
sources. In both estimations, we employ a probit adopted OLS regression (van Praag and
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004). Our panel approach demonstrates that young birth cohorts per-
ceive their SFWB worse than older birth cohorts. This indicates that they are aware of the
implications and political and demographic risk that is associated with the pension reforms.
Using the cross-sectional regressions, we ﬁnd mixed results concerning the importance of
additional income sources. The subsample that is largely unaﬀected by the reforms because
they are already retired appreciates additional income sources, while the subsample that is
predominantly still working is hardly doing so. Individuals’ characteristics as education, in-
come and wealth are in line with life-cycle theory implications. Diﬀerences in the perception
between eastern and western Germany also become apparent.
The next section explains the hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the cross-sectional
ASID waves, followed by the description of the methodology in Section 2.4. The synthetic
panel results are presented in Section 2.5, and the cross-sectional ones in Section 2.6. A
conclusion will be provided in Section 2.7.
2.2 Hypotheses
Relationships between SFWB and Individual Characteristics
Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with high education have stronger
income growth rates than people with low education (see Fitzenberger, Schnabel and Wun-
derlich (2004) for Germany). According to the life-cycle model with habit formation, this
4That is, we assume intertemporal additive utility, complete markets and rational agent behavior.
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will lead to a higher savings rate. Moreover, better educated people are also more knowl-
edgeable and can make more sophisticated savings decisions. Therefore,
(1) we expect better educated people to evaluate their SFWB at retirement
superior.
Individuals are said to save adequately if they succeed in smoothing their consumption
over the life cycle (Fornero, Lusardi and Monticone 2009). This does not imply that they
always consume the same, but that they try to avoid jumps. Given an uncertain earnings
path, it may happen that an individual is surprised by a large negative income shock
due to unemployment for instance. The individual will reduce consumption and live on
precautionary savings. Thus, the savings rate decreases. High income earners, however,
can adopt to this savings rate decrease more easily than low income earners. Therefore,
(2) we expect individuals with high income to be more positive about their
SFWB at retirement than those with low income.
More wealth also facilitates consumption smoothing. Consequently,
(3) we expect people to perceive their SFWB at retirement better the wealth-
ier they are.
As Banks, Blundell, Disney and Emmerson (2002) note, saving is a forward looking
activity. Accordingly, young people do not perceive their (future) ﬁnancial situation as bad
because they anticipate that they will accumulate savings over the lifetime.5 As a result, we
can assume that there will be no age eﬀect on SFWB if we correct for all other inﬂuences
(such as income). Two related eﬀects are the cohort and the time eﬀect. From the course of
public pension reforms in Germany, we know that the real rate of return to the public pen-
sion system is decreasing (i.e. Ottnad and Wahl 2005, Wilke 2005). The younger cohorts
carry the ﬁnancial burden of current retirees and responsibility for their own retirement
income. Moreover, as a result of the shift towards funded occupational and private pension
plans, the overall retirement income risk has changed for individuals (Bo¨rsch-Supan and
Reil-Held 1998). While former retirees mainly faced (reasonably low) demographic and po-
litical risk through the unfunded PAYG system, younger cohorts, who are investing directly
and indirectly through strengthened occupational and private pension plans in stocks and
bonds, face capital market risk on top of this. Ongoing political discussions in the media
about the sustainability of the state pension demonstrate the increasing political and demo-
graphic risk, especially for the younger generation. Consequently, their perception about
retirement income should be changing. Older cohorts, who are already retired, still beneﬁt
to a large extent from the old rules. Thus, they should indicate higher SFWB at retirement
than the younger ones. Therefore,
5The behavioral ﬁnance literature suggest that people procrastinate saving. Given, this interpretation
people still start later in life and do not feel bad about it in the present.
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(4) we expect to see a negative cohort eﬀect on SFWB at retirement.6
The time eﬀect is ambiguous because it captures various changes.
The 2001 reform requires individuals to save additionally in the second and third pillar
if they want to ﬁll the emerging gap caused by reduction in the ﬁrst pillar pension (see
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2004)). Additional income sources facilitate extra saving and
therefore help to achieve an adequate retirement income level. In a second analysis, we
investigate whether individuals acknowledge the advantage of additional income once we
control for the total level of income. From a life-cycle perspective additional income sources
are recommendable because of diversiﬁcation. However, more dominant may be a behavioral
eﬀect of additional income sources on SFWB. As Thaler and Sunstein (2008) explain, people
keep mental accounts or piggy banks. A woman may have one for shopping grocery, one
for shopping labels and one for retirement. Depending on where the money comes from it
is allocated to one of the piggy banks. Therefore,
(5) we expect the young generation to acknowledge additional income sources
for their evaluation of SFWB at retirement more over time.
The Meaning of SFWB diﬀers between Old and Young People
People in old age already know their retirement income. They only have to judge how well
it makes them oﬀ. For young people, who are still in the labor force, it is more diﬃcult
to assess their SFWB. Their ﬁrst step is to predict their future labor income path and
the resulting retirement income. It is only the second step, the assessment of this income
path, that they have in common with the retirees. The non-retirees therefore answer this
question with more uncertainty compared to the retirees because they do not know their
total income path yet and secondly have more diﬃculties in assessing whether it will be
suﬃcient for their standard of living. Given risk averse individuals, uncertainty can lead
to diﬀerent SFWB evaluations. To control for this aspect we split the sample into two
subsamples at the mean retirement age. The average retirement age in 1995 was 60.5 for
males and 58.4 for females (Banks et al. 2002). We therefore split the sample into an older
than 60 (including those who are 60 years old) and a younger than 60 sample.7 The ASID
waves aim at individuals older than 50. Therefore the proportion of the older subsample is
relatively high around 70%. We refer to these subsamples as the young and the old sample.
Because of risk aversion and uncertainty, we expect the income eﬀect on SFWB to
diﬀer between people in old age and people in the labor force. In contrast to the elderly
6There have been no other legal amendments between 1992 and 2003 that were cohort related and aﬀect
people’s ﬁnances.
7We take age 60 instead of the retirement status as a selection point because it is exogenous to the
dependent variable.
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sample the young sample faces uncertainty in their wages. Risk averse individuals require
some percentage more income to feel equally well about their ﬁnancial situation than an
individual that does not face any risk as the elderly sample. Therefore,
(2a) we expect the slope of the income eﬀect on SFWB at retirement in the
old sample to be steeper than in the younger sample.
Most of the old sample is already retired when the reforms take place. Everyone is aﬀected
by the change in indexation. But only the cohorts born after 1937 are aﬀected to diﬀerent
extents by the changes in eligibility ages, contribution and replacement rates. As a result,
(4a) we expect the cohort eﬀect on SFWB at retirement to be ﬂat in the old
sample and
(4b) we expect the cohort eﬀect on SFWB at retirement to be negative in
the young sample.
2.3 The ASID Data
In order to investigate individuals’ evaluation of their ﬁnancial well-being at retirement, we
make use of the data set “Altersicherung in Deutschland” (ASID) from the Zentralarchiv
fu¨r Empirische Sozialforschung situated in Cologne. The ﬁrst survey was conducted in 1986,
however restricted to the old federal states of Germany. Thus, we discard this ﬁrst wave. It
was followed by another wave in 1992, which then also incorporated the new federal states in
the east. The questionnaire was sent to a random sample of couple and single households,
who were older than 55. In the former case, the questionnaire was to be completed by
husband and wife. In order to achieve a high response rate the respective individuals were
once reminded by a letter and then called by an interviewer. Further, incomplete surveys
were completed over the phone by an interviewer whenever possible. The respondents
were asked numerous questions about their current accommodation, education, job and
ﬁrm characteristics, income sources, socio-demographics, and perceived ﬁnancial well-being.
Data cleaning ensured that an individual’s responses were consistent to establish internal
validity. External validity, concerning the representativeness of the German population, was
established by comparing sample statistics to reference statistics from the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce with regard to gender, age, state, and especially the state pension (GRV for regular
employees and BVG for civil servants). In 1995 another survey was conducted in the same
manner only for residents of the new federal states. Since no major changes in regulation
had taken place for the people in the old states, their responses from 1992 were projected
to 1995 on the basis of a special microsimulation model.
Two survey waves followed in 1999 and 2003, which closely follow the previous two
cross-sectional waves. We exclude people living in institutions (=Heimbewohner) as they
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might not be able to assess their ﬁnancial well-being. Further, we drop those individuals
who did not indicate an evaluation of their ﬁnancial well-being and/or income. Appendix
2.A breaks down the ﬁnal number of observations by cohort, region(east/west) and year.
Descriptive Statistics of SFWB at Retirement
The original ﬁve point Likert Scale of SFWB, 0 to 4, was extended ex-post, 0 to 8, to be
able to rank double checking as some respondents checked, for instance, good and very
good simultaneously. Throughout the paper, we interpret the SFWB in terms of retirement
income adequacy. For the sake of illustration we work with the negative of this scale, such
that the best feeling corresponds to the highest number.
Table 2.1 illustrates how SFWB varies with demographic characteristics. Moreover, it
distinguishes the years before and after the pension reforms kicked in and people older and
younger than the average retirement age of 60 in the respective year. We assume that
the pension reforms have been realized as of 1999. The amendments from 1992 started
to become into eﬀect in 1997 and media exposure was large at that time. The German
government revoked the demographic adjustment factor to pension income, which was only
introduced a year earlier, and increased the VAT to secure sustainable contribution rates.
Moreover, the special treatment of women with regard to the state pension was ﬁnally
eliminated. Therefore, it is safe to assume that from 1999 on, people have incorporated the
reform implications into their expectations of SFWB at retirement or have started to feel
the political and demographic risk at least. The descriptive statistic for the overall SFWB
shows that there is no systematic decrease in SFWB over time. Consequently, people’s
mood with regard to their pensions is not generally decreasing.
If we distinguish by region, we observe higher SFWB scores in western than in eastern
Germany. In eastern Germany, the time trend is positive for the young and the old sample
before and after 1999. In western Germany, it is negative for the young sample over the
entire period, while it is positive for the old sample until 1999 and decreases thereafter.
The discrepancy between the young and the old in western Germany is in line with the
return cutting reforms. It is also interesting to observe that males feel better about their
ﬁnancial situation than females in the old sample, whereas it is the opposite way around in
the young sample. Women, born before 1952 and given a certain number of service years,
still enjoy younger eligibility ages. Distinguishing the years before and as of the realization
of pension reforms, we observe much lower means of SFWB for both genders in the young
sample and only slightly lower means for both genders in the old sample. Again, this is in
line with the nature of the reforms.
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Before Reform Realization As of Reform Realization
1992 1995 1999 2003
Young Old Young Old Young Old Young Old
Overall
-3.261 -3.163 -3.045 -3.323
Region
East -4.248 -3.478 -4.118 -3.226 -3.829 -2.973 -4.314 -3.367
West -3.100 -2.913 -3.100 -2.913 -3.158 -2.868 -3.472 -3.128
By Gender
Male -3.552 -3.097 -3.472 -2.990 -3.439 -2.877 -3.800 -3.186
Female -3.519 -3.140 -3.424 -3.045 -3.342 -2.927 -3.694 -3.230
By Jobtype
Job1 -3.487 -3.215 -3.487 -3.215 -3.892 -3.201 -4.253 -3.583
Job2 -3.145 -2.943 -3.147 -2.943 -3.574 -2.922 -3.979 -3.343
Job3 -2.852 -2.580 -2.846 -2.579 -3.155 -2.641 -3.474 -2.985
Job4 -2.731 -2.310 -2.589 -2.258 -2.836 -2.508 -3.026 -2.660
Job5 -2.345 -2.094 -2.343 -2.092 -2.749 -2.397 -2.895 -2.526
By Income
less 500 -5.333 -6.059 -5.444 -5.941 -4.000 -5.795 -5.716 -5.285
(500,1000) -5.119 -4.691 -5.478 -5.127 -5.544 -4.993 -5.213 -4.409
(1000,1500) -4.688 -3.779 -4.883 -4.258 -5.084 -4.506 -4.518 -3.494
(1500,2000) -4.368 -3.534 -4.433 -3.504 -4.661 -3.609 -3.947 -3.118
(2000,3000) -3.962 -3.239 -4.134 -3.194 -4.057 -3.128 -3.556 -2.725
(3000,4000) -3.630 -2.854 -3.654 -3.061 -3.836 -2.919 -3.209 -2.507
(4000,5000) -3.403 -2.667 -3.523 -2.731 -3.651 -2.711 -2.850 -2.194
more 5000 -3.213 -2.514 -3.286 -2.634 -3.391 -2.509 -2.766 -2.058
By Age
less 55 -3.473 -3.320 -3.333 -3.751
(55,58) -3.539 -3.480 -3.404 -3.778
(58,60) -3.568 -3.475 -3.384 -3.656
(60,62) -3.453 -3.357 -3.255 -3.577
(62,65) -3.253 -3.193 -3.078 -3.454
(65,70) -3.085 -2.955 -2.906 -3.243
(70,75) -2.977 -2.874 -2.727 -3.113
(75,80) -2.948 -2.841 -2.648 -3.010
(80,85) -2.953 -2.880 -2.762 -2.812
more 85 -3.068 -2.927 -2.971 -2.831
By Cohort
less 1917 -2.971 -2.905 -2.888 -2.895
[1917, 1922) -2.966 -2.847 -2.691 -2.696
[1922, 1927) -3.046 -2.869 -2.696 -2.989
[1927, 1932) -3.271 -2.993 -2.789 -3.052
[1932, 1937) -3.557 -3.522 -3.508 -3.304 -2.973 -3.191
[1937, 1942) -3.497 -3.463 -3.384 -3.225 -3.395
[1942, 1947) -3.463 -3.296 -3.371 -3.685 -3.577
[1947, 1952) -3.511 -3.437 -3.359 -3.741
more 1952 -3.455 -3.223 -3.566 -3.888
Table 2.1: Mean SFWB by Demographic Characteristics
This table contains average SFWB scores (-8,0). Along the Columns, we distinguish the survey years and the young
(younger than 60 years) and the old (older than 60 years) sample. Along the rows, we distinguish between several
characteristics. The job types from 1 to 5 refer to respectively blue-collar worker, skilled worker, qualiﬁed employee,
qualiﬁed employee in leading position and executive. Income is deﬁned as monthly income after taxes.
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Education has a profound impact on people’s savings. In our sample, most people
underwent the same education. In the 1999 sample, two thirds of the people had only basic
education (=Volksschulabschluss) as it was common until the middle of the 20th century.
A higher degree of heterogeneity in our sample is found in the type of job, which also
gives us an indication about people’s abilities as the degree of responsibility and intellectual
challenge increases with the job type. Therefore it is not surprising to see average SFWB
increasing from job type 1 (blue-collar worker) to job type 5 (executive). Comparing again
the years before and since reform realizations for the old sample, we can observe a slight
decrease from -3.215 to -3.583 in average SFWB of job type 1 and a slight decrease from
-2.094 to -2.526 in average SFWB of job type 5. The drop is much larger for the young
sample. Here, average SFWB drops from -3.487 to -4.253 for job type 1 and from -2.345 to
-2.895 for job type 5. Again, this shows that the young sample expects to be worse oﬀ in
old age than the old sample.
Similar observations can be made for the level of monthly after tax income. In all
subsamples, there is a monotonic increase in average SFWB over income when income is
larger than e500. Earning higher income thus pays oﬀ in terms of perceived ﬁnancial
security in old age. Furthermore, the means are always greater for the older than for the
younger than 60 sample. There is no clear time trend in these categories.
Typical subjective well-being proﬁles are U-shaped over the life-cycle (Blanchﬂower and
Oswald 2008). In this paper, however, we study subjective financial well-being at re-
tirement in the sense of retirement income adequacy. As argued above, this should not
vary over age. Table 2.1, however, depicts a systematic pattern of SFWB over age. For
the old sample, SFWB increases from age group 60-62 until age group 75-80 or 80-85 in all
years. SFWB decreases again for the (two) oldest age groups. For the young sample, there
is also a clear trend prior to the realizations of pension reforms: SFWB becomes worse with
age. After the reforms have been kicking in, the means are less dispersed and the middle
age group 55-58 always feels worst. This demonstrates that the reforms have an eﬀect on
the relationship between SFWB and age or a function of age.
This function of age could be the birth or the calender year. As argued before, we expect
a negative relationship between the birth years after 1937 and SFWB.8 Table 2.1 illustrates
that, before the reforms were realized in the public, SFWB of the young sample increases
from the earliest cohort born till the (second to) last cohort born. Once the reforms were
realized, the worst SFWB always corresponds to the cohort born after 1950. In case of the
old sample, SFWB simply decreases with birth cohorts, disregarding the oldest cohort in
1995 and 1999. In summary, while the cohort pattern of the old sample remains roughly
constant the cohort pattern of the young sample, which is aﬀected more by the reforms,
8Individuals born before 1937 are unaﬀected by the reforms, except for the change in indexation.
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is altered in favor of the hypothesis that the reforms lead to negative changes in SFWB
for young cohorts. Formally we can test whether the diﬀerences between the aﬀected and
unaﬀected cohorts diﬀers before and after 1999.
H0 : Δprior = Δafter
H1 : Δprior = Δafter
Δprior =
∑
t={1992,1995}
∑
i∈{C<1937} yit∑
t={1992,1995}
∑
i IC<1937
−
∑
t={1992,1995}
∑
i∈{C≥1937} yit∑
t={1992,1995}
∑
i IC≥1937
Δafter =
∑
t={1999,2003}
∑
i∈{C<1937} yit∑
t={1999,2003}
∑
i IC<1937
−
∑
t={1999,2003}
∑
i∈{C≥1937} yit∑
t={1999,2003}
∑
i IC≥1937
where C is the cohort birth year, yit is SFWB of individual i in year t and IC<1937 (IC≥1937)
an indicator for people born prior to (after) 1937. The t-statistic is 13.40. The rejection of
H0 at the 1% level conﬁrms that there has been a change in the young cohort’s perception
of ﬁnancial well-being once the reforms have been realized.
Three important ﬁndings from these observations should be kept in mind. First, the
young sample always feels worse than the old sample. Second, the reforms turn the co-
hort patterns of SFWB around in the young sample, while they remain stable in the old
sample. And third, a diﬀerence in diﬀerence test conﬁrms a switch in younger cohort’s
perception about SFWB at the time that individuals have understood the reforms. These
intermediate conclusions stem from descriptive evidence, which does not control for various
other inﬂuences. In the next section, we control for them and show that cohort eﬀects
are also present when controlling for other determinants such as time, income and other
demographic information.
2.4 Estimation
Given the measurement of SFWB, which will serve as the dependent variable, an ordered
probit or logit model is the appropriate tool for our analysis. We assume that there are
i = 1, ..., N individuals, each of which chooses a response yk out of a ﬁnite number of ordered
response categories k ∈ {1, ...,K}. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) propose a
method to transform the responses yk into a variable that is approximately distributed as a
standard normal variable. Consequently, we can estimate the model by OLS. Implicitly, we
allow for a cardinal meaning of the responses now. We apply the empirical transformation
as, for instance, used by Bo¨rsch-Supan and Ju¨rges (2006) for each survey year separately:
y∗k = Φ
−1
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(yi ≤ yk − 1) + 1
2
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(yi = yk)
)
, (2.1)
where Φ−1 is deﬁned as the inverse of the standard normal distribution and I is the indicator
function. The ﬁrst term in the bracket represents the proportion of individuals, who have
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checked response categories lower than or equal to k. The second term in the bracket
calculates the proportion of individuals, who have checked response category k.
2.4.1 Synthetic Panel Approach
To analyze cohort, income, education and wealth eﬀects (Hypotheses 1 to 4) on SFWB
while controlling for various other inﬂuences, we estimate the following equation:
y∗it = α+ β Cit⊗eastit + γ Tit⊗eastit + δ Incit ⊗eastit + λcontrolsit + eit, (2.2)
where y∗it is a function of SFWB as deﬁned in 2.1; Cit consists of all relevant cohort dummies;
Tit of all times dummies (1995, 1999, 2003) and Incit of the second order polynomial
of income. eastit is a dummy for people living in the east of Germany. The controlsit
consist of household size, number of household earners, gender, a dummy for marriage,
home ownership, a dummy for self-employed people, a dummy for people who indicate to
have health problems and the job type. eit are the residuals.
• For the more than 60 year olds, Cit contains cohort dummies from cohort 1, c1, till
cohort 7, c7, except for cohort 5 (c5).
• For the less than 60 year olds, Cit contains cohort dummies from cohort 6, c6, till
cohort 9, c9, except for cohort 5 (c5).
c2 till c8 are ﬁve year birth cohorts between 1917 and 1952. c1 are all birth cohorts before
1917 and c9 all birth cohort born after 1952. Five year dummies is the result of a tradeoﬀ
between degrees of freedom and precision of cohort eﬀects. The threshold years are selected
such that there is a break in year 1937, which corresponds to the last cohort not aﬀected
by the cohort speciﬁc reforms. The reference group is born between 1932 and 1937 (c5).
We include time dummies for each year. 1992 is the base year. Their impact is ambiguous
because they can capture anything during these periods. We use household income after
taxes as opposed to before taxes to account for the diﬀerent tax treatment of civil servants
and regular employees. Further, we model income as a second order polynomial to account
for the impact of income to decrease at higher income levels. Also, we distinguish between
eastern and western Germany. There still are cultural and price level diﬀerences between
eastern and western Germany due to diﬀering state regimes between World War II and
the reuniﬁcation in 1990. Tigges, Rieger, Jonitz, Brengelmann and Engel (2000) ﬁnd that
people in the east are more risk averse than people in the west. Income inequality is also
shown to be signiﬁcantly lower in the east (Biewen 2000). Therefore, we allow all eﬀects
that we are interested in to diﬀer between eastern and western Germany.
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To correct for wealth, we include a dummy for people who live in their own house.
People can borrow against their house and have therefore access to more money than peo-
ple who do not have a house. Next to income, wealth, birth cohort and time, we include
standard explanatory variables for S(F)WB or the adequacy of retirement income include
socio-demographic variables such as gender, marital status, education and health (Diener
and Biswas-Diener (2002), Seghieri, Desantis and Tanturri (2006), Headey (1993)). Re-
lated, are the corrections for household size and the number of earners, which also aﬀect
SFWB through household income. All of them are included as dummies. By controlling
for these variables and age (through time and cohort) we can isolate the income eﬀect. The
comparative European study of Seghieri et al. (2006) identiﬁes marriage to have a positive
eﬀect on ﬁnancial satisfaction in all countries but Portugal and Greece. Next to diﬀerent
tax treatments of singles and married couples, marriage also indicates a strong social sup-
port system, which leads to better general well-being and may have repercussion on SFWB.
Seghieri et al. (2006) ﬁnd the gender eﬀect to diﬀer between Northern and Southern Euro-
pean countries: Males are more satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial situation in the South while
women are more satisﬁed with it in the North. In line with Headey (1993), they demonstrate
that bad health has a distressing eﬀect on ﬁnancial well-being. Bad health often depresses
individuals, especially when chronic, and can, due to lower productivity, also deprive labor
income. Moreover, sick people also need more medication which can consume a large share
of their earnings. We therefore include a dummy for self-assessed bad health.
As our data consists of several cross sections we use a synthetic panel as proposed by
Deaton (1985). Individuals are sorted into groups according to certain criteria, which are
in our case: cohort membership and east / west residence. This leads to 88 groups or
equivalently 88 new synthetic “individuals”. Our groups exhibit large diﬀerences in the
number of observations per group. Therefore, the new synthetic “individuals” are weighted
by the square root of number of observations in the respective group. As the individual
observations diﬀer from their respective group means (the synthetic “individual” response),
an errors-in-variables estimator is applied to all variables but cohort, east and year. The
variables cohort, east and year are exactly identiﬁed by the deﬁnition of the groups. Ac-
cording to Deaton (1985), the estimator and its covariance matrix can be calculated as
follows:
βˆ = (X ′X − TS)−1(X ′y∗ − Ts) (2.3)
V (βˆ) = Ω̂−1[T−1X ′Xe′e+ T−2X ′ee′X]Ω̂−1 (2.4)
+ v−1Ω̂−1[S(s00 − 2s′β + β′Sβ) + T−2X ′ee′X]Ω̂−1
S = cov(Xitc − X¯tc)
s = cov(Xitc − X¯tc, y∗itc − y¯∗tc)
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s00 = var(y
∗
itc − y¯∗tc)
Ω̂ = X ′X − S,
where βˆ consists of the parameter estimates of α, β, γ, δ and λ from equation (2.2); X are
the explanatory variables as given in (2.2); T is the number of observations in the synthetic
panel (number of groups times number of time series observations), v is the average number
of individuals in each group, and e the residuals from (2.2).
2.4.2 Cross-Sectional Approach
We also use cross-sectional regressions to identify the importance of individuals’ income
sources (Hypothesis 5). For each survey year, we estimate:
y∗i = α+β Ci⊗easti+γ Ti⊗easti+δ Inci⊗easti+κ Inc sourcesi+λcontrolsi+ei, (2.5)
where Inc sourcesi consists of several dummies that indicate whether an individual receives
income from a speciﬁc source. As the level of income is already corrected for, the nature of
the income source eﬀect κ is only psychological. Additional to the controls of 2.2, controls
in 2.5 also include the dummies for the industries that people are or used to be employed in.
Assuming that the norm is to receive labor or state pension income, these income sources
should be insigniﬁcant. The eﬀects of the following income sources are ambiguous:
• work
• regular state pension, GRV (only for old sample)
• state pension for civil servants, BVG (only for old sample)
• KLG, a special pay for women who gave birth before 1921, so called Tru¨mmerfrauen
(only for old sample)9
• early retirement pay (state pension).
As people prefer to receive a certain amount of income without working for it over working
for it, we expect the eﬀect of the income source work to be smaller than that of GRV, BVG,
early retirement and KLG. Additional income or wealth sources should have a positive
eﬀect:
• occupational pension (only for old sample)
9These women did not get the years in which they cared for their children accredited. As a result, the
German state passed a law that entitles these women to monthly payments that range between 27 and 35
DM. (ASID Information)
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• savings and securities
• rent and lease
• home ownership
Income from social security aids should depress SFWB:
• unemployment insurance
• health insurance.
Recall that couples had to ﬁll out two questionnaires to leave them scope for diverging
opinions or diﬀerent demographic characteristics. As they are likely to behave similarly
though, we correct for the correlation between couples’ residuals by employing Feasible
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). Thus, we regress the transformed SFWB on the ex-
planatory and control variables in ﬁrst step, compute the (positive) correlation, ρ, between
partners and assume no correlation across households. The second step is to estimate the
model by FGLS, which then incorporates a twofold weighting matrix:10
Ω =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 ρ 0 0 0 0 0
ρ 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 ρ 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 1 0 0 0
. . .
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
; (2.6)
to be precise an estimate of the former, where ρ is replaced by the estimate ρˆ in Ωˆ. For
every cross section βˆ and V (βˆ) can be retrieved as:
βˆ = (X ′Ωˆ−1X)−1(X ′Ωˆ−1y∗) (2.7)
V (βˆ) =
(
eΩ̂−1e
N −m
)(
X ′Ωˆ−1X
)−1
, (2.8)
where βˆ now consists of the parameter estimates and X of the variables from equation 2.5;
N refers to the number of observations and m to the number of independent variables.
2.5 Cohort and Income Eﬀects in the Synthetic Panel
In order to analyze Hypotheses 1 to 4 we investigate the outcome of regression equation
(2.2) for the old and the young sample in this section.
10We order the observations such that couples are sorted in front of singles.
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The old sample
The complete estimates of regression equation (2.2) can be found in the left half of Table
2.B1 in Appendix 2.B. Figure 2.1 depicts the cohort eﬀects for the older than 60 sample.
Note that we normalize with respect to the cohort born between 1932 and 1937. We plot
the coeﬃcients of the respective cohort dummies against cohorts.
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Figure 2.1: Cohort Eﬀects for the old Sample in eastern and western Germany
This ﬁgure plots the cohort eﬀects of the elderly (older than 60 years) sample. The cohort eﬀects
are the coeﬃcients of the dummies from regression (2.2). The solid blue line corresponds to western
and the dashed red line to eastern Germany.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates that there is hardly any diﬀerence between the cohort eﬀects
in eastern (dotted red) and western (solid blue) Germany for the old sample. Both are
negative for the early cohorts and soon converge to zero. The t-statistics in Table 2.B1
conﬁrm the indistinguishability from zero after the ﬁrst cohort. Thus, their cohort eﬀect is
ﬂat. The non-existing cohort eﬀect is exactly what we hypothesized as these people were
largely unaﬀected by the reforms. When individuals born prior to 1937 retired, there was
hardly any actuarial adjustment to earlier retirement. The time eﬀects in Table 2.B1 show
a negative trend until 1999 and improve thereafter. Moreover, people in eastern Germany
exhibit a signiﬁcantly more accentuated negative trend in 1999 than in western Germany.
In Figure 2.2 we plot the income eﬀect, which results from multiplying the income
coeﬃcients and income. As Table 2.B1 demonstrates, the second order polynomial of income
and its interactions are signiﬁcant at the respectively 1% and 10% level. For both regions
in Germany the income eﬀect is upward sloping. In western Germany (solid blue), the
relationship between SFWB and income is linear, which implies that each eincome increase
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Figure 2.2: Income Eﬀects for the old Sample in eastern and western Germany
This ﬁgure plots the income eﬀect of the elderly (older than 60 years) sample. The income eﬀect is
equal to δ1inc+ δ2inc
2 based on regression (2.2). The solid blue line corresponds to western and the
dashed red line to eastern Germany.
is equally valuable and therefore it is independent of the income level. In eastern Germany
(dashed red), however, the relationship exhibits a logarithmic shape. Here, a eincome
increase leads to greater changes in SFWB at a low income level than at a high income level.
Consequently, there seems to exist an income threshold for the people in eastern Germany,
whereafter they are not so worried about their ﬁnancial situation anymore. For people in
western Germany, income gains are always equally important. Finally, the income eﬀect is
stronger in eastern relative to western Germany. Part of it can be explained by the lower
price level in eastern relative to western Germany. The greater part can be attributed to the
improper correction for wealth. People with lower wealth appreciate income substantially
more than people with higher wealth. Ammermu¨ller, Weber and Westerheide (2005) ﬁnd
that people have less wealth in eastern than in western Germany. Consequently, people in
eastern Germany value income more. This leads to a stronger income eﬀect if we cannot
suﬃciently correct for liquid wealth.
The young sample
The complete estimates of regression equation (2.2) are in the right half of Table 2.B1.
Figure 2.3 depicts the cohort eﬀects for labor force participants, that is people younger
than 60 years. Note that we also normalize here with respect to the cohort born between
1932 and 1937. We plot the coeﬃcients of the respective cohort dummies against cohorts.
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Figure 2.3: Cohort Eﬀects for the young Sample in eastern and western Germany
This ﬁgure plots the cohort eﬀect of the young (younger than 60 years) sample. The cohort eﬀects
are the coeﬃcients of the dummies from regression (2.2). The solid blue line corresponds to western
and the dashed red line to eastern Germany.
Figure 2.3 looks considerably diﬀerent from Figure 2.1. The overall picture indicates
a negative cohort eﬀect that ﬂattens out towards younger cohorts. All cohorts born after
1937 and thus the majority of this sample are aﬀected by the reforms that led to decreasing
real rates of return across cohorts. The deviation from this in the last cohort may be driven
by a small number of observations in the last cohort. The signiﬁcance level of the cohort
dummies increases from 52% to 11%. Again, the cohort eﬀects are more extreme in eastern
(dashed red) than in western (solid blue) Germany. The signiﬁcance level of interaction
terms increases from 36% to 9%. Younger cohorts in eastern Germany, who extremely
suﬀer from high unemployment rates, feel worse oﬀ than the younger cohorts in western
Germany, who do not face unemployment risk to this extent. Note that being unemployment
for longer than a year substantially decreases your future state pension pay.11 As a result,
the situation is much worse for young people in eastern than in western Germany.
As Figure 2.4 demonstrates, the income eﬀect is somewhat weaker for the younger
than for the older sample. In comparison to Figure 2.2, the slope for the young sample is
smaller than the one for the old sample. The young sample still faces a high labor income
uncertainty. As argued above, more risk averse individuals require more income for the
same level of SFWB, which implies a ﬂatter slope as apparent in Figure 2.4. Again, the
11In the ﬁrst year of unemployment, people still receive about 60 - 67% of their former income and get
80% of their former earning points accredited at the German state pension. As of the second year, however,
this decreases to a ﬁxed amount.
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Figure 2.4: Income Eﬀects for the young Sample in eastern and western Germany
This ﬁgure plots the income eﬀect of the young (younger than 60 years) sample. The income eﬀect
is equal to δ1inc + δ2inc
2 based on regression (2.2). The solid blue line corresponds to western and
the dashed red line to eastern Germany.
income eﬀect is stronger in eastern (dashed red) than in western (solid blue)Germany.
2.6 The Inﬂuence of Income Sources over the Cross Section
In order to analyze the eﬀect of additional income sources on the perceived retirement
income adequacy (Hypothesis 5) we investigate the outcome of regression equation (2.5) for
the old and the young sample. We will only discuss the eﬀects of income sources in this
section. People can have multiple income sources. Therefore, the reference group of each
income source dummy is the group that does not receive income from the respective source.
The complete set of regression results can be found in Tables 2.B2 and 2.B3 in Appendix
2.B. Recall, that these are only psychological eﬀects. The income level has already been
accounted for.
The old sample
Table 2.2 summarizes the eﬀects from various income sources and home ownership on SFWB
for the old sample. It is interesting to note that more and more additional income dummies
become signiﬁcant over time. GRV, KLG and BVG and early retirement are positive but
indistinguishable from zero throughout the entire period. As these income sources represent
the status quo, this is not surprising. Civil servants in Germany are regarded as having a
very generous retirement income. The coeﬃcient of BVG is therefore larger than that of
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Variable Coef 1992 Coef 1995 Coef 1999 Coef 2003
GRV 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002
KLG 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.019
occupational pension 0.006 0.006 0.010  0.011 
BVG 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.005
work -0.024  -0.020  -0.034  -0.033 
unemployment insurance -0.006 -0.022  -0.013 -0.043 
early retirement 0.013 0.022
health insurance -0.017 -0.015 -0.018 -0.087 
rent and lease -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002
savings and securities 0.011  0.007  0.014  0.019 
homeowner 0.075  0.083  0.178  0.192 
R¯2 0.209 0.194 0.182 0.216
N 24,818 23,869 21,364 28,423
Table 2.2: Source of Income Eﬀect on SFWB for the old Sample
This table contains the coeﬃcients of the dummies that indicate income sources from the
cross-sectional regression (2.5) based on the old (older than 60 years) sample for each survey
year. See Appendix 2.B for other control variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
indicate the signiﬁcance level.
GRV in every year, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (T-Statistics: 0.43, 0.40, 0.61 and
0.33, respectively). Receiving income from GRV while also enjoying leisure is perceived
as signiﬁcantly better than receiving income from work as expected. As people in the old
sample are older than or equal to 60 years, the work dummy may simply indicate a selection
eﬀect. If someone is still working in old age while the pension system is quite generous for
this subsample, the person may not have accumulated suﬃcient wealth (earning points) in
the state pension. Moreover, he might feel bad about himself due to social comparison.
People in the old sample acknowledge additional income sources as from occupational
pension plans and savings and securities more over time: the magnitude and the signiﬁcance
of both sources increase over time. Owning a house also becomes increasingly important
over time despite relatively stable real estate prices in Germany. According to Bo¨rsch-
Supan et al. (2001), only 40% of all Germans live in their own house. The real estate
fraction of wealth, however, has been estimated to be 75% (Ja¨ntti and Sierminska 2007).
Because we cannot control for liquid wealth, this eﬀect may proxy a wealth eﬀect, indicating
that wealthier individuals feel ﬁnancially better prepared for retirement. Income from rent
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and lease remains insigniﬁcant. Income from social insurances as the health insurance or
unemployment insurance is negative. In the former case it is occasionally signiﬁcant while
in the latter case it only becomes signiﬁcantly negative in 2003.
Although the old sample is aﬀected by the reforms only to a limited extent, these people
come to acknowledge certain additional income sources, such as from occupational pension,
savings and securities and owning their own house.
The young sample
Variable Coef 1992 Coef 1995 Coef 1999 Coef 2003
work -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011
unemployment insurance -0.001 -0.002 -0.010 -0.032 
early retirement 0.005 0.003
health insurance -0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.040
rent and lease 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000
savings and securities 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.016 
homeowner 0.149  0.188  0.253  0.312 
R¯2 0.237 0.215 0.237 0.250
N 12,937 12,174 08,978 07,790
Table 2.3: Source of Income Eﬀect on SFWB for young Sample
This table contains the coeﬃcients of the dummies that indicate income sources from the
cross-sectional regression (2.5) based on the younger (younger than 60 years) sample for
each survey year. See Appendix 2.B for other control variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
and * p<0.1 indicate the signiﬁcance level.
Table 2.3 summarizes the income source eﬀects on SFWB for individuals, who are
younger than 60 years old. Most of them are still in the labor force, which represents
the status quo and therefore explains the insigniﬁcance of income from work. Income from
early retirement also remains insigniﬁcant as for the old sample. The same holds for income
from rent and lease. Income from savings and securities becomes increasingly important
over time, but it is only signiﬁcantly positive in 2003. Thus, also the young sample becomes
aware that additional income sources help to increase their ﬁnancial well-being at retire-
ment. However, the coeﬃcients for their sample are much less signiﬁcant than those for the
old sample. Only owning their own house is signiﬁcantly positive throughout the sample
period; even to a larger extent than for the old sample.
Moreover, income from social insurances as the unemployment insurance and health
insurance is also only signiﬁcant in 2003. Since the young sample is substantially more
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exposed to the reforms, they should realize the importance of additional income sources and
the disadvantage of being unemployed more than the old sample. Our evidence suggests,
though, that they do not. In the previous section, we found that the young sample feels
worse about their ﬁnancial well-being at retirement the later they are born. The limited
appreciation of the income sources supports this conclusion. If they valued additional private
income sources they would be able to ﬁll the pension gap that emerges from decreasing
replacement rates more easily and therefore would not have to feel worse about their SFWB.
2.7 Conclusion
In light of recent pension reforms in Germany, this chapter investigated several possible
determinants of subjective ﬁnancial well-being in the life-cycle framework. Particularly, we
expected young cohorts to feel substantially better than old cohorts, whose GRV beneﬁts
have been cut severely (Hypothesis 4). As a result, it has becomes more important for
younger generations to have additional income sources now and in old age (Hypothesis 5).
Throughout the paper, we interpreted SFWB as people’s perception of their retirement
income adequacy.
Section 2.5 demonstrated that people, who are still working, are aware of the decreasing
real rate of return across birth cohorts. Using a synthetic panel approach, we found negli-
gible cohort eﬀects in the old sample, who are to a large extent unaﬀected by the birth year
speciﬁc reforms because they were already retired, and substantial negative cohort eﬀects
in the young sample. In line with this evidence, Section 2.6 showed that the young sample
hardly appreciate additional income sources until 2003. Also, despite substantial cuts in
public retirement income the recipients of unemployment income have not perceived their
ﬁnancial situation at retirement worse than those who do not in the young sample until
2003. If the young sample instead appreciated their additional income sources, making an
eﬀort to ﬁll their pension gap due to lower replacement rates, younger cohorts would not
have to feel worse about their SFWB at retirement than older cohorts.
Additionally, we found the usual suspects as education, income and wealth to be in line
with life-cycle theory if we allow for habit formation (Hypotheses 1-3) in Section 2.5. People
evaluate their ﬁnancial well-being better the more challenging their job is, approximating
education, because they face higher income growth. Moreover, higher income levels also lead
to improvements in people’s perception about retirement income. This eﬀect is steeper for
the old sample than for the young sample, since the latter still face labor income uncertainty.
As a result, the young sample requires more income to be equally convinced of a good
retirement income as the old sample. Taking house ownership as a proxy for wealth, we
showed that wealth also generates higher SFWB scores. In the cross-sectional regressions,
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we saw this eﬀect to become stronger over the years. Many of these eﬀects, in particular the
cohort and the income eﬀect, are stronger in eastern than in western Germany. This can
have several reasons. Among these are higher risk aversion (Tigges et al. 2000), improper
correction for wealth (Ammermu¨ller et al. 2005) and high unemployment rates in eastern
Germany after the reuniﬁcation.
Concluding, younger people are aware of their relative disadvantage in the public pen-
sion system or have a least become aware of the political and demographic risk that is
attached to the public pension. However, they do not seem to take the appropriate steps
to ﬁll their pension gap. Further research is necessary to analyze why young cohorts are
not trying to improve their ﬁnancial situation at retirement, given that they know their
position. Explanations could lie in procrastination, or insecurity about further reforms re-
forms. Because of the forward looking nature of saving for retirement political stability is an
important “must” for individuals to make, ﬁrst of all, savings decisions and secondly make
adequate savings decisions. The appreciation of additional income sources for retirement
income may therefore only evolve slowly.
32
2.A Appendix A: Number of Observations
Figure 2.A1: Number of Observations by Birth Cohort
This ﬁgure contains the number of observations that the analysis is based on by birth cohort. We
distinguish between the survey years (1992 - solid, 1995 - dotted, 1999 - dashed, 2003 - dash dotted),
the young (younger than 60) sample in western (green), the old (older than 60) sample in western
(blue), the young (younger than 60) sample in eastern (orange), and old (older than 60) sample in
eastern (red) Germany.
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2.B Appendix B: Regression Output
Old Young T-Stat
Coef StE T-Ratio Coef StE T-Ratio young=old
constant -0.020 0.007 -2.940 -0.017 0.031 -0.55 0.094
cohort(less1917) -0.020 0.010 -2.087
cohort[1917,1922) -0.009 0.008 -1.206
cohort[1922,1927) -0.001 0.006 -0.252
cohort[1927,1932) 0.000 0.005 0.064
cohort[1937,1942) 0.001 0.007 0.219 -0.024 0.038 -0.636 -0.647
cohort[1942,1947) -0.004 0.010 -0.404 -0.069 0.054 -1.271 -1.184
cohort[1947,1952) -0.131 0.083 -1.576
cohort(more1952) -0.131 0.086 -1.525
1995 -0.007 0.005 -1.590 0.028 0.028 1.016 1.231
1999 -0.020 0.006 -3.401 0.062 0.048 1.296 1.695
2003 0.001 0.007 0.173 0.111 0.067 1.654 1.633
east*constant -0.021 0.011 -1.959 -0.022 0.044 -0.501 -0.022
east*cohort(less1917) -0.012 0.014 -0.803
east*cohort[1917,1922) -0.008 0.012 -0.620
east*cohort[1922,1927) 0.000 0.008 0.052
east*cohort[1927,1932) 0.000 0.007 -0.042
east*cohort[1937,1942) 0.001 0.010 0.140 -0.048 0.053 -0.906 -0.908
east*cohort[1942,1947) -0.006 0.014 -0.445 -0.121 0.076 -1.587 -1.488
east*cohort[1947,1952) -0.209 0.119 -1.759
east*cohort(more1952) -0.201 0.12 -1.678
east*1995 -0.008 0.009 -0.980 0.057 0.035 1.637 1.799
east*1999 -0.023 0.012 -1.839 0.099 0.067 1.476 1.792
east*2003 -0.005 0.009 -0.581 0.159 0.101 1.574 1.617
female 0.071 0.094 0.756 0.098 0.114 0.857 0.183
married -0.145 0.164 -0.880 -0.04 0.214 -0.188 0.389
homeowner 0.144 0.082 1.768 0.217 0.131 1.663 0.472
healthprob -0.058 0.082 -0.704 -0.054 0.112 -0.481 0.029
selfemployed -0.135 0.174 -0.776 -0.057 0.243 -0.232 0.261
job2 0.106 0.123 0.860 0.102 0.171 0.595 -0.019
job3 0.156 0.139 1.125 0.144 0.192 0.754 -0.051
job4 0.159 0.188 0.850 0.187 0.23 0.813 0.094
job5 0.124 0.202 0.611 0.145 0.252 0.575 0.065
hhsize2 0.043 0.220 0.194 0.124 0.283 0.437 0.226
hhsize3 -0.076 0.288 -0.264 0.064 0.373 0.172 0.297
hhsize4+ -0.093 0.353 -0.263 -0.045 0.399 -0.113 0.090
hhsizeNaN 0.007 0.533 0.013 0.013 0.719 0.018 0.007
hhearn2 -0.053 0.140 -0.381 -0.069 0.15 -0.458 -0.078
hhearn3 0.039 0.271 0.142 0.017 0.313 0.054 -0.053
hhearn4+ 0.061 0.461 0.132 0.018 0.396 0.046 -0.071
hhearnNaN -0.071 0.699 -0.102 -0.2 0.945 -0.211 -0.110
inc 0.026321 0.004 6.675 0.014464 0.004 3.799 -2.096
inc2 -4.44E-05 0.000 -3.702 -1.57E-05 0.000 -2.254 0.171
east*inc 2.82E-02 0.017 1.659 0.01447 0.019 0.75 -0.537
east*inc2 -0.00037 0.001 -1.721 -0.00013 0.000 -0.801 0.370
Table 2.B1: Synthetic Panel Results
This table contains the regression results from (2.2) for the young (younger than 60 years) and the old
(older than 60 years) sample. The job types from 1 to 5 refer to respectively blue-collar workers, skilled
worker, qualiﬁed employee, qualiﬁed employee in leading position and executive.
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1992 1995 1999 2003
Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat
constant’ -0.606 -29.715 -0.662 -35.018 -0.738 -35.351 -0.807 -43.867
female’ 0.018 5.693 0.015 5.507 0.026 7.106 0.032 10.253
married’ -0.271 -14.260 -0.311 -16.412 -0.181 -8.951 -0.268 -15.716
cohort(less1917)’ 0.067 6.093 0.053 6.114 0.119 7.522 0.219 10.290
cohort[1917,1922)’ 0.045 4.519 0.039 5.029 0.092 7.758 0.171 11.858
cohort[1922,1927)’ 0.029 3.242 0.025 4.274 0.075 7.868 0.122 11.151
cohort[1927,1932)’ 0.013 1.637 0.012 2.613 0.051 6.408 0.084 9.051
cohort[1932,1937)’ 0.025 4.031 0.052 6.337
cohort[1937,1942)’ 0.025 3.544
healthprob’ -0.053 -5.408 -0.045 -4.408 -0.024 -2.201 -0.022 -2.327
hhsize 2’ -0.032 -1.351 0.004 0.183 -0.007 -0.255 0.058 2.186
hhsize 3’ -0.153 -4.813 -0.101 -3.149 -0.213 -5.115 -0.181 -5.176
hhsize more4’ -0.111 -2.810 -0.047 -1.163 -0.327 -6.540 -0.186 -4.341
hhsize NaN’ 0.024 0.322 0.127 1.714 -0.126 -2.963 0.056 1.016
hhearners 2’ -0.048 -2.882 -0.076 -4.448 -0.019 -0.780 -0.036 -1.638
hhearners 3’ 0.053 1.671 -0.011 -0.338 0.112 2.607 0.156 4.179
hhearners more4’ 0.012 0.229 -0.035 -0.664 0.330 4.834 0.131 2.100
hhearners NaN’ -0.121 -1.404 -0.183 -2.046 0.084 0.962 -0.137 -1.809
selfemployed’ -0.003 -0.539 0.002 0.374 -0.003 -0.384 -0.002 -0.292
homeowner’ 0.075 7.079 0.083 7.565 0.178 12.941 0.192 16.195
income’ 0.033 61.949 0.031 61.216 0.023 53.013 0.046 68.546
income2’ 0.000 -33.441 0.000 -32.063 0.000 -29.235 0.000 -42.367
income GRV’ 0.002 0.541 0.003 0.713 0.006 1.141 0.002 0.493
income KLG’ 0.004 0.452 0.006 0.694 0.005 0.236 0.019 0.628
income occ’ 0.006 1.230 0.006 1.389 0.010 1.660 0.011 2.164
income BVG’ 0.006 0.826 0.006 0.904 0.012 1.379 0.005 0.708
income work’ -0.024 -3.157 -0.020 -2.865 -0.034 -4.909 -0.033 -4.789
income unemplinsurance’ -0.006 -0.744 -0.022 -2.032 -0.013 -0.744 -0.043 -3.320
income earlyret’ 0.013 0.685 0.022 1.067
income healthinsurance’ -0.017 -1.169 -0.015 -1.250 -0.018 -0.397 -0.087 -1.697
income rentlease’ -0.001 -0.213 -0.003 -0.501 0.001 0.102 0.002 0.234
income savingssec’ 0.011 3.072 0.007 2.100 0.014 3.267 0.019 5.166
job1’ 0.009 1.304 0.010 1.465 0.010 1.241 0.002 0.290
job2’ 0.016 2.308 0.016 2.404 0.020 2.525 0.013 1.681
job3’ 0.016 2.197 0.016 2.302 0.022 2.647 0.018 2.133
job4’ 0.014 1.574 0.014 1.680 0.016 1.608 0.016 1.713
job5’ 0.007 0.663 0.008 0.904 0.013 1.301 0.010 1.085
industries 2’ 0.009 0.911 0.007 0.724 0.015 1.180 0.011 0.829
industries 3’ -0.005 -0.761 -0.007 -1.126 -0.001 -0.156 -0.008 -1.041
industries 4’ -0.009 -1.295 -0.010 -1.576 -0.002 -0.220 -0.009 -1.085
industries 5’ -0.010 -1.553 -0.010 -1.752 -0.005 -0.650 -0.015 -1.906
industries 6’ 0.000 -0.028 -0.006 -0.774 0.000 -0.012 -0.001 -0.058
industries 7’ -0.010 -1.547 -0.007 -1.094 0.006 0.520 -0.001 -0.142
industries 9’ -0.008 -0.711 -0.005 -0.455 0.003 0.227 -0.022 -1.783
industries NaN’ -0.013 -0.773 -0.013 -0.955 -0.024 -0.717 -0.074 -2.292
east*constant’ -0.408 -9.752 -0.535 -12.095 0.007 0.239 0.013 0.783
east*cohort(less1917)’ 0.074 4.268 0.091 5.938 0.115 4.219 0.130 3.530
east*cohort[1917,1922)’ 0.047 2.981 0.062 4.739 0.092 4.685 0.111 4.751
east*cohort[1922,1927)’ 0.033 2.347 0.048 4.599 0.067 4.181 0.087 4.824
east*cohort[1927,1932)’ 0.020 1.577 0.025 3.063 0.042 3.253 0.064 4.201
east*cohort[1932,1947)’ 0.020 1.897 0.040 2.980
east*cohort[1937,1942)’ 0.013 1.177
east*income’ 0.038 12.355 0.037 14.216 -0.160 -6.487 0.003 0.233
east*income2’ -0.001 -14.199 -0.001 -14.601 0.002 1.951 -0.150 -7.310
R¯2 0.209 0.194 0.182 0.216
N 24,818 23,869 21,364 28,423
This table contains the coeﬃcients and T-Ratios from the cross-sectional regression (2.5) based on the
elderly (older than 60 years) sample for each survey year. The job types from 1 to 5 refer to respectively
blue-collar worker, skilled worker, qualiﬁed employee, qualiﬁed employee in leading position and executive.
Industries 1 till 9 denote respectively Agriculture / Forestry (reference group), Mining, (Energy-) Industry,
Building / Trade, Commerce / Services, Public undertakings, Civil service, Civil service without further
details / Associations and Private economy without further details.
Table 2.B2: Cross-Sectional Regressions based on the old Sample
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1992 1995 1999 2003
Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat
’constant’ -0.581 -20.557 -0.656 -22.647 -1.085 -32.039 -0.946 -26.074
’female’ 0.006 1.747 0.005 1.373 0.008 1.955 0.016 2.548
’married’ -0.063 -2.131 -0.035 -1.156 -0.101 -2.952 -0.153 -4.374
’cohort[1937,1942)’ -0.001 -0.193 0.002 0.281
’cohort[1932,1947)’ -0.004 -0.625 0.000 -0.046 -0.006 -1.231
’cohort[1947,1952)’ -0.006 -0.364 -0.005 -0.422 -0.011 -1.407 -0.011 -1.553
’cohort(more1952)’ 0.002 0.106 0.000 -0.006 -0.014 -1.348 -0.026 -2.395
’healthprob’ -0.074 -5.415 -0.083 -5.896 -0.010 -0.617 -0.036 -1.984
’hhsize 2’ 0.136 3.669 0.108 2.885 0.123 2.627 0.121 2.540
’hhsize 3’ 0.091 2.194 0.059 1.397 -0.087 -1.568 0.004 0.070
’hhsize more4’ -0.009 -0.188 -0.041 -0.886 -0.210 -3.524 -0.185 -3.028
’hhsize NaN’ 0.232 1.355 -0.011 -0.076 -0.198 -2.114 0.126 0.887
’hhearners 2’ -0.122 -6.565 -0.113 -6.051 -0.028 -0.887 -0.081 -2.523
’hhearners 3’ -0.053 -1.765 -0.047 -1.525 0.110 2.395 0.033 0.675
’hhearners more4’ -0.104 -2.081 -0.068 -1.322 0.177 2.392 0.029 0.350
’hhearners NaN’ -0.427 -2.056 -0.315 -1.630 0.039 0.245 -0.206 -1.406
’selfemployed’ -0.002 -0.331 0.001 0.182 0.000 -0.030 0.000 -0.009
’homeowner’ 0.149 10.341 0.188 12.573 0.253 13.976 0.312 15.909
’income’ 0.015 35.025 0.014 32.980 0.022 31.099 0.035 32.777
’income2’ 0.000 -18.751 0.000 -16.785 0.000 -16.639 0.000 -19.468
work’ -0.002 -0.471 -0.002 -0.682 -0.006 -1.259 -0.011 -1.485
unemployment insurance’ -0.001 -0.178 -0.002 -0.362 -0.010 -1.504 -0.032 -2.357
early retirement’ 0.005 0.502 0.003 0.250
health insurance’ -0.005 -0.483 -0.006 -0.559 -0.013 -0.936 -0.040 -1.345
rent and lease’ 0.001 0.246 0.000 0.071 0.003 0.358 0.000 0.018
savings and securities’ 0.005 1.441 0.004 0.992 0.007 1.596 0.016 2.091
job1’ -0.003 -0.381 0.000 0.038 -0.001 -0.126 0.000 -0.024
job2’ 0.002 0.245 0.005 0.638 0.004 0.395 0.013 0.655
job3’ 0.002 0.275 0.005 0.651 0.005 0.472 0.018 0.925
job4’ 0.004 0.391 0.008 0.829 0.006 0.460 0.017 0.792
job5’ 0.002 0.233 0.006 0.607 0.004 0.280 0.018 0.795
industries 2’ 0.017 1.462 0.013 0.980 0.013 0.671 0.003 0.107
industries 3’ 0.005 0.740 0.002 0.236 0.009 0.820 -0.004 -0.209
industries 4’ 0.004 0.573 0.001 0.130 0.006 0.533 -0.007 -0.372
industries 5’ 0.004 0.495 0.001 0.091 0.006 0.597 -0.008 -0.409
industries 6’ 0.010 1.113 0.007 0.714 0.009 0.807 0.002 0.105
industries 7’ 0.006 0.865 0.005 0.677 0.009 0.682 -0.005 -0.244
industries 9’ 0.000 0.031 0.001 0.070 -0.002 -0.154 -0.010 -0.340
industries NaN’ -0.001 -0.024 -0.013 -0.609 -0.010 -0.288 -0.025 -0.322
’east*constant’ -0.428 -9.789 -0.517 -11.542 -0.089 -3.510 -0.228 -9.371
’east*cohort[1937,1942)’ -0.005 -0.799 -0.013 -1.411
east*cohort[1942,1947)’ -0.004 -0.283 -0.015 -1.330 -0.001 -0.150
’east*cohort[1947,1952)’ -0.003 -0.123 -0.011 -0.599 -0.001 -0.126 -0.005 -0.444
’east*cohort(more1952)’ -0.016 -0.464 -0.011 -0.372 0.002 0.083 -0.006 -0.382
’east*income’ 0.008 3.195 0.012 6.290 0.000 -4.405 0.012 0.796
’east*income2’ 0.000 -3.463 0.000 -6.269 0.002 0.189 0.012 0.582
R¯2 0.237 0.215 0.237 0.250
N 12,937 12,174 08,978 07,790
This table contains the coeﬃcients and T-Ratios from the cross-sectional regression (2.5) based on the
young (younger than 60 years) sample for each survey year. The job types from 1 to 5 refer to respectively
blue-collar worker, skilled worker, qualiﬁed employee, qualiﬁed employee in leading position and executive.
Industries 1 till 9 denote respectively Agriculture / Forestry (reference group), Mining, (Energy-) Industry,
Building / Trade, Commerce / Services, Public undertakings, Civil service, Civil service without further
details / Associations and Private economy without further details.
Table 2.B3: Cross-Sectional Regressions based on young Sample
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Chapter 3
Financial Incentives, Labor Force
Participation and Retirement
Entry in Germany
3.1 Introduction
Labor force participation has changed substantially in many developed economies in recent
years. The prominent patterns of labor force participation diﬀer fundamentally between men
and women. Predominant trends in Germany are the increasing labor market participation
of western German women, a reduction of labor force participation of eastern German
women, and an overall reduction of men’s labor force participation. The reasons for these
trends are seen mainly in the variation of socio-economic circumstances. In particular the
changes in the division of labor within the family, the lower number of children, higher
educational levels of women and higher divorce rates increase women’s incentives to have
their own source of income. Additionally, changes in social security plan provision change
labor force participation of the elderly (see e.g. Gruber and Wise (1997)).
These shifts in labor force participation do not only have an impact on the current
income of households but also inﬂuence retirement income. Over their working lives women
of younger cohorts in western Germany acquire more pension claims compared to those of
older cohorts and as a consequence their incentives to enter retirement change. The ﬁnancial
consequences of the changing labor force participation over the life cycle for retirement
is reﬂected in the accumulated social security wealth (SSW) and in the option value of
postponing retirement (OV).1 Up to this point, literature has taken birth cohorts only
1Social security wealth is deﬁned as the discounted sum of all future retirement income minus the future
contributions to the social security system until retirement. The option value is the utility of the cash ﬂow
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implicit into account by varying institutional regulations when calculating the SSW and
OV. But no cohort related eﬀects per se were taken into consideration to explain retirement
entry behavior. The objective of this study is to estimate retirement entry behavior of
German individuals and explicitly consider changes in labor force participation decisions
across cohorts. Our paper can be seen as an advancement of the micro-econometric analysis
of the economic incentives to retire by Bo¨rsch-Supan (1992), Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a), Bo¨rsch-
Supan (2001), Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) and Bo¨rsch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz and
Mastrobuoni (2004).
Increasing female labor participation has been proposed as one of the instruments to
ease the burden of demographic change on the labor market and social security systems.
Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a) argues that increasing female labor force participation could at least
temporarily buﬀer the decline in labor force pending in the coming 20 to 30 years. However,
the consequences of increasing female labor force participation at younger ages by oﬀering
child care and similar policy measures for overall female labor force participation are not
clear ex ante. It could on the one hand be that women become more attached to the labor
market and thus keep working at older ages, too. On the other hand, it might well be that
women retire earlier because they have higher pension claims. In our analysis, we analyze
the eﬀects of changes in female labor force participation on retirement behavior.
We ﬁnd that the accumulated SSW and the OV change across cohorts. This is not only
due to institutional changes but also due to a change in employment patterns. Our estima-
tion results suggest that men and women in eastern and western Germany have diﬀerent
leisure preferences. These estimates also turn out to diﬀer between using employment exit
versus retirement entry as the dependent variable. Our regression results point towards a
widening time span between employment exit and retirement entry for younger cohorts of
western Germany. For men this is driven by earlier employment exit of younger cohorts,
for women this is driven by later retirement entry of younger cohorts. In eastern Germany,
we ﬁnd later employment exit and entry and therefore no change in the gap for men, and
later exit and no change in entry and therefore a narrowing gap for young female cohorts.
The remaining of this analysis is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we examine related
literature and give an overview of the main trends in labor force participation in Germany.
It also introduces the most important institutional features of the German public pension
system. Our empirical analysis is based on an administrative panel data set of the German
public retirement insurance (Versichertenkontenstichprobe 2006 ). We describe the data set
brieﬂy in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we introduce our estimation strategy. The results of
our analysis are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
that follows from retiring at the highest utility yielding retirement age less the utility of the associated cash
ﬂow from retiring now.
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3.2 Related Literature and Contribution
3.2.1 Incentives to Retire
The sociological and economic debate about retirement behavior of individuals distinguishes
pull and push factors of retirement entry. The push factors are perceived as factors beyond
the inﬂuence of the individual, like the general labor market situation for example. The
pull factors, however, are closely related to individuals’ preferences. The most prominent
pull factors are ﬁnancial incentives, social factors, and health. In the course of our analysis
we will focus on the pull factors of retirement, speciﬁcally the economic incentives as these
were identiﬁed to play a major role in individuals’ retirement decision.2
Economic incentives relate to personal wealth, public pension wealth (the SSW) and
eligibility to pension schemes. Previous research has shown that individuals react very
sensitively to the ﬁnancial incentives of retirement schemes. Ground breaking analyzes were
conducted, for instance, by Stock and Wise (1990). Gruber and Wise (1998) provide a very
enlightening comparison of retirement behavior around the world. The central insight is that
individuals in all countries react very sensitively to the design of their pension system. They
ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between incentives created by the social security systems
(which pose an implicit tax on the continuation of work) and participation decisions of the
elderly across countries. Similarly, Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a) argues that despite the variation of
the design of early retirement provisions between European countries and over time there is
a surprising consistency in the reaction of individuals to ﬁnancial incentives. Bo¨rsch-Supan,
Brugiavini and Enrica (2008) conﬁrm these ﬁndings on the basis of the Survey of Health
Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) data. The authors ﬁnd that diﬀerences in the
institutional design of pensions systems can explain much of the variation of individuals’
retirement patterns in diﬀerent European countries. There are several studies of retirement
behavior in Germany that document the sensitivity to the institutional design of the pension
system, which we will discuss below.
Social factors that inﬂuence retirement choices include retirement behavior of peer
groups and in case of couples also that of their partners. A variety of studies ﬁnd evidence
that retirement decisions are highly interdependent among couples (see e.g. Mastrogiacomo,
Alessie and Lindeboom (2004) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2004)). Blau and Riphahn
(1999) ﬁnd a high interdependence of employment decisions of elderly couples in Germany.
An individual is much more likely to leave the labor force if the spouse has already left the
2Riphahn (1997) show that the drop in labor force participation of the elderly in the late 1970ies and
early 1980ies was not driven by the high unemployment rate but rather by the incentives to retire early after
the reform in 1972. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a) comes to similar conclusions. In our estimation we will include
GDP growth and the unemployment rate to account for demand driven changes in the labor market.
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labor force and vice versa individuals with a partner in the labor force are much more likely
to reenter the labor force themselves.
Furthermore, physical and psychological health has a direct eﬀect on the ability and
willingness to work (see e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000b) and Siddiqui (1997)). Bo¨rsch-Supan
et al. (2008) ﬁnd that despite institutional variation in European countries, health and the
subjective survival probability play an important role for retirement entry on the individual
level. One of the major challenges of estimating the eﬀect of health on retirement choices
is the endogeneity of health. Individuals who are granted disability status are likely to
report poor health on the one hand because they are truly unhealthy but on the other hand
to legitimate their disability status. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2001) compares diﬀerent estimation
techniques and ﬁnds that ignoring the endogeneity problem leads to an overestimation of
the coeﬃcient of the OV. We follow his approach and use the age-speciﬁc sample probability
to be granted disability status as an instrument.
3.2.2 The German Public Pension System
Germany has a very old (introduced by Chancellor Bismarck in 1889) and – up to now – quite
generous public pension system. Since 1957, it is organized as a Pay-As-You-Go system and
covers about 85% of the German work force.3 As it was designed to extend the standard
of living that individuals maintained during their working life to retirement, about 90% of
current retirees’ income is provided by public pensions (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke 2006). The
pensions are roughly proportional to lifetime income and eligibility depends additionally on
the duration of the contribution period. There are few redistributive properties in the
system. The role of occupational and private pensions, respectively the second and third
pillar, is limited at the moment but growing in importance.4
Retirement age. Prior to 1972 the legal retirement age was 65 and the average age
to enter old-age retirement of western German men was even slightly above this threshold
(see Figure 3.1). The 1972 reform introduced a window of retirement between age 60 and
65 for the ﬁrst time. The normal legal retirement age was still 65. However, women,
the unemployed, and workers who could not be properly employed due to health or labor
market reasons were able to leave the labor force and claim their full pensions from age 60
3For a very detailed description of the institutional features of the German public pension system see
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) and Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998). For an overview of the historical
development of the institutional details of the German public pension system as well as diﬀerent reforms
and reform options see Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000b) and Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2004).
4The transition to a three-pillar-system was introduced in the 2001 pension reform (called “Riester
Reform” after the former minister for labor Walter Riester). The replacement rate in the ﬁrst pillar will be
reduced substantially in future years due to the introduction of a sustainability factor and second and third
pillar pensions are strengthened by oﬀering subsidies and tax reliefs to these plan participants.
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on. Workers with a long service life, i.e. more than 35 years of contributions, were able
enter retirement from age 63 on without deductions. These generous rules led to a dramatic
reduction of the average retirement entry age (see Figure 3.1). The retirement reforms in
1992 and 1999 both aimed at increasing the average retirement age and stop the trend
to retire early that started with the 1972 reform. Eligibility ages for entry into retirement
without deductions are gradually increased for women, the unemployed and disabled people.
The special treatment of women and unemployed people is phased out for individuals born
after 1951. In 2007, an additional reform increased the legal retirement age from 65 to 67.
The transition will take place between 2012 and 2029. Figure 3.2 gives an overview of the
legal retirement ages applicable to certain cohorts.
Figure 3.1: Average Pension Receipt Ages across Time
This ﬁgure plots the average ages of ﬁrst receiving old age and disability pension over calender years.
It is given for men and women living in eastern and western Germany. It is based on data from the
German Public Pension Provider (GRV).
Actuarial Adjustment. In addition to the increase in the eligibility ages in 1992,
adjustment factors for individuals that enter retirement before or after age 65 were intro-
duced. Individuals’ pension income is on the one hand reduced by 3.6% per early retired
year and on the other hand increased by 6% per later retired year. Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schn-
abel (1998) show that these adjustment factors are not actuarially fair. Thus, there is still
a substantial incentive to retire early. They interpret the loss in retirement income when
postponing retirement as an implicit tax and estimate that this tax was above 50% prior to
the 1992 reform and still exceeds 20% after the reform when shifting retirement entry by
one year from 59 to 60.
Disability Pensions. Besides the old age pension, disability pensions can be granted
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Figure 3.2: Eligibility Ages across Cohorts
This ﬁgure plots the institutional retirement eligibility ages for diﬀerent pension types over birth
years.
for health reasons. Prior to the 2001 reform disability pensions used to be allocated very gen-
erously so that people could easily retire early without sacriﬁcing an actuarial fair amount
of retirement income. Moreover, usually individuals were granted full disability status and
for an unlimited period. Another important amendment is the redeﬁnition of disability
in the 2001 reform. Since 2001, people are only temporarily granted disability status and
rules for full disability as opposed to partial disability are interpreted in a stricter manner.
Additionally, disabled individuals face a reduction of their pensions of 3.6% (max 10.8%)
per early retired year before age 63. This reference age increases to 65 until 2024.
Consequences of the Reforms. Consequentially, it has become more diﬃcult to
retire early. Firstly, because the respective “normal” retirement ages have been raised
and will increase even further; Secondly, because of the actuarial adjustment of -3.6% /
+6%; And thirdly, because of stricter disability rules. Most of the studies on retirement
behavior in Germany analyze retirement behavior on the basis of the 1972 legislation and
simulate the eﬀect of the 1992 reform on retirement behavior.5 Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a)
models the eﬀect of the 1992 reform using an option value model a` la Stock and Wise
(1990) and ﬁnds that the introduction of adjustment factors of 3.6% increases the average
retirement age of people in western Germany by about half a year. The hypothetical
introduction of actuarially fair adjustment factors could increase retirement ages by about
5See e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan (1992), Schmidt (1995), Siddiqui (1997), Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a), Bo¨rsch-Supan
(2001), Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004).
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two years. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2001) shows that these results are robust to alternative model
speciﬁcations. Siddiqui (1997) comes to the same conclusions on the basis of a survival
rate model without option value. Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004) estimate the retirement age
to increase by about eight months after the 1992 reform and seventeen months if almost
actuarially fair adjustment factors of 6% were introduced. Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004)
conduct a similar experiment. They estimate that the combined eﬀect of the 1992 and 1999
reforms increases retirement age of western German men from 61.2 to 63 years and for west
German women from 61.7 to 62.4 years. Additionally, they simulate the eﬀects of reform
proposals discussed by the so-called Ru¨rup commission. Appendix 3.B gives an overview
of the econometric models of retirement incentives in Germany. The most recent study on
retirement behavior in Germany is conducted by Hanel (2009). She estimates the eﬀect of
the 1999 reform on actual retirement patterns in Germany on the basis of an administrative
data set (Versichertenkontenstichprobe 2002 ). Her analysis reveals that individuals shift
exit from employment by about 10 months and the claiming of beneﬁts by about 14 months
on average. Thus, the gap between labor force exit and retirement entry widens due to the
1999 legislation.
3.2.3 Hypotheses
Over the last decades labor force participation and employment rates in Germany have
changed substantially. Labor supply decisions not only vary over the life cycle for a given
cohort but also diﬀer across cohorts. The trends are diﬀerent for men and women in east-
ern and western Germany. While men overall decreased their employment (Figure 3.3(a)),
women’s employment rates (ER) over the life cycle increased across cohorts (Figure 3.3(b))
in western Germany. Besides the level shift the age speciﬁc proﬁle of female employment
patterns converges towards the male proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, male ER proﬁles exhibit an in-
verted “U-shape”, while that of women used to be “M-shaped”. The reasons for these shifts
are manyfold. Economists like to argue that the relative price of formal sector employment
has changed relative to household work or homemaking, which in turn changed the intra
household allocation of human resources. In particular, the number of children declined,
educational levels of women increased and divorce rates increased. Also, the legal situation
for divorcees has changed.6 This is reﬂected in a declining gender wage gap such that overall
the diﬀerence in employment rates between men and women decreased.
6See e.g. Ba¨cker, Bispinck, Hofemann and Naegele (2008) and Jansen, Ku¨mmerling and Lehndorﬀ (2009).
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As Figures 3.3(c) and 3.3(d) demonstrate, life-cycle patterns are slightly diﬀerent in
eastern Germany. During the communist regime employment of men and women was close
to 100%. After uniﬁcation the labor market situation for both men and women was diﬃcult
and strongly inﬂuenced by high unemployment and early retirement. However, it seems
that eastern German women were hit more severely by unemployment at uniﬁcation: the
decline in their ER is much sharper than the decline in male ER.
These changes in employment do not only have an impact on the current income of
households in Germany but also inﬂuence retirement income. However, the higher (lower)
labor market participation of women (men) at younger ages has ambiguous eﬀects on SSW
and therefore retirement behavior. For example due to longer contribution periods, rel-
atively higher income due to higher educational degrees and longer experience, western
German women of younger cohorts acquire more pension claims of their own, but also con-
tribute more. When deciding to leave the labor force higher pension claims might, on the
one hand, shift retirement entry to earlier ages. On the other hand, if women of younger
cohorts earn higher wages during their working lives the opportunity cost of leaving the
labor force are also higher and women might decide to work longer. The overall eﬀect is
unclear. At the same time changes in the institutional framework led to a declining social
security wealth for younger cohorts. In our analysis of retirement behavior we try to take
account of these cohort trends by including proxies for the opportunity cost of work. In a
ﬁrst step, we control for the gap in ER between men and women. Later on, we control for
the number of children per cohort and the share of individuals with higher education. By
including these variables we aim at estimating cohort trends besides the purely ﬁnancial
eﬀects already captured by SSW and OV.
3.3 Data
For the estimation of the retirement age we require, amongst others, information on the
retirement incentives that the elderly face and their labor force status. The former heavily
depends on individuals’ earning histories. The German Public Pension provider (GRV),
the Deutsche Rentenversicherung, releases a scientiﬁc use ﬁle (Versichertenkontenstichprobe
2006 ) on an annual basis since 2005.7 It contains socio-demographic information, labor
force participation and full earnings histories in terms of earning points on a monthly basis
from age 14 till age 65. 60,000 individuals were randomly selected out of the entire pool of
individuals that the GRV administers. This pool includes everyone who, at some point in
7We would particularly like to thank Ingmar Hansen, Tanja Mu¨ller and Michael Stegmann from the
Versicherungsdatenzentrum des Deutschen Rentenversicherung Bundes for their helpful, friendly and fast
support.
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his life, made mandatory or voluntary contributions to the GRV. In Germany, a fraction of
around 20% of labor income is automatically redistributed from labor income to the GRV
for every employee.8 The sample contains individuals who are born between 1939 and 1976.
As the sample was constructed in 2006, it covers calender years 1953 until 2006.
Compared to the earlier work by Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004) and Berkel and Bo¨rsch-
Supan (2004), we do not only know the earning points that accrue from employment but we
also know the sum of all retirement relevant earning points. Additional earning points may
come from periods of unemployment, education, or children. We can therefore calculate
retirement income very precisely. Additionally, we overcome the problem of measuring
health based on subjective information in surveys by using administrative information on
days missing from work due to illness. Thus, the endogeneity bias arising from the need to
legitimate disability status by having bad health does not prevail in our context. In fact, the
contemporaneous correlation between receiving disability pension and the number of sick
months within a year is low at around 38% (25% if only yes/no is considered). We do not
have information on households’ assets and other pension income. According to Bo¨rsch-
Supan and Schnabel (1999) less than 10% of the retirement income stems from private
pensions, ﬁrm pensions or assets. We therefore argue that we can abstract from these
sources of income and attribute all incentives for retirement to the social security system.
The administrative data set also lacks information on the household context. We do have
information on the number of children and their age. However, we do not know individuals’
marital status or the income of the spouse. We generate an artiﬁcial marriage variable
by randomly matching a marriage (yes/no) status based on descriptive statistics from the
Federal Statistical Oﬃce, which document that 74.9% of the population are married at age
54 in 2006.
We are interested in estimating the retirement probabilities at certain ages. Therefore,
we condition on being employed or self-employed at age 54. After age 54, people can chose
any state to remain in the sample. Note that we need individuals to take at least one
decision. That is, individuals need to be observed at least until age 55. Consequently,
the reduced sample consists of people born between 1939 and 1951. Additionally, we drop
people who earn less than e1,000 of labor income in any year that they work and people,
who are not marginally employed but earn less than the common marginal employment
income of e400 per month. This results in 9,491 individuals who we observe almost eight
years on average. In total, we have 74,439 data points.
Table 3.1 describes our dataset. At the beginning of our sample period, age 54, about
half of the observations are comprised of females. Our sample consists to 70% of people
in western and to 30% of people in eastern Germany. The condition of still working at
8There are exceptions for special job-groups such as doctors, chartered accountants, and civil servants.
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Mean Std Min Max
Female (%) 49.51 50.00
East (%) 30.19 45.91
Age 58.18 3.16 54.00 65.00
Income/e1000 28.64 13.96 1.04 76.81
Service Years 30.03 7.96 6.00 50.00
Nr Kids (women) 1.73 1.16 0.00 10.00
Married (%) 72.70 44.55
Obs Time (years) 7.84
Table 3.1: Sample Description - Estimation Sample
This table contains the descriptive statistics of our entire sample of the Versichertenkontenstichprobe 2006,
where NT = 74, 439. They are evaluated at the beginning of the sample period, age 54.
age 54 explains the relatively high proportion of people in eastern Germany in our sample
(see Figures 3.3(a) to 3.3(d)). Our mean age is about 58 years. The proportion of married
individuals is given by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce by construction. Women in our sample
give birth to 1.73 children on average, which is quite high compared to recent trends. Mean
annual income before taxes of working individuals in our sample, which we deduce from the
earning points, lies around e28,640 at age 54.
3.4 Estimating Incentives to Enter Retirement
There is a variety of diﬀerent approaches to model the incentives to enter retirement. Winter
(1999) gives an overview of alternative methods. In general, retirement entry is modeled as
a binary dynamic choice problem. Besides simple dynamic probit models9 structural models
of retirement entry were developed. Here one can distinguish between structural models
that take full account of the intertemporal optimization algorithm10 and reduced form
models. Reduced form models or option value models were introduced by Stock and Wise
(1990). These models explicitly take account of the intertemporal optimization problem
without fully solving it: At every age the household trades oﬀ the income streams from
retiring immediately versus retiring at any future point in time. The individual continues
to work as long as the option value of postponing retirement is positive. Most of the
analysis on retirement incentives in Germany mentioned in Section 3.2 follow variants of
this approach. Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) compare the results of a simple probit
9Simple hazard rate models were estimated for example by Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) for the UK
and by Siddiqui (1997) using German SOEP data.
10E.g. by Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust (1987), Berkovec and Stern (1991), Rust and Phelan
(1997).
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model, a full structural model and the option value model. Their results suggest that both,
the full structural model as well as the OV approach, perform equally well and substantially
better than the simple probit. They argue that the OV model has the advantage of less
computational eﬀort compared to a full structural model.
In our analysis, we build on the approach of Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004) and Berkel and
Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004). They estimate the probability to retire at a certain age by ﬁtting
a binary probit to a retirement indicator with help of socio-demographic information and
economic incentives. Central to the economic indicators is SSW and the OV. Both require
an expectation about future income streams. These income streams depend on the pathway
into retirement that an individual chooses. We will ﬁrst discuss the assumptions that are
related to the structure of the pathways and then discuss assumptions that are related to
the income levels.
As the individuals in our data set can be in diﬀerent states, pathways can also consists
of several states. These are working, being unemployed, receiving a disability pension,
receiving an old age pension or doing nothing, where doing nothing means that there is no
spell in our dataset, which implies that the individual is in a state that is not retirement
relevant (for instance, someone who has decided not to participate in the labor force at
all).11 We model three types of pathways. The ﬁrst pathway into retirement goes via
unemployment, the second via disability and the third is the regular pathway. Suppose an
individual, aged S, plans to retire at age R. If R lies below the regular retirement age,
he can theoretically take either of the three pathways. In the ﬁrst case, he would receive
unemployment beneﬁts until the regular retirement age. In the middle case, he would ﬁrst
receive beneﬁts from disability and later receive old age pension beneﬁts, but the transition
does not matter because it is only a formal redeﬁnition of the state and the transition does
not imply a change in pension income. As of 2001, the amount of both beneﬁt types are
adjusted downwards the younger an individual disables (max 10.8%). If an individual takes
the regular retirement pathway, he would receive nothing from age R until the ﬁrst possible
eligibility age. If R is above or equal to the regular retirement age, he can only take the
regular pathway.
To determine the value of retirement in the future (R > S), we assume that the currently
not working individual starts to work again and the currently working individual continues
to work. At age R both types stop working and have the possibility to retire on the above
mentioned pathways. Because the individuals cannot be certain to receive disability status
or become unemployment in order to access the ﬁrst or second pathway, we attach age-
dependent probabilities to the pathways as given in Table 3.2. To determine the value of
11We cannot distinguish part- and full-time work. Neither can we distinguish full and partial disability.
We do distinguish between the unemployment beneﬁts ALG1, ALG2 and the former Arbeitslosenhilfe.
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immediate retirement (R = S), the same probabilities apply independent of the current
status to avoid endogeneity.
Age
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
From W
To U 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
To D 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Table 3.2: Transition Probabilities
U refers to the unemployment pathway. D refers to the disability pathway. W refers to the state of working.
We assume that the individuals form their expectations based on these outlined pathways.
In case a person works in the future he expects to receive the same labor income as he
received the last time that he worked (i.e. zero wage growth, which is a common assumption
after age 50 (Bo¨rsch-Supan 2001) and supported by our data). Contributions to the social
security system, which include the old age pension, unemployment, health and disability
insurance in Germany, and beneﬁts from the social security system are expected to take on
the values as the individual observes them at the current age S.
Dependent Variable
One can deﬁne retirement in terms of leaving the labor force or starting to receive pension
beneﬁts. As explained in Section 3.2, there is often a gap between the two. There is no
consensus on the deﬁnition of retirement in earlier studies. Studies based on GSOEP data
often used self-reported retirement status, i.e. a very wide deﬁnition of retirement to esti-
mate incentive structures. Most individuals consider pension income from pre-retirement
schemes (Vorruhestand) also as retirement income.12 Our administrative record does not
include subjective information. We cannot know whether someone decides to become un-
employed, disabled or to do nothing or whether he was hit by a random event and put in
the position.
Therefore, we will deal with both possibilities. We will ﬁrst use permanently leaving
employment as the dependent variable. If someone does nothing, becomes unemployed or
disabled or claims a regular pension, we say that he has left employment. This corresponds
to the belief that people have chosen their actual states. We will refer to this as “exit”.
Using this deﬁnition we can use all data from birth cohort 1939 to 1951. Thereafter, we
will use old age pension claiming as the dependent variable to accommodate the possibility
that people have not chosen their employment exit. We refer to this dependent variable as
12See Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004) for estimations based on diﬀerent deﬁnitions.
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“entry”. As regular pension beneﬁt claiming is only possible as of age 60, our sample is
reduced to birth cohorts 1939 to 1946.
Explanatory Variables
Social Security Wealth. In line with the literature (Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan 2004,
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. 2004, Stock and Wise 1990), we calculate social security wealth (SSW)
– the net present value of all future social security beneﬁts – as the expected present value of
all future beneﬁts (aY (R)RETt ) minus the contributions levied on gross earnings (ctY
LAB
t )
13.
The SSW of an individual who is S years old and plans to retire at age R is
SSWS(R) =
∞∑
t=R
aY (R)RETt ptδ
t−S −
R−1∑
t=S
ctY
LAB
t ptδ
t−S (3.1)
where
S is the planing age
R is the retirement age
Y LABt is labor income before taxes at age t
aY (R)RETt is retirement income after taxes at age t when retirement age is R
ct is contribution rate to the pension system at age t
pt is survival probability until age t, conditional on survival until age S
δ is discount factor
Option Value of Delayed Retirement. In contrast to SSW, the OV trades oﬀ the
economic consequences of diﬀerent retirement ages. Moreover, it is deﬁned in terms of utility
from income streams. Receiving income without working is worth α more than receiving
income from labor.14 Deﬁne VS(R) as the expected discounted future utility from retiring
at age R, is
VS(R) =
R−1∑
t=S
u(aY LABt )ptδ
t−S + α
∞∑
t=R
u(aY (R)RETt )ptδ
t−S (3.2)
where
aY LABt is labor income after taxes and other charges at age t
α is the relative utility of leisure
u(x) is = x
The discount rate is commonly set to 0.03 in Germany (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. 2004), which
results in a discount rate of 0.97. Similarly, we adopt the utility function from previous
13According to the Alterseinku¨nftegesetz from 2004 the contributions are tax deductable. Since we ignore
this, the SSW is slightly biased downwards
14We assume α to be constant across individuals and time. We diﬀerentiate between men and women and
eastern and western Germany though.
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analyzes. Let VS(R)
∗ be the largest value of the expected discounted future utility over all
retirement ages R
V ∗S = argmax
R
VS(R). (3.3)
The option value is then deﬁned as
OVS = V
∗
S − VS(S). (3.4)
We obtain age dependent survival probabilities from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce for the
years 2005, 2020 and 2050. Survival probabilities are linearly interpolated for the remaining
years. As Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004), we estimate α by employing a grid search over a series
of αs, using regression (3.5) below. We keep the price level at 2005 Euros. Our model thus
consists of real values.
Other Control Variables. Other economic incentives for retirement entry include
private wealth, labor income, the number of service years, and the number of children.
The number of children in the household has been found to have a negative inﬂuence on
retirement, because it implies that parents still have higher ﬁnancial obligations. Socio-
demographic variables include age-speciﬁc dummies and marital status. To correct for time
eﬀects we include GDP growth and unemployment rates for western and respectively eastern
Germany.
We run separate regressions for people living in eastern and western Germany and men
and women. The former is necessary because there are still price level and structural
diﬀerences between eastern and western Germany (Tigges et al. 2000, Biewen 2000). The
latter is common in the literature and necessary for us to identify the diﬀerences in the
determinants.
Iit = α0 + α1D56it + . . .+ α10D65it + α11Yi + α12Y
2
i + α13SYit + α14SY
2
it + α15Kit
+β0OV (α)it + γ0SSWit + κXit + it (3.5)
where Iit indicates whether individual i at age t is retired (1) or not (0), D56it . . . D65it
are the age-speciﬁc dummies, Yi is gross income earned at age 54, SYit the number of
service years, Kit the number of kids, and Xit includes the average number of months that
a person is sick over the sample period as well as the controls for a time trend. Compared
to previous studies, we lack information about spouses and private wealth. We estimate
a simple probit model with robust standard errors. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2001) argues that the
improper speciﬁcation underestimates the true eﬀect of explanatory variables, as multiple
experiments with the error structure in his study show.
Changes in Women’s Employment. In Section 3.2.3, we argued that especially labor
force behavior of women in western Germany has changed across cohorts due to reasons
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that are related to family issues (fewer children, more divorces) and due to economic reasons
(higher education, higher wages). These factors are related to the opportunity cost of work
and determine the employment rate. We use the estimates from Fitzenberger et al. (2004) to
construct a cohort trend. These are, however, only available for western Germany. As Figure
3.D1 in Appendix 3.D demonstrates the diﬀerence between male and female employment
rates, i.e. the ER gap, is steadily decreasing across cohorts. In a ﬁrst step, we will therefore
augment regression (3.5) by including a cohort speciﬁc ER gap between men and women in
order to provide evidence for the importance of cohort related economic factors:
Iit = α0 + α1D56it + . . .+ α10D65it + α11Yi + α12Y
2
i + α13SYit + α14SY
2
it + α15Kit
+α16ERGi + β0OVit + γ0SSWit + κXit + it (3.6)
where ERGi is the cohort-speciﬁc gap between male and female employment rates in western
Germany. In the second step, we decompose the cohort-speciﬁc ER gap into a cohort trend
that is equal to the average number of children per woman in each cohort, which captures
the changes in roles within families, and a cohort trend that is equal to the percentage of
university graduates in each cohort in the respective subsample, which captures the changes
in job skills. As Figure 3.D2 in Appendix 3.D shows, the percentage of west German women
holding a university degree increases most. None of the subsamples faces a decreasing share
of university graduates. Therefore, a high percentage corresponds to young cohorts. Figure
3.D3 in Appendix 3.D depicts the decreasing number of children per woman in eastern and
western Germany across cohorts. It decreases faster in western than in eastern Germany.
Here, a low number corresponds to young cohorts. We run the following regression that
includes the kids and the education trend.
Iit = α0 + α1D56it + . . .+ α10D65it + α11Yi + α12Y
2
i + α13SYit + α14SY
2
it + α15Kit
+α17PEi + α18KTi + β0OVit + γ0SSWit + κXit + it (3.7)
where PEi is the cohort-speciﬁc share of university graduates in the respective subsample,
and KTit is the cohort-speciﬁc average number of children of woman in the respective
subsample.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Actual Employment Exit
We ﬁrst consider the retirement deﬁnition in the sense of permanent employment exit.
Figures 3.4(a) to 3.4(d) plot the percentage of the sample leaving work over age. In western
Germany, many women start exiting at age 55, whereas most men wait until age 60 as
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illustrated in Figure 3.4(a) and 3.4(b). Another diﬀerence between men and women is the
number of pivotal retirement ages. We can detect two for men but only one for women.
According to Figure 3.4(a), most men exit the labor force at age 60 and age 63, while
according to Figure 3.4(b), there is a striking single peak at age 60 for women. For both
groups, we see declining exit rates at age 60 as people are born later. This is especially
obvious for women in western Germany. The peak at age 60 decreases from 33% to 15%. At
the same time, a second peak emerges at age 63. The picture diﬀers very much in eastern
Germany. Especially for men, there is no clear pivotal retirement age. Men (and women)
start retiring immediately. The average exit rate in Figure 3.4(c) is rather ﬂat across all
ages. In Figure 3.4(d), there is a peak at age 60 but less accentuated than in the case of
western German women.
Reasons for the diﬀerence between eastern and western Germany lie in the high un-
employment rates in the former East. They made it possible for older cohorts to receive
unemployment aid or a disability status at relatively young ages, thereby retiring much
earlier than the regular retirement age. Diﬀerences between men and women lie in the
institutional retirement framework. The now abolished female pension made it possible
for women born prior to 1952 to receive an old age pension much earlier (and with lower
adjustment factors) than their male equivalent.
3.5.2 Actual Retirement Entry
Figures 3.5(a) to 3.5(d) plot the fraction of individuals who start to receive an old age
pension over age for diﬀerent birth cohorts. The entry rate is more similar between eastern
and western Germany than the exit rate. It is zero for everyone until age 60 because this is
the ﬁrst age at which it becomes possible for anyone to receive regular pension payments.
Thereafter, the pictures diﬀers greatly between men and women. Almost 60% of all women
in eastern and western Germany, who were born in 1939, retire at age 60. In line with the
increasing regular retirement age for women, this percentage decreases to about 20% (35%)
for women born in 1946 in western (eastern) Germany. This drop is much larger than in
the exit case. Additionally, a second peak at age 63 is emerging. This is the new minimum
eligibility age for women with a long service life. For men, there are again two peaks; one
at age 60 and one at age 63. In contrast to the exit rate, the entry rate is more accentuated
at the second peak and not at the ﬁrst. Age 63 is the minimum eligibility age for men with
a long service life. We can also see the trend of a decreasing ﬁrst and increasing second
peak as people are born later. This indicates that people are responding to recent pension
reforms and that they postpone beneﬁt claiming. They also postpone exiting the labor
force, but by less than entering regular retirement. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Hanel
(2009).
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3.5.3 Estimating Alphas
α indicates the preference for income while not working over income while working. It
may also be inﬂuenced by the beneﬁts from home production. However, it is commonly
interpreted as the preference for leisure. We expect the preference for leisure to be higher
when taking exit than when taking entry as the dependent variable because people retire
earlier in the former case, which implies that they must value leisure more. Similarly, as
women stop working and start claiming old age pension beneﬁts earlier than men they
should have a higher preference for leisure.
(a) Estimated Alpha, Iit = exit
(b) Estimated Alpha, Iit = entry
Figure 3.6: Estimated Alphas
This ﬁgure plots the log likelihood for increasing αs in deviation from the log likelihood of α = 1 for
men (solid) and women (dashed) in eastern (red, triangles) and western (blue, squares) Germany.
The upper panel refers to the case where the dependent variable is employment exit, the lower one
to the case where the dependent variables is retirement entry.
Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) depict the log likelihood for increasing αs in deviation from
the log likelihood of α = 1. The upper graph, which results from the regressions with exit
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as the dependent variables, shows that α for women is not converging yet within the values
in our grid. The largest α in our grid implies that an individual is indiﬀerent between
receiving e100 from work and e20 leisure. Since we doubt that anyone would accept even
less than e20, we set women’s α = 5.0 in case of exit from work as the dependent. Men’s αs
are somewhat lower. West German men are best described by an α = 2.7 and east German
men by an α = 1.4. This implies indiﬀerence between e100 from work and respectively e37
and e71 from leisure.
If we take retirement entry as the dependent variable instead, west and east German
women have an estimated α of respectively 3.8 and 3.9, implying indiﬀerence between
receiving e100 from work and about e25 while enjoying leisure. West German men indicate
a preference for leisure of 4.6. For east German men α = 1.0. Previously estimated αs from
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004) lie between 2.5 and 4.0. They explain that the αs are higher the
fewer information one has about the individuals. We lack private wealth and income of the
spouse, which may play a role for retirement entry decision.
Our estimates suggest that preference for leisure is indeed higher for women than for men
and the preference for leisure is higher in case of exit from work than in case of retirement
entry. West German men appear to be an exception.
3.5.4 Social Security Wealth and the Option Value of Postponing Retire-
ment
Figures 3.7(a) to 3.7(d) depict SSW for men and women in western and eastern Germany.
It plots the SSW associated with immediate retirement over age for diﬀerent birth cohorts,
where the light lines refer to the young and the dark to the old cohorts.
In all ﬁgures, SSW monotonically increases with age until a certain age. In case of men
it peaks around age 63 as shown in Figures 3.7(a) and 3.7(c). This pattern reﬂects the
minimum eligibility ages to the pension for people with a long service life, which allows
people to retire at some discount. Women’s SSW peaks at the normal retirement ages (i.e.
the age at which no actuarial adjustment apply) of the special female pension that applies
to all women born prior to 1952. Their eligibility age increases by one year for each cohort
born between 1940 and 1945. Figure 3.7(b) and 3.7(d) exhibit a peak at age 60 for cohorts
born in 1939 and 1940, a peak at age 62 for cohorts born in 1941, and lastly a peak at
age 63 for cohorts born in 1942. The following peaks we cannot observe anymore, but we
can see SSW of the younger cohorts to still be increasing. It is interesting to observe the
diﬀering slopes before the peaks. SSW of men increases more than that of women. There is
more at stake for men than for women because the former have accumulated more earnings
points.
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Apart from the diﬀerence in the slopes, we can also observe substantially diﬀerent levels
between men and women in western Germany. Despite higher survival probabilities and
more generous pension eligibility ages for women, their SSW remains substantially below
that of men. This is mainly due to their lower labor force participation. However, as
documented in Section 3.2.3, women in younger birth cohorts have been changing their
behavior. They have started to behave more similar to men. In Figure 3.7(b), we can
observe the birth cohorts 1948 to 1950 (yellow, orange and red) to be above the birth
cohorts 1945 to 1947 (blue and purple lines), for instance. As the younger cohorts’ SSW
would rather decrease as a response to the regulatory pension amendments, this must be
driven by more earnings points. We do not observe this for men. This gender diﬀerence is
weaker in eastern Germany, because there is a smaller diﬀerence between male and female
employment rates. Even today, women in eastern Germany return to work after maternity
leave more often and faster compared to their counterparts in western Germany. We can
also observe a generally lower SSW level in eastern than in western Germany, which is in
line with the generally lower income level in the former. Accordingly, the pension level is
adjusted downwards in the former East. If we adjust for the price level diﬀerence between
1995 and 2005 and look at average SSW of all cohorts across age, these shapes and levels
are comparable to the ones in Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004). Note that we also include the
possibility of receiving unemployment beneﬁts in the calculation of SSW and OV.
Figures 3.1(a) to 3.1(d) depict the OV of postponing retirement for men and women
in western and eastern Germany. We plot the OV with alpha from the regressions with
exit as the dependent variable.15 The optimal retirement age corresponds to an OV of 0.
It becomes negative if people are worse oﬀ in terms of utility by working than by retiring
next period. All of the lines are downward sloping as it becomes more attractive to enter
retirement as one gets older. There is a striking diﬀerence between the patterns of men
and women. For all cohorts, women’s OV decreases until age 59. Thereafter, they exhibit
a sharp drop in regular intervals of one year in line with the normal retirement age for
women. If we take 1941 as an example, we see the sharp drop at age 61, which is their
ﬁrst eligibility age without actuarial adjustments. After the normal retirement age of the
respective cohort, the OVs of the cohorts converge at age 65. This makes sense because all
women are subject to the same rules as of age 65. The younger cohorts will therefore not
exhibit this sharp drop anymore but will smoothly decline until age 65. The OVs are more
dispersed across cohorts for women because their high alpha makes the cash ﬂow diﬀerences
more extreme. Again, we observe higher OVs in western Germany for female cohorts born
after 1948 (yellow, orange and red) than for female cohorts born between 1945 and 1947
(blue and purple lines).
15Appendix 3.C contains the OVs with alpha from the regressions with entry as the dependent variable.
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3.5.5 Regression Results, Western Germany
As explained in Section 3.4, we look at the relationship between exit from work and the
individual characteristics and the relationship between entering old age pension and the
individual characteristics. In the former case, we use all cohorts while in the latter we
restrict ourselves to cohorts born prior to 1947. We only use observations as of age 59 in
the latter case because individuals are not able to start claiming old age pension beneﬁts
prior to age 60. In both subsamples, we drop individuals’ observations along the time series
dimension as soon as they leave work, respectively start claiming an old age pension.
Iit = employment exit
Table 3.3 contains the marginal eﬀects and their T-Ratios from regression (3.5) to (3.7) and
taking Iit = employment exit for people living in western Germany; The left panel gives
the results for women and the right panel gives the results for men. The ﬁrst columns serve
as the benchmark against which we compare the results of the cohort trend augmented
regressions. We ﬁrst discuss the women. The pseudo-R2 indicates that the benchmark
equation can explain 39.5% of the variation in the retirement status. Comparable results
from Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004) yield a pseudo-R2 of 25.8%.
The marginal eﬀects of income and the number of service years are signiﬁcantly negative
and therefore indicate labor attachment. The longer women in western Germany have been
working the less likely they are going to stop working. SSW is signiﬁcantly positive. If
considered along the time-series dimension, decreasing SSW should trigger retirement. If
considered along the cross-sectional dimension, individuals with higher SSW can aﬀord to
stop working earlier than those with lower SSW. Here, it seems that the cross-sectional
nature dominates. Since we cannot control properly for private wealth, the OV and SSW
may capture this instead.16 The OV aﬀects exit from work signiﬁcantly negative, as it
should. A high OV indicates a lot of retirement income potential in the future compared
to now. Thus, along the time-series dimension, individuals should retire the smaller the
OV. Note that being or having ever been marginally employed or unemployed both trigger
retirement. The latter’s signiﬁcance is spoiled by endogeneity though. The age dummies
are all positive and, especially those referring to age 60 and 61, highly signiﬁcant. Moreover,
there is a notable jump of the marginal eﬀects between age 59 and 60, which appears to
be the pivotal retirement age for women (cf Figures 3.4(b)). We observe women, who are
sick more often, to retire earlier and women, who have more children, to retire later. The
highest education dummy indicates labor attachment again.
16The results are robust to including a cohort speciﬁc fraction of home ownership and of individuals who
do not possess any private wealth. These variables are constructed on the basis of the SAVE data set.
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Columns 2 and 3, which summarize the cohort-trend augmented regressions (3.6) and
(3.7), show that the augmentation does not improve the regression ﬁt. The T-Ratios also
indicate that there is no systematic pattern in the exiting behavior of western German
women with respect to the cohort trends that are related to the opportunity cost of labor.
The regression results for men (right panel in Table 3.3) are similar to those for women in
western Germany. Notable diﬀerences are 1) a less than 10% (positive) signiﬁcant marginal
eﬀect of SSW, 2) a positive income eﬀect, 3) less signiﬁcant age dummies and 4) no jump
of the marginal eﬀects. The fact that the age dummies are less signiﬁcant and the absence
of a jump suggest that the ﬁnancial incentive variables capture the age-speciﬁc variation
with regard to the exiting behavior better for men than for women in western Germany.
For men, marriage has also a negative eﬀect on the probability to retire.
In contrast to women, the ER gap in regression (3.6) carries a signiﬁcantly negative
sign for men. Thus, the smaller the gap between male and female employment rates (i.e.
the younger cohorts) the more likely men leave work. The decomposition in regression
(3.7) demonstrates that the skill related and the kids trend have an inﬂuence. The skill
trend points towards later retirement of young cohorts. The kids trend, capturing the
growing instability of families, points towards earlier retirement of young cohorts. The
larger magnitude of the kids trend compared to skill trend supports the direction of the ER
gap.
Iit = retirement entry
Table 3.4 contains the equivalent regression results to Table 3.3 if we take retirement entry
as the dependent variable. We can explain about 15% of all entries for women and 33% of
all entries for men. We ﬁrst discuss the results of women again.
The results of the regressions with retirement entry as the dependent variable are some-
what diﬀerent to those with employment exit as the dependent variable. Women are now
more likely to retire the more they earn and the longer they have been working. Conse-
quently, we can conclude that women with longer service lives are less likely to exit from
work but more likely to start claiming old age pension beneﬁts; equivalently for labor in-
come. The option value still carries a signiﬁcantly negative sign. The impact of SSW
on retirement is now indistinguishable from zero.17 The age dummies still capture some
age related incentives. Entering retirement at age 61, 63 and 65 is especially likely. En-
tering retirement at age 62 is very uncommon. As previously observed in the literature,
self-employment leads to later retirement because these people are more attached to their
17In Appendix 3.A, we show regression results for western Germany if we do not cut oﬀ all observations
prior to age 59 and Iit = entry. For women, the eﬀect of SSW is then more negative but still not signiﬁcant
at a 10% level. The signs and signiﬁcance of the economic cohort trend remain unaﬀected.
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work. It is also interesting to observe that the marginal employment dummy is negatively
signiﬁcant. It illustrates that women, who are marginally employed, are less likely to start
claiming pension beneﬁts while they are more likely to leave work (previous regression).
Consequently, marginally employed women have a large gap between stopping to work and
starting to claim old age pension beneﬁts. Women with many kids, on the other hand,
have a relatively smaller gap: The number of kids has signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on old
age pension claiming but a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on stopping to work.
By including the cohort-related economic trends in Columns 2 and 3, we can increase
the pseudo-R2 by l.9%, the largest percentage increased observed in this analysis. The ER
gap in (3.6) has a signiﬁcantly positive marginal eﬀect on entering retirement. Comparing
this to the regression results (3.7), the skill trend has an insigniﬁcantly negative and the
kids trend an insigniﬁcantly (but stronger than the skill trend) positive eﬀect on claiming
old age pension beneﬁts. Consequently, both indicate that younger cohorts retire later.
Thus, we observe that women do not change their employment exit but postpone old age
pension claiming the later they are born. As a result, the time span between employment
exit is wider for younger than for older female cohorts, which is in line with the ﬁndings of
Hanel (2009). Moreover, we can conclude that this pattern is not only related to economic
incentives as captured by the OV and SSW but by other cohort-speciﬁc determinants related
to the opportunity cost of work.
For men, the results for retirement entry are also somewhat diﬀerent from the results for
employment. While income aﬀects stopping to work positively, it does not aﬀect retirement
entry at all. The marginal eﬀect of the number of service years becomes more negative. The
OV is still signiﬁcantly negative while SSW is now signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level.18 At
the same time the age dummies gain in importance in comparison to the previous regression
for men in western Germany. Age 63 and 65 appear to be the pivotal retirement entry ages
for men. These observations indicate that our explanatory variables are better suited to
explain men’s exit than men’s entry behavior.
Including the cohort-dependent ER gap in regression (3.6), yields a positive eﬀect on
retirement. However, it is less than the 10% signiﬁcant. Note that the sign here goes into
the opposite direction than when taking exit as the dependent variable. The decomposition
of the ER gap into the skill and kids trend shows that both are pointing towards earlier
retirement for older cohorts (insigniﬁcantly though) as the ER gap. These results imply that
the time span between leaving work and entering retirement is also widening for younger
male cohorts.
18In Appendix 3.A, we show regression results for western Germany if we do not cut oﬀ all observations
prior to age 59 and Iit = entry. For men, the eﬀect of SSW is then indistinguishable from zero. The signs
and signiﬁcance of the economic cohort trend remain unaﬀected.
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3.5.6 Regression Results, Eastern Germany
Iit = employment exit
Table 3.5 summarizes the results of regression (3.5) and (3.7) for people living in eastern
Germany and Iit = employment exit. We have to skip (3.6) due to a lack of data. The left
panel refers to women; the right to men. The pseudo-R2s are around 43%. We discuss the
women ﬁrst.
Women’s exit in eastern Germany is unaﬀected by their labor income but positively
aﬀected by number of years they have been working. These women do not show signs of
labor attachment. Self-employment aﬀects exit signiﬁcantly positive. This implies that self-
employed women in eastern Germany are more likely to stop working, which is at odds with
the previous observations and evidence in the literature (cf Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004)).19
The marginal eﬀects of OV and SSW are signiﬁcantly negative as they should. The age
dummies are again signiﬁcantly positive and increasing. As for women in western Germany,
we observe a jump between age 59 and 60.
The marginal eﬀects of the skill and the education trend in Column 2 indicate an
increasing likeliness for younger cohorts to retire early due to the skill trend on the one
hand, but a decreasing likeliness for the younger cohorts to retire early due to the kids
trend on the other hand. The magnitude and signiﬁcance of the latter eﬀect is substantially
greater. Therefore the overall eﬀect points to later exits of younger cohorts.
The regression results (3.5) for men diﬀer from the ones for women in eastern Germany
along several dimensions. Firstly, the OV is insigniﬁcant but SSW is signiﬁcantly negative.
Secondly, income has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on exiting employment, indicating that
men evaluate the opportunity cost of work as too high to leave work in eastern Germany
(or, as a results of unemployment wave after the reuniﬁcation poorly skilled men in eastern
Germany (earning few) were laid oﬀ.) Thirdly, the age dummies do not exhibit an extreme
jump.
In the cohort-trend augmented regressions, we observe a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of
the skill trend and a positive and similarly signiﬁcant eﬀect of the kids trend on exiting
employment. Since the magnitude of the latter is larger, eastern German men of younger
cohorts are less likely to leave work than those of older cohorts.
19A new law, the Gesetz zur Fo¨rderung von Kleinunternehmern und zur Verbesserung der Unternehmens-
ﬁnanzierung implemented in 2003, oﬀers ﬁnancial support to unemployed individuals who want to start
their own one-man business. Self-employed women in eastern Germany may, to a large extent, belong to
this group and therefore represent a selection of self-employed individuals.
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Women East Men East
Regr (3.5) Regr (3.7) Regr (3.5) Regr (3.7)
ov -0.014 -2.38 -0.014 -2.72 0.016 0.66 0.015 0.61
ssw -0.028 -2.42 -0.024 -2.32 -0.052 -1.86 -0.053 -1.87
inc -0.064 -0.56 -0.037 -0.35 -0.910 -2.23 -0.948 -2.26
servyears 0.247 3.66 0.227 3.55 0.378 2.09 0.419 2.23
selfempl 28.503 2.05 26.867 1.96 38.292 4.43 37.747 4.40
margempl 0.982 0.28 1.190 0.35 4.103 0.36 4.373 0.36
unempl 54.430 16.81 52.900 15.76 59.193 14.50 59.623 14.66
age56 1.462 2.31 1.252 2.12 6.292 3.28 6.227 3.22
age57 1.597 2.32 1.203 1.95 8.375 3.57 8.080 3.45
age58 3.764 3.57 3.052 3.26 11.945 3.88 10.905 3.67
age59 4.987 3.72 4.161 3.47 17.666 4.35 16.679 4.19
age60 27.020 6.38 24.401 5.98 25.423 4.78 24.068 4.59
age61 36.958 6.73 34.368 6.35 32.566 5.06 31.703 4.95
age62 30.445 4.99 28.644 4.79 30.518 4.34 30.349 4.31
age63 41.515 4.89 39.426 4.63 42.476 4.73 41.960 4.66
age64 42.498 3.71 36.549 3.21 45.011 4.18 45.108 4.16
age65 78.897 6.82 71.604 5.03 90.314 23.66 90.053 23.73
sick 7.502 6.13 7.029 6.02 10.583 5.10 10.728 5.11
married -0.486 -0.88 -0.461 -0.89 -1.930 -1.54 -2.113 -1.65
edu2 2.593 2.14 1.929 1.78 6.407 2.59 6.680 2.63
edu3 3.185 1.62 2.126 1.26 4.502 1.30 4.926 1.34
nrkids 0.246 0.95 0.162 0.69 -2.447 -0.89 -2.421 -0.87
ttrend gdpg 0.449 1.96 0.350 1.64 0.209 0.51 0.362 0.86
ttrend unempl 0.480 1.59 0.702 2.34 2.975 3.88 3.166 3.96
ctrend edu 0.108 1.09 0.782 2.91
ctrend nrkids 12.068 3.60 12.871 2.13
R2 44.2 44.5 42.5 42.7
NT 8,744 8,744 7,549 7,549
Table 3.5: Marginal Eﬀects for East Germany, Iit = exit
This table contains the marginal eﬀects (in %) and their T-Ratios from regression equation (3.5) and (3.7)
for women and men in eastern Germany and Iit = exit. They are evaluated at the subsample means and
computed by the Delta Method.
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Women East Men East
Regr (3.5) Regr (3.7) Regr (3.5) Regr (3.7)
ov -0.432 -14.02 -0.437 -13.49 -0.324 -3.46 -0.310 -3.34
ssw -0.070 -1.57 -0.073 -1.63 0.053 1.18 0.051 1.16
inc 0.517 2.19 0.541 2.26 0.450 1.53 0.431 1.47
servyears -0.213 -0.84 -0.234 -0.92 -1.090 -3.78 -1.081 -3.75
selfempl 19.779 1.22 19.305 1.19 -10.645 -2.66 -11.374 -3.53
margempl 1.970 0.18 2.839 0.25
unempl 13.606 7.52 13.539 7.43 28.563 14.04 28.761 14.15
age61 19.261 7.55 19.014 7.34 7.754 3.82 8.330 4.07
age62 1.623 0.51 0.963 0.29 -1.630 -0.78 -1.277 -0.61
age63 7.734 1.54 6.367 1.22 34.764 5.75 34.983 5.79
age64 15.665 1.85 15.034 1.78 22.653 2.94 22.336 2.91
age65 46.223 3.21 45.953 3.18 84.737 19.86 84.007 17.65
sick 8.455 4.00 8.517 4.01 -1.322 -1.00 -1.520 -1.14
married 2.541 1.35 -3.880 -1.96 -1.950 -1.14 -9.956 -6.15
edu2 7.322 2.73 7.350 2.72 0.700 0.36 0.537 0.27
edu3 16.917 3.15 16.889 3.14 2.807 0.86 2.518 0.79
nrkids -0.719 -0.86 -0.720 -0.85 13.311 2.75 13.362 2.79
ttrend gdpg -1.436 -2.04 -1.206 -1.51 -0.040 -0.07 -0.428 -0.71
ttrend unempl -2.601 -2.25 -2.190 -1.70 -2.061 -2.10 -0.985 -0.91
ctrend edu -0.305 -0.74 0.585 1.09
ctrend nrkids -8.401 -0.66 37.545 2.97
R2 19.2 19.2 30.2 30.6
NT 3,143 3,143 3,041 3,041
Table 3.6: Marginal Eﬀects for Eastern Germany, Iit = entry
This table contains the marginal eﬀects (in %) and their T-Ratios from regression equation (3.5) and (3.7)
for women and men in eastern Germany and Iit = entry. They are evaluated at the subsample means and
computed by the Delta Method. The two east German men that are or have ever been marginally employed
retire immediately. Therefore we exclude this variable and their observations from the regression.
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Iit = retirement entry
Table 3.6 contains the equivalent results to Table 3.5 if we take Iit = retirement entry.
As in the exit case, eastern German women are more likely enter retirement the lower the
OV and SSW. The marginal eﬀect of income on retirement is positive and, contrary to
before, signiﬁcant. The number of service years has turned insigniﬁcant though. Also, self-
employment has lost signiﬁcance. Interesting to observe is the lower signiﬁcance of the age
dummies compared to the exit case. Together with negative signiﬁcance of the ﬁnancial
incentives, it shows that the ﬁnancial incentives are able to capture most of the age-related
eﬀects on retirement. Only age 61 and 65 remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Including the cohort-related economic trends increases the explanatory power only by
0.7% but the trends are not signiﬁcant. The skill trend points towards later retirement of
younger cohorts while the kids trend points towards earlier retirement of younger cohorts.
The overall eﬀect is inconclusive.
The regression results for men in eastern Germany with entry as dependent variable are
diﬀerent from the ones with exit as dependent variable along several dimensions. Sign and
signiﬁcance of the OV and SSW switch again such that the OV is now signiﬁcantly positive
and SSW indistinguishable from zero. Income is positive but hardly signiﬁcant. Conﬂicting
with the regression results with exit as the dependent variable, the impact of the number of
service years is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating labor attachment, while it was signiﬁcantly
positive before. The signiﬁcance of the age dummies hardly changes compared to the results
with exit as the dependent variable.
Including the skill and kids trend increases the explanatory power by 1.3% as Column
2 for men shows. Again, it is the kids trend that is making the diﬀerence. It is signiﬁcantly
positive, thus, implying the younger cohorts are more likely to retire later.
3.6 Conclusion
Women’s labor force participation has changed across cohorts. As a result of higher ed-
ucation, higher divorce rates and fewer children, women particularly in western Germany
have become more active in the labor force. Their employment life-cycle pattern converges
to that of men. As they work more, they also acquire more earning points. Jointly with
increasing self responsibility, this should aﬀect retirement entry behavior.
To investigate retirement behavior, we use the option value framework. Our results
show that the choice of the dependent variable is important. When taking employment exit
we get a substantially higher preference for leisure than when taking retirement entry. We
also see that there is a diﬀerence in this preference between men and women and people in
eastern and western of Germany. The drops in SSW and the OV in Figures 3.4(a) to 3.5(d)
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for women illustrate that there are cohort eﬀects related to the institutional design. But
these ﬁgures also show that there are cohort eﬀects that are not related to the institutional
design, since SSW, for instance, is larger for cohorts 1948 to 1950 than for cohorts 1945 to
1947 despite their relative disadvantage caused by the institutional regulation.
Our benchmark regression results demonstrate that the choice of the dependent vari-
able is also important for the direction and signiﬁcance of variables such as the ﬁnancial
incentive variables, income, and the cohort trend that is to capture the opportunity cost of
work. Among the economic variables, the OV and income are the only ones that remain
(signiﬁcantly) negative, respectively positive. We include cohort trends that are related to
the opportunity cost of work, proxied by the number of children and by the proportion of
university graduates. The opportunity cost of work aﬀects the employment rate and, as
hypothesized, employment exit / retirement entry behavior.
In the beginning, we argued that the increasing labor force participation of women can
aﬀect retirement positively or negatively. It depends on whether women feel that there
is more at stake or whether they feel that they can aﬀord to retire early. As we observe
the gap between labor force exit and retirement entry to widen for women (and men) in
western Germany (in line with the observations made by Hanel (2009), individuals appear
to be able to aﬀord a longer time without public pension income. Furthermore, note that
the skill trend has always a negative eﬀect on retirement, indicating that the increasing
investment in human capital leads to postponing retirement. The picture is diﬀerent in
eastern Germany. Here, the gap between labor force exit and retirement entry narrows for
women due to postponement of labor force exit and is largely unaﬀected for men due to
simultaneous postponement of exit and entry. Consequently, people in eastern Germany do
not appear to be able to aﬀord early retirement anymore or to want to use their human
capital somewhat longer.
Thus, overall we do not ﬁnd strong evidence that increasing female labor force partici-
pation when young also leads t overall higher labor force participation of women. Younger
western German women tend to leave the labor force earlier while younger eastern German
women tend to postpone labor force exit. However, their behavior is still inﬂuenced strongly
from market transition during the 1990s. It will be interesting to extend our analysis of
retirement behavior to future cohort in order to see how recent changes in labor and child
policies will inﬂuence labor market participation later in life.
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3.A Appendix A: Robustness: West Germany, Iit = entry
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3.D Appendix D: Cohort Trends
Figure 3.D1: Employment Rate Gap
This ﬁgure plots the percentage of employed men less the percentage of employed women in western
Germany across cohorts as implied by the regression results of Table 4 in Fitzenberger et al. (2004).
Figure 3.D2: Percentage University Graduates
This ﬁgure plots the percentage of university graduates across cohorts by region and gender. It is
based on the Mikrozensus.
Figure 3.D3: Average Number of Children
This ﬁgure plots the average number of children of women across cohorts by region. It is based on
our data, the Versichertenkontenstichprobe 2006.
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Chapter 4
Tax-deferred Saving for Early
Retirement: Analysis of the Dutch
Life-Course Savings Scheme
4.1 Introduction
The increasing dependency ratio of pension beneﬁciaries to pension contributors has made
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) state pensions untenable (e.g. Gruber and Wise 1997, Gruber and
Wise 2002, Gruber and Wise 2005, Bonoli 2003) and lead to the abolishment of generous
state early retirement schemes and a general shift to occupational and private pensions.
This requires participants to save for their own pension during their working life. The
shift in responsibility is accompanied by ﬁscal stimuli. The most evident are tax-deferred
saving arrangements such as the individual retirement accounts and 401(k) plans in the
US (Attanasio, Banks and Wakeﬁeld 2004), the Riester Rente in Germany (Bo¨rsch-Supan
and Wilke 2005) and the life-course savings scheme in the Netherlands (Bovenberg and
Wilthagen 2008).
The Dutch scheme combines tax-deferred saving with early retirement which allows par-
ticipants to reduce the eﬀective tax rate beyond that of regular tax deferment while also
enjoying leisure. This is because withdrawals can be spread over the early retirement years.
For this system, we study the eﬀect of tax-deferred saving and early retirement on optimal
life-cycle planning, lifetime utility and ﬁscal costs in an uncertain environment. This life-
course savings scheme was introduced in 2006 after the former generous early retirement
scheme (Vervroegde UitTreding) was abolished. Thereby, the government discourages early
retirement compared to before 2006, which reduces state responsibility and expenses. But
at the same time, the government also introduced a possibility to retire early that individu-
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als themselves are responsible for. The new life-course savings scheme (Levensloopregeling)
enables individuals to transfer leisure within their life course. If they work hard and ac-
cumulate 210% of their income in the tax-deferred savings account (TDA), they can retire
comfortably three years earlier by receiving 70% of their previous income each early retired
year. From here on we refer to the life-course savings scheme account as the TDA.
Contributions to the TDA are made from pre-tax income and the savings accumulate
tax free. Taxes are only paid upon withdrawal of the funds. Because consumers discount
future payments, tax deferment has a positive eﬀect on lifetime utility. Withdrawals from
the TDA are restricted to speciﬁc purposes, e.g. retirement or extended unpaid leave.1
This makes the savings illiquid and unsuitable as a buﬀer for periods of low income or
disappointing investment returns. Participants cannot borrow against their TDA.
Next to tax deferment, the TDA may also facilitate an eﬀective tax rate decrease. Given
a progressive income tax system, a participant may contribute to the TDA exactly when the
marginal income tax rate is high, as when working, and withdraw from the TDA when the
marginal income tax rate is low, as when retired. Early retirement extends the opportunity
window for this tax advantage as the participant may withdraw the savings over a period
of several years. Thereby, he reduces each withdrawal balance and thus the corresponding
marginal tax rate. Tax credits and subsidies oﬀer further opportunities for tax advantages
in combination with the TDA.
Despite these ﬁnancial advantages, the participation rate in the life-course savings
scheme three years after its introduction is still only about 6% (Maas 2009). The low
participation is seen as puzzling, since the tax beneﬁts should be substantial and clear. The
scheme has also been widely discussed in the media. Thus, public awareness should exist.
This paper’s purpose is to gain an understanding of this participation puzzle through a
life-cycle model.
The analytical part of our paper demonstrates that the TDA increases the marginal
propensity to save. As a result, individuals are willing to save for more. The optimal TDA
savings are adjusted to the income tax brackets. Horan (2005) points out that participants
should save in a TDA account only if the marginal tax rate is lower at (early) retirement.
Otherwise, upfront taxation, as in the regular wealth account, may be preferable. We ﬁnd
that this is horizon dependent as the regular wealth account in the Netherlands faces a
cost of carrying in the form of a wealth tax. If retirement is far ahead, the TDA may still
be preferred despite a negative diﬀerence between marginal income taxes today and in the
1The German and US arrangement are intended to support regular state pension payments only. The
Dutch life-cycle arrangement also serves to smooth income over working and non-working periods and allows
participants to use the funds for unpaid extended leave up to three years. Most participants use it to retire
early (NIBUD 2007). Other schemes adopt a beneﬁt formula with beneﬁts decreasing with early retirement.
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future due to the long horizon of wealth tax payments.
Indeed, our simulations show that all participants gain by using the TDA. In all pa-
rameter constellations and for diﬀerent initial wealth levels, we ﬁnd that using a TDA is
optimal. Compared to the situation without TDAs, the government foregoes up to e29,000
over the lifetime. In terms of certainty equivalent consumption the individual gains up to
1.5% of annual consumption (up to e10,000 over the lifetime) by the TDA’s introduction.
The certainty equivalent consumption percentage increases with consumers’ patience for
almost all given other parameters. There is no systematic pattern with regard to leisure
preferences or initial wealth levels. The tax eﬀects go into the same direction. Investigating
US ﬁscal stimuli to trigger individuals to save privately, Attanasio et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
the ﬁscal costs outweigh the gain in utility. The large diﬀerence between the consumer’s
certain consumption gain of e10,000 and the government’s loss of e29,000 are in line with
Attanasio et al. (2004).
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) ﬁnd that people only start saving for retirement if they
build up a suﬃcient liquidity buﬀer to protect consumption from income shocks. This buﬀer
amounts to 12%− 15% of gross income. In our model, individuals start at age 40 with the
average liquid wealth balance of a 40 year old Dutch and postpone saving until the late
40s in the baseline case. We ﬁnd that the only parameter to get them to save earlier is
more patience. Neither leisure preferences nor initial wealth play a major role for the age
at which the individual ﬁrst saves for early retirement.
The introduction of the TDA may lead to a substitution eﬀect, shifting savings from
the regular wealth account to the TDA, and an income eﬀect, increasing total savings.
Tax incentives increase the eﬀective interest rate. This increases the marginal utility of
saving, which again increases savings and reduces optimal consumption and leisure. We
observe a small income eﬀect if there is uncertainty. Overall, however, the substitution
eﬀect dominates as in analysis of Attanasio et al. (2004).
Reasons for the low participation rate despite the apparent advantages may lie in the
problem that individuals are humans and not econs (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Individuals
postpone complicated decisions. These inertia represent a substantial hurdle for participa-
tion. US 401(k) experiments have demonstrated that they may be overcome by setting
the default to participation or save-more-tomorrow programs. Providing a well diversi-
ﬁed default asset allocation has also proven to reduce mistakes according to acknowledged
life-cycle theory. Lastly, education programs have provided mixed evidence. If education
programs oﬀer follow-up meetings or another form of continuation, individuals tend to
participate more and make smarter and more frequent decisions in retirement programs
(Lusardi 2008).
The following section introduces the life-cycle model and the speciﬁc parameters that
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make up the potential participant. We discuss the participant’s optimal strategy and its
ﬁscal implications of several versions of the model, with and without TDA and early re-
tirement, given certainty in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the equivalent results in the
more realistic setting of uncertainty in wages and returns. We consider the optimal solution
for diﬀerent individuals and diﬀerent situations in Section 4.4. We conclude in Section 4.5
by summarizing which participants proﬁt most from the TDA and early retirement and in
what cases the ﬁscal costs for the government are most severe.
4.2 A Life-Cycle Model with a Tax-deferred Account and
endogenous Labor Supply
Model
We model an individual’s annual decision on consumption C, labor supply N , and contri-
butions to a tax-deferred account Q from current age s = 40 until the regular retirement
age T = 65. The preferences over consumption and leisure are modeled by a time separable
Cobb-Douglas function,
U(C,N,WT ) = E
[
T−1∑
t=s
βt−T
(Ct(1−Nt)θ)1−γ
1− γ + φ
(W ∗T )
1−γ
1− γ
]
, (4.1)
where the boldface symbols C and N denote the entire vectors of consumption (C =
C40, . . . , C64) and labor supply (N = N40, . . . , N64). The utility function has constant
relative risk aversion γ, implying an intertemporal rate of substitution equal to 1/γ. The
discount factor β represents the time preference of the individual. Real consumption and
leisure (1−N) are imperfect substitutes. The relative preference for leisure is modeled by
θ and may be time varying. We follow the speciﬁcation of Gomes, Kotlifkoﬀ and Viceira
(2008) and restrict labor supply to at most twothird’s of a total time budget of one hundred
hours per week: 0 ≤ Nt ≤ 2/3.
As Gourinchas and Parker (2002), we only model behavior up to retirement age T .
Thereafter, we assume that the individual derives utility from several sources of income,
which are summarized by ﬁnal wealth W ∗T and will be deﬁned below. The parameter φ
provides the weight of ﬁnal wealth in the lifetime utility.
Participants can save in a regular wealth account and a TDA. Contributions to the
regular wealth account are paid from after-tax income, whereas contributions to the TDA
are made from pre-tax income. Thus, taxes must be paid when withdrawing money from
the TDA. Wealth in the regular account is liquid, whereas wealth in the TDA cannot
be used until (early) retirement. In the Dutch tax system the TDA oﬀers a further tax
advantage since, in contrast to the regular account, wealth in the TDA is not subject to a
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wealth tax. We assume that participants cannot borrow against future labor income and
the TDA, meaning that both accounts are required to have a non-negative balance. The
regular wealth account Wt and the TDA Lt receive the same real return before tax equal
to Rt. The two accounts evolve as:
Wt+1 = Rt+1 (Wt +NtYt −Qt − Tt − Ct) , (4.2)
Lt+1 = Rt+1 (Lt +Qt) , (4.3)
where Yt is the wage rate, Qt are TDA contributions, and Tt are total taxes.
Some restrictions apply to the contributions to the Dutch TDA. First, contributions
are limited to 12% of gross labor income per year and may not cause the TDA balance to
exceed 210% of current annual income,
Qt ≤ min ( 0.12NtYt , Lt−1 − 2.1NtYt ) . (4.4)
The latter condition is based on the idea that the savings scheme is intended to ﬁnance a
maximum of three years of early retirement at an approximate replacement rate of 70% of
annual income per year.2 Second, withdrawals from the TDA (Qt < 0) are restricted to
years that a participant is outside the labor force (Nt = 0), so that at all times we have the
constraint
NtQt ≥ 0. (4.5)
Qualiﬁed withdrawals include sabbaticals, maternity leave, long-term care or early retire-
ment (though not unemployment). In the model we assume that withdrawals from the TDA
are restricted to early retirement. This assumption reduces the optimization complexity,
but is in line with the intended use of most scheme’s participants. If anything is left in the
TDA upon the 65th birthday, the remainder is taxed as income and added to ﬁnal wealth.
Total taxes Tt are the sum of income tax and wealth tax,
Tt = T Y (Zt) + T W (Wt−1), (4.6)
where Zt = NtYt − Qt − Dt is taxable labor income. Income tax is progressive, and age
dependent tax credits Dt apply. The progressive form comes from stepwise increases in the
marginal rate so that the income tax is piecewise linear in pre-tax income. Appendix 4.A
provides details of the tax parameters. The wealth tax is a function of last period’s liquid
wealth Wt−1. It is also progressive, as the ﬁrst e46,300 are tax-exempt. The remainder is
taxed at a ﬂat rate of τw = 1.2%. The Dutch wealth tax is not related to realized gains or
losses.
2If the account later on exceeds the 210% bound due to high returns, funds in the TDA do not have to
be withdrawn, and in fact cannot even be withdrawn for that reason. Rules for withdrawals are independent
of the balance in the account.
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Final wealth W ∗T is the sum of liquid wealth WT , the present value of state and occu-
pational pensions BT and the after-tax TDA balance LT − T Y (LT ).
W ∗T = WT +BT + LT − T Y (LT ). (4.7)
Values for φ and BT are derived in Appendix 4.B.
The individual faces two types of uncertainty in this model: ﬁnancial returns Rt and
wages Yt. We assume that the regular wealth account and the TDA oﬀer the same real
return Rt, which we assume to be lognormally distributed with constant mean and variance.
We need Rt to be independent over time in order to limit the number of state variables
in the model. Since the individual can only invest in one asset class, the same in both
accounts, there is no asset allocation decision. For this reason we do not introduce separate
parameters for risk aversion and intertemporal substitution like Epstein-Zin preferences.
When working, the individual earns an exogenously given wage Yt. The wage process
lnYt follows a three factor model. Following Gomes et al. (2008), we consider an age related
component f(t), a permanent income component xt and a transitory income component t,
lnYt+1 = f(t) + xt + t
xt+1 = xt + ut+1
f(t) = α0 + α1(t− 20) + α2(t− 20)2 (4.8)
The permanent ut and transitory shocks t are assumed to be uncorrelated. The permanent
shock may be correlated to return innovations. The age component diﬀers across individuals
according to job and education level. Timing of income shocks is such that the consumer
bases his decision at time t on his known wage Yt. Future returns and wages remain
uncertain, however.
Solution
The individual needs to solve for the optimal consumption, leisure and TDA contributions
over the life cycle given the tax rules, the budget equations (4.2) and (4.3), and the inequality
constraints on Q (4.4) and N (4.5). Due to the nonlinearity of the tax scheme, the problem
is not homogenous in wealth and permanent income. This means that we have three state
variables: S = (W,L, x). At time T no decisions are made and the value function just
depends on the state variables ST = (WT , LT , xT ):
VT (ST ) = φ
(W ∗T )
1−γ
1− γ . (4.9)
We can express the Bellmann equation for all other time periods t = s, . . . , T − 1 as
Vt(St) = max
Ct,Nt,Qt
{
(Ct(1−Nt)θ)1−γ
1− γ + βEt[Vt+1(St+1)]
}
. (4.10)
84
To derive ﬁrst order conditions, we deﬁne the objective function
Jt(Ct, Nt, Qt) =
(Ct(1−Nt)θ)1−γ
1− γ + βEt[Vt+1(St+1)]. (4.11)
The objective function (4.11) is not diﬀerentiable with respect to (1 − Nt) and Qt at the
kinks of the tax schedule. Despite this problem, we can derive a partially analytical solution.
The objective function is everywhere diﬀerentiable with respect to consumption, meaning
that we can use the ﬁrst order condition(
∂Jt
∂Ct
= 0
)
→ (Ct(1−Nt)
θ)1−γ
Ct
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1(St+1)
∂Wt+1
Rt+1
]
. (4.12)
For the derivative of Jt with respect to leisure, we have to exclude the points at which
taxable income (Zt) is at one of the kinks Ij in the marginal tax rate,
Zt = NtYt −Qt −Dt = Ij (j = 1, 2, 3). (4.13)
At all other points the derivative is equal to
∂Jt
∂(1−Nt) =
θ(Ct(1−Nt)θ)1−γ
(1−Nt) − βEt
[
∂Vt+1(St+1)
∂Wt+1
Rt+1
]
(1− τY (Zt))Yt
= (Ct(1−Nt)θ)1−γ
(
θ
(1−Nt) −
(1− τY (Zt))Yt
Ct
)
. (4.14)
The second equality results from plugging (4.12) into the ﬁrst equality. Since (Ct(1 −
Nt)
θ)1−γ is always positive, the sign of ∂Jt∂(1−Nt) is the same as the sign of
(
θ
(1−Nt) −
(1−τY (Zt))Yt
Ct
)
.
We can rewrite Zt in terms of leisure (1−Nt) instead of labor Nt
Zt = NtYt −Qt −Dt = −Yt(1−Nt) + Yt −Qt −Dt
to see that Zt is decreasing in leisure. Thus, (4.14) is downward sloping in (1−Nt), but not
deﬁned at the kinks Zt = Ij . When leisure hits a tax kink the consumer faces a downward
jump in the marginal tax rate
τY (Zt) =
{
τj if Zt ≥ Ij
τj−1 if Zt < Ij−1
. (4.15)
Since τj > τj−1 jumps are always downward, and ∂Jt∂(1−Nt) is monotonically decreasing in
(1 − Nt) at a given consumption level Ct and wage Yt. Figure 4.1 depicts the derivative
∂J
∂(1−Nt) at a given Ct as a function of (1 − Nt) for two values of Qt + Dt and a ﬁxed Yt.
In the ﬁrst case Qt + Dt = 0 and therefore no tax deductions apply (solid blue line). In
the second case Qt +Dt > 0 and thus tax deductions apply (dashed red line). An internal
optimum exists if there is a (1−Nt) at which the derivative is equal to zero. In this case,
the ﬁrst order conditions have an internal optimum for (1−Nt) and Ct. In Figure 4.1, this
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Figure 4.1: ∂J∂(1−N) as a function of 1-N
This ﬁgure plots the derivative of J with respect to leisure (1-N) (4.14) as a function of leisure. The
oﬀered wage for 100hrs is ﬁxed at 100. Consumption is set to 25. Moreover, θ = 2 and γ = 1.5.
In the ﬁrst case, no tax deduction apply: Qt + Dt = 0 (solid blue line). In the second case, tax
deductions apply: Qt +Dt = 8 (dashed red line).
is the case for Qt +Dt > 0. If the function never crosses the horizontal axis as in case of
Qt +Dt = 0, the optimal value for (1 − Nt) is at the point between the two marginal tax
rates that are closest to the x-axis (0.83 here).
The monotonicity of ∂J∂(1−Nt) implies that there is a unique value of (1−Nt) that max-
imizes J(Ct, Nt, Qt) for a given Qt. We can trace out the entire relation between Ct and
(1 − Nt) by varying wealth Wt. Minimum leisure is (1 − Nt) = 1/3, in which case the
consumer faces the highest possible tax bracket. At an interior optimum the relationship
between Ct and (1−Nt) is
(1− τY (Zt))Yt(1−Nt) = θCt. (4.16)
At an interior optimum taxable income is between the income tax thresholds.
Ij−1 < Zt < Ij
Ij−1 < NtYt −Qt −Dt < Ij
Ij−1+Qt+Dt
Yt
< Nt <
Ij+Qt+Dt
Yt
A corner solution occurs if income or tax deductions are such that
Nt =
Ij +Qt +Dt
Yt
(4.17)
If income increases beyond a certain level the optimal value Nt hits a kink in the tax schedule
and induces the consumer to work less.
Figure 4.2 depicts the relationship between Ct and (1 −Nt) for two values of Qt +Dt.
It shows that Ct adjusts at the points where Nt hits a kink. Once the maximum of leisure
is achieved, the consumer can only improve his utility by consuming more.
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Figure 4.2: Leisure and Consumption at Optimum
This ﬁgure illustrates the relation between Ct and (1−Nt), which follows from the ﬁrst of conditions
(4.12) and (4.14) and is given by (4.16). The oﬀered wage for 100hrs is ﬁxed at 100. Moreover,
θ = 2 and γ = 1.5. In the ﬁrst case, no tax deduction apply: Qt +Dt = 0 (solid blue line). In the
second case, tax deductions apply: Qt +Dt = 8 (dashed red line).
The relation between Ct and Nt holds for any given Qt. If Qt = 0, the relationship
between leisure and consumption is represented by the solid blue line in Figure 4.2. If
Qt > 0, i.e. if the individual contributes to the TDA, the individual can earn more without
moving into the next tax bracket because TDA contributions reduce taxable income. Con-
sequently, the consumption leisure relationship shifts down to the red line in Figure 4.2.
The lines coincide in case of maximum leisure, because the marginal tax rate is zero here.
Contributions to the TDA have an intertemporal eﬀect through the diﬀerences in tax rates
that apply to the liquid account and the TDA. The optimal Qt therefore requires numerical
optimization.
During potential early retirement, Nt = 0 and Qt is negative. Dependent on time and
leisure preferences and the realized stochastic processes, the individual allocates the with-
drawals from the TDA over a maximum of three years. This allocation Qt is taxed as
income. When making the decision to contribute to the TDA, the individual thus has to
compare the marginal tax rates upon contribution and the marginal tax rate upon with-
drawal. Without loss of generality, let Rt = R and consider an additional unit of gross
income at time t.3 If saved in the wealth account, it will be taxed against the marginal
tax rate τY . Hence, the marginal eﬀect of an additional unit of gross income at time t is
(1− τY ). At time T − s− t, the individual can withdraw (1− τY )RT−s−t for s = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Alternatively, if the extra unit is saved in the TDA, it is taxed at time T − s − t at the
marginal tax rate τL. The marginal ﬁnal wealth eﬀect of an extra unit of gross income is
then (1− τL)RT−s−t. Hence a consumer is better oﬀ saving for retirement using the TDA
3We can assume that Rt is ﬁxed because the liquid account and the TDA earn the same rate of return
before taxes.
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at time t if
RT−s−t(1− τL) > (1− τY )RT−s−t for s = {0, 1, 2, 3}
or simply τL < τY . In case the regular wealth account exceeds the threshold of e46,300, a
wealth tax rate of 1.2% applies. In this case, a consumer is better oﬀ if
RT−s−t(1− τL) > (1− τY )((1− τW )R)T−s−t for s = {0, 1, 2, 3}
or t < T +
ln(1− τY )− ln(1− τL)
ln(1− τW ) . (4.18)
Higher wealth taxes and low τL relative to τY make the TDA attractive and reduce the age
at which investment in the TDA is the more attractive option. Table 4.1 illustrates this
point. The ratio of income taxes τL relative to τY is important to understand the TDA
Tax Wealth Income Tax Preferred location
τW = 0 τY ≤ τL W  L
τW = 0 τY ≥ τL W  L
τW > 0 τY ≤ τL W  L for t ≤ t∗
τW > 0 τY ≥ τL W  L
τW = 1.2% (τY , τL) = (42%, 52%) t
∗ = 49
Table 4.1: TDA versus regular wealth account
This table summarizes the optimal location for savings in Column 3 depending on the marginal
wealth tax rate, given in Column 1, and the relationship between the marginal income tax rate
when contributing τY and when withdrawing τL, given in Column 2, according to (4.18). s = 0.
contribution until the age of 61. In the absence of progressive tax rates, i.e. if τL and
τY are equal, the individual would be indiﬀerent unless the wealth tax applies. In case of
progressive tax rates, the attractiveness of savings in the TDA depends on the marginal tax
rates. If τL < τY , TDA savings are most attractive. However, if τL > τY , TDA contributions
may be preferred until age 49 only (see Table 4.1) as the exemption from wealth tax needs
to be balanced against the higher marginal tax rate when withdrawing from the TDA .
Because of the non-diﬀerentiability problem we cannot derive an analytical intertemporal
relationship. To solve the model we use numerical optimization. We construct a decision
grid of C and Q and a state grid of W , L, and X. In each state, we go through the
decision grid and calculate N according to (4.16) for each decision grid point C and Q. If
the calculated N is not internally consistent, a corner solution applies. Once we ﬁnd the
decision grid point that leads to the highest utility (sum of instantaneous utility associated
with this decision and average future utilities associated with the resulting future states)
we construct a reﬁned grid around this solution and start all over again.4
4Details about the numerical optimization procedures are provided in Appendix 4.C.
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In summary, we consider the Dutch system as a system of progressive income taxes.
This implies that taxable income, that is labor income that is not saved in the TDA plus
withdrawals from the TDA, is taxed at increasing marginal tax rates. An individual who
does the math may hence engage in tax planning by shifting taxable income from periods
with high income and high marginal tax rates to periods with low income and low marginal
tax rates.
Benchmark Model Parameters
In line with the ﬁndings of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) we use a discount factor β = 0.96
and a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ = 1.5. In this case, consumption proﬁles are
hump-shaped if income is uncertain as also observed empirically. Following Gomes et al.
(2008), we set the leisure preference parameter to the value that leads to an average working
week of about 38 hours in the absence of a TDA. In our model, this is θ = 1.5. By varying
θ between 1.25 and 2.00, we obtain 41.5 to 31.5 hour working weeks. Moreover, leisure
preferences vary over age. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) show that leisure becomes on
average 8% more valuable every life year. Moreover, the results from NIBUD (2007) indicate
that people want to retire early and therefore must have a preference for leisure in old age.
We distinguish between two life phases to account for increasing leisure preferences. The
ﬁrst one lasts from age 40 till including age 61, where we set θ = 1.5. The second phase is
the potential early retirement phase with twice the leisure preference, θ = 3.0, which leads
to 8.5 hours per week in the absence of a TDA. The parameter φ = 22.19 weighs the value
of an annuity after retirement with a 90% chance to survive each year.5
The remaining parameters are representative for the Dutch life-course savings scheme.
The wage process is calibrated to the empirical wage process in the Netherlands (Kalmijn
and Alessie 2008), in particular to match the wage peak at age 52. This yields α0 =
4.2, α1 = 0.033 and α2 = −0.0005 in (4.8). The base pension is set equal to 65% of the
previous net permanent income. The return process is based on a Dutch bond fund over the
last 30 years (Dimson, Marsh and Staunton 2002) with a mean log real return of 1.1% and
a standard deviations of 9.4%. The permanent and non-permanent income shocks u and
 are normally and i.i.d. with standard deviations 17.7% and 17.9% respectively (Meghir
and Pistaferri 2004). The contemporaneous correlation between the permanent income
shock and the return process is 17%. Findings by Alessie and Kapteyn (1999) suggest that
individuals hold approximately e12,000 (1996) of ﬁnancial wealth at age 40. Assuming 2%
inﬂation, this yields about e15,000 in 2008. In the stochastic benchmark life-cycle model
we use these e15,000 as initial wealth. Consumers with diﬀerent income, risk aversion,
5Appendix 4.B provides further details for the utility of terminal wealth.
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leisure preferences and initial wealth will be considered in Section 4.4.
To demonstrate that the baseline parameters yield standard solutions, Figure 4.3 depicts
the optimal paths with uncertain income and returns (but without a TDA) that correspond
to 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of lifetime utility as well as the average proﬁles. Apart
from the progressive income taxes, it is the classical life-cycle model, which has been widely
studied in literature, (e.g. Campbell and Viceira 2001, Browning and Crossley 2001), and
conﬁrms the plausibility of the parameter values. Figure 4.3(a) captures optimal consump-
tion and labor supply choices. The fat blue line depicts the hump-shaped proﬁle of mean
consumption. It starts decreasing after the (deterministic) age dependent income com-
ponent peaks. Average consumption in the ﬁrst (second) life phase is around e28,800
(e25,800). The fat green line illustrates average labor supply. It increases steadily until
age 61. The average working week is 37.5 hours. After this, leisure preferences double
and labor supply decreases in line with the consumption drop to 5.6 hours per week . The
percentile decisions are not smooth because of the unforeseeable shocks that the individual
has to cope with. N is smoother than C because the ﬁrst order conditions imply that only
C adjusts at corner solutions. The resulting wealth account balance is captured in Figure
4.3(b). The individual starts to accumulate wealth for retirement in the late 40s, which
is somewhat later than what Gourinchas and Parker (2002) ﬁnd.6 The average individual
consumes part of his liquid wealth during the potential early retirement years because of
his lower labor income. He enters regular retirement with around e15,000.
4.3 Optimal Life-Cycle Savings in the Absence of Uncer-
tainty
We ﬁrst consider optimization under certainty in order to demonstrate the mechanism of the
tax incentives. We assume that the gross returns are ﬁxed at 1.1% and that real wages only
follow f(t) in (4.8). In this deterministic model we set initial wealth to e0 as individuals will
not hold precautionary savings. Based on the deterministic example we study the eﬀects
of the introduction of a TDA, subject to progressive income taxation, in isolation. In the
next section, we show what happens to the mechanism if income and returns are uncertain.
6They ﬁt their model to the US population, who receive less public pension in old age. Therefore their
agents need to save more, which can lead to an earlier starting age.
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(a) Decisions
(b) Accounts
Figure 4.3: Standard Life-Cycle Model with Uncertainty
This ﬁgure illustrates the optimal decisions (4.3(a)) and resulting regular wealth account balances
(4.3(b)) of the simple life-cycle model version without a TDA as described in Section 4.2. The pref-
erence parameters are θ = 1.5/3.0, β = 0.96 and γ = 1.5. The uncertainty describing parameters are
tailored to the Netherlands. Investment returns are time independent and lognormally distributed
with mean 1.1% and standard deviation 9.4%. Moreover, returns are correlated to permanent wage
shocks, which are also lognormally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 17.7%. Transi-
tory wage shocks follow a lognormal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 17.9%. The
age dependent deterministic component is described by (4.8). The ﬁgures plots the average path
(bold) and the paths corresponding to the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of utility.
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Optimal Savings without the TDA
We start by studying a consumer without access to the TDA. To derive implications from
ﬁrst order conditions, we assume that we stay below the wealth tax threshold. In the
absence of a progressive taxation, the intertemporal relationship of consumption evolves as
Ct+1
Ct
= (Rβ)
− 1
θ(1−γ)−γ
(
Yt+1
Yt
) θ(1−γ)
θ(1−γ)−γ
. (4.19)
Consumption growth is a trade-oﬀ between the future consumption preference β, which
favors decreasing consumption, and income growth, which increases consumption (both
exponents in (4.19) are positive). Given the benchmark parameters, consumption evolves
as Ct+1 = 0.987(Yt+1/Yt)
1/3Ct. Consumption grows if wage growth exceeds 1.75% and
decreases otherwise.
The dashed lines in Figure 4.4 visualize the optimal solution to this life-cycle problem.
Figure 4.4(a) shows the optimal decisions and Figure 4.4(b) the resulting account balance.
Consumption is given by the dashed blue line and labor supply by the dashed green line. At
the beginning of the planning horizon, the individual consumes e26,850. As a response to
the oﬀered wage process consumption exhibits a hump shape until age 61, as also reported
by a.o. Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Bloom, Canning and Graham (2003). Thereafter
it drops to a lower level of around e21,000. Labor supply stays relatively constant around
38%, that is a 38 hour week, until age 55. A period of more work follows to accumulate
the savings. As a response to stronger leisure preferences in old age, labor supply drops to
a lower level of around 15 hours in the second life phase. The marginal tax rates in the
ﬁrst and second life phase are respectively 42% and 33.6%. The main reason for the lower
marginal tax rate in the second life phase is the individual’s lower labor supply. A minor
reason lies in the increasing age dependent tax credits (see Appendix 4.A). The simultaneous
drop in consumption is implied by (4.16). Note that consumers’ labor supply does not fall
to zero in this model without a TDA. They do not retire early.
The dashed black line in Figure 4.4(b) shows the regular wealth holdings over age.
Given no initial wealth, the individual saves small amounts in the beginning of the planning
horizon. The exponential shape of the wealth account implies that the individual increases
his saving rate from age 55 to 61, where his savings amount to around e27,500. The
decreasing wealth level after age 61 shows that consumption in old age is partially ﬁnanced
by regular wealth. Upon regular retirement, the individual holds e1,040.
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(a) Decisions
(b) Accounts
Figure 4.4: Life-Cycle Model without Uncertainty
This ﬁgure illustrates the optimal decisions (4.4(a)) and resulting regular wealth account balances
(4.4(b)) of the simple life-cycle model version without a TDA as described in Section 4.2. The
preference parameters are θ = 1.5/3.0, β = 0.96 and γ = 1.5. The parameters are tailored to the
Netherlands. Investment returns are ﬁxed at 1.1%. Wages follow the age dependent deterministic
process as in (4.8).
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Optimal Savings with the TDA
Suppose the consumer may use the TDA as an alternative to save for ﬁnal wealth. The
introduction of the TDA increases the propensity to save by oﬀering a more proﬁtable
alternative. In Section 4.2 we showed that TDA contributions shift the relationship between
leisure and consumption down. Therefore, the individual can work more without incurring
higher marginal taxes. Furthermore, the marginal utility of saving increases. In equilibrium,
the marginal utility of optimal consumption and leisure must also increase. This puts a
downward pressure on consumption and motivates to work more.
To analyze the tax eﬀects in isolation from the early retirement, we solve a life-cycle
model that includes the TDA as a savings account but excludes the possibility to retire
early. The dash dotted lines in Figure 4.4 show the solution to this model. Consumption
and labor supply look very similar to the previous case. At the beginning of the planning
horizon, the individual works 38.4 hours a week. This is 6 minutes (0.1 hrs) more than the
individual who may not use the TDA. As a response to more work (4.16), the individual
increases his consumption by e450 to e27,400in the ﬁrst phase. Thus, the consumer with
a TDA enjoys less leisure but more consumption in the ﬁrst phase. The dash dotted red
line in Figure 4.4(a) plots the contributions to the TDA as a fraction of labor income.
Contributions stay around 1% as of age 47 until age 61. The marginal tax rate, i.e. the
tax rate that would have applied to the contributions, is 42% in the ﬁrst life phase. In the
second life phase he faces a marginal tax rate of 33.6%. Since the individual is not retiring
early, the marginal tax rate drop is only due to the lower level of labor supply and the
increasing age dependent tax credits (see Appendix 4.A).
The purple dash dotted line in Figure 4.4(b) represents the TDA balance and demon-
strates that the individual builds up about e11,000 until age 61. Upon regular retirement
this is taxed at a marginal tax rate of 33.6%, which is substantially lower than the 42% that
the individual would have had to pay on the contributions if he had not put his money in
the TDA. Regular wealth holdings peak around e27,500 as in the model without a TDA.
The larger amount of savings at age 61 translate into a higher ﬁnal wealth balance. The
individual who invests in the TDA holds almost e9,000 at age 65. This substantial increase
lends evidence to an enormous income eﬀect.
Despite obvious income eﬀects, the ﬁscal eﬀect of the TDA is low. The discounted
lifetime7 taxes paid decrease by only 0.29% to e216, 000. The decrease stems from the
substitution of the 42% marginal income tax rate for a lower marginal tax rates upon
withdrawal of the TDA contributions and the annual TDA subsidy.
7Lifetime refers to the 25 modeled years.
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Optimal Savings under Early Retirement
We now consider the role of TDAs for early retirement. Early retirement allows the indi-
vidual to further exploit the TDA because it oﬀers the opportunity to withdraw the TDA
balance over several years. This implies that the total balance is not taxed at once, but in
parts. Due to the progressive income tax system, this can lead to a further reduction in
total taxes. Referring to the trade-oﬀ (4.18) between wealth tax and the marginal income
tax rates on labor and TDA, this makes saving in the TDA even more attractive.
The solid lines in Figure 4.4 depict the solutions of the full model, that is with the
possibility to use the TDA and to retire early. The consumption and labor supply proﬁles
until age 64 look again similar to the previous cases. At age 64 labor supply (solid green
line) now drops to 0. The consumer in the full model thus retires one year early. His
consumption drops accordingly. TDA contributions become larger than 1% as of age 46,
which is one year earlier than in the model without early retirement, and accumulate to
e26,600 after age 61. As of age 51, the individual saves additionally in the regular wealth
account to ﬁnance greater leisure during age 62 and 63. Early retirement at age 64 is paid
by the TDA. Upon regular retirement, his ﬁnal wealth amounts to almost e880, which is
less than the individual without the TDA holds. The individual faces a marginal tax rate
of 42% during the contribution period. The marginal tax rate drops to 33.6% as he enters
the second life phase due to the decreased labor supply. At age 64 it increases again to 42%
due to a large withdrawal. As we showed in Table 4.1, it is still preferable to save in the
TDA instead of the regular wealth account if marginal income tax rates upon contribution
and withdrawal are equal. The remaining balance in the TDA is taxed at 33.6% again. In
contrast to the previous case, the individual was able to spread his TDA wealth over two
withdrawals: one in at age 64, where the employee personal income tax credit still applies,
and one upon regular retirement. Thereby, he achieved much lower tax rates.
Fiscal eﬀects amount to a 0.87% decrease in discounted lifetime taxes (e1,880). This
reduction can again be attributed to the lower marginal tax rate upon withdrawal of the
TDA balance compared to the marginal tax rate upon contribution and the TDA subsidy.
While the government loses some taxes, the introduction of the TDA increases the lifetime
utility of consumers. We express the utility eﬀect in terms of certainty equivalent (CEQ)
lifetime consumption. This is the extra annual consumption that needs to be provided
to the consumer without TDA to achieve the same utility as a consumer with TDA. The
utility increase due to the TDA in the deterministic case is equivalent to a 0.2% increase in
certainty equivalent annual consumption, which amounts to approximately e840 over the
lifetime (see Table 4.3).
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CEQ (in %) CEQ (total disc e1000)
θ/β 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.99
1.25 0.06 0.35 1.10 0.23 1.64 6.92
1.50 0.04 0.20 1.29 0.14 0.84 7.39
1.75 0.02 0.38 1.49 0.06 1.48 7.80
2.00 0.08 0.59 1.52 0.20 2.06 7.30
Δ taxes (in %) Δ taxes (total disc e1000)
θ/β 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.99
1.25 0.07 0.69 5.05 0.13 1.72 18.85
1.50 0.08 0.87 5.38 0.12 1.88 17.30
1.75 0.55 2.96 5.89 0.76 5.65 16.52
2.00 0.52 2.87 5.23 0.64 4.85 12.82
Table 4.2: Utility gains and Tax Losses due to TDAs (Deterministic)
This table contains a measure of utility increase due to the TDA introduction to assess individuals’ gain of it and
a measure of change in taxes to assess the ﬁscal burden of the TDA introduction for the deterministic model. The
upper panel contains information on the former, the lower on the latter. The left part of the upper panel reports the
additional percentage of certain consumption that the individual without the TDA needs to receive to be as well oﬀ
as the individual with a TDA (Certainty Equivalent Consumption, CEQ). The right half of the upper panel translates
the percentage of CEQ into total discounted consumption over the lifetime. Similarly the left half of the lower panel
contains the percentage change in taxes for the government due to the introduction of the TDA, the right half the
absolute diﬀerence of the discounted tax revenues. These numbers are reported for several leisure preference θ (along
the columns) and discount factor β (along the rows) values. Initial wealth = e0 and risk aversion γ = 1.5.
4.4 Optimal Savings under Uncertainty
We have shown that, under certainty, the individual saves in the TDA, retires early and
thereby improves his utility by a CEQ increase of 0.2% of annual consumption. Under
uncertainty, liquidity motives and risk aversion may change these conclusions. We consider
uncertainty in the returns and income process, while keeping the means of them (respectively
0, 0, and 1.01) equal to the deterministic case. We consider 1000 simulations of random,
realized shocks.
Life-Cycle Proﬁles
Figure 4.5 depicts the solution with the baseline parameters. It includes the optimal paths
that correspond to the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of lifetime utility as well as the
average. The optimal strategy depends on the permanent income state and the history of
returns and income shocks. The shocks therefore determine the accumulated regular and
tax-deferred savings. We observe limited dispersion in consumption and labor in Figure
4.5(a). Consumption ranges between e15,000 and e53,000 on a scale from e0 till inﬁnity,
and labor supply between 27 and 47 on a scale from 0 to 66 hours per week in the ﬁrst life
phase. Dispersion of TDA contributions amounts to the full scale; from 0 to almost 12%
(Figure 4.5(b)). Given a precautionary savings buﬀer and a higher after-tax return in
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the TDA, income shocks immediately aﬀect TDA contributions.
On average we observe the typical hump-shaped consumption pattern again. Labor
supply increases until age 61. As in the deterministic case, TDA contributions become
meaningful in someone’s late 40s. However, contrary to the deterministic case, average
contribution rates increase steadily in the stochastic case. Both wealth accounts in Figures
4.5(c) and 4.5(d) grow as of the mid 40s at the latest and lead to balances of around e42,000
just before potential early retirement, which is much larger than in the deterministic case
(regular wealth account e18,000 and TDA e26,600). Consumption during potential early
retirement is ﬁrst supported by the regular wealth account. During the last year, where the
median and the 75th percentile realizations lead to one year of early retirement, consumption
is mostly ﬁnanced by the TDA. On average, contributions in the ﬁrst life phase would have
been taxed at the marginal tax rates of 42% and 52%. During the potential early retirement
years the marginal tax rate drops to 33.6% and 42%. The remaining average TDA balance
upon regular retirement is taxed at a marginal tax rate of 33.6%. As the marginal tax rate
upon withdrawal is lower than upon contribution, we observe that the individual saves a
lot of money by deferring his taxes on contributions.
The ﬁnal wealth balance amounts to about e15,600, which is e450 (3%) more than the
same model without a TDA yields (not shown). The individual mostly shifts his savings
from the regular account to the TDA and only acquires few additional wealth. In line with
Attanasio et al. (2004), we ﬁnd the substitution to dominate the income eﬀect.
To measure the gain of the TDA introduction for individuals we compute the CEQ
lifetime consumption. In this benchmark case, one would have to give the individual without
a TDA 1.24% of certain annual consumption more to make him as happy as the equivalent
individual with a TDA. Over the lifetime, this corresponds to discounted total of e5,630.
Due to deferred taxation and subsidies the government loses discounted taxes of e12,000
(14%) per individual compared to the model without a TDA. This is mainly due to the
substitution towards a lower marginal income tax rate. In essence, the government pays
about 50% of average consumption at age 64. The individual feels only half of that better
oﬀ.
Participation and Retirement
The previous life-cycle proﬁles demonstrated that on average people should use the TDA.
Figure 4.6 plots the fraction of a 1000 random consumers that save more than 1% of their
income in the TDA as a function of age. This fraction increases monotonically from age 48
till 61, where it reaches 87%. Until age 48 no one saves more than 1% in the TDA, which
reﬂects the impatience of people. They value immediate consumption more than immediate
saving (or later consumption). As a result, they postpone saving until the utility of future
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consumption and leisure outweighs the immediate one. The participant gain slows down
at age 53, where he faces the ﬁrst negative wage growth, and as of age 58, whereafter it
becomes less useful to save for early retirement due to a too short horizon (3 years).
Figure 4.6: Percentage TDA users over Age Figure 4.7: Percentage Early Retirees over
Age
Given all realizations as in Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6 plots the fraction of the thousand realizations that
lead to participation in the TDA as a function of age. TDA participation is deﬁned as contributing
more than 1% of gross income NtYt. Figure 4.7 plots the fraction of the thousand realizations that
lead to early retirement as a function of age. Early retirement is deﬁned as 0 labor supply, Nt = 0.
The bold line depicts the percentage retirees in this life-cycle model. For comparison, we show the
proportions from the same model but without a TDA as the dashed line.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the proportion of people retiring early. It becomes immediately
clear that there are far more early retirees in the model with (bold line) than without the
TDA (dashed line). Around 80% of the retirees in the model with the TDA are TDA-
participants, deﬁned as contributing more than 1% of labor income at age 61 (100% if 0%
is used). The percentage of early retirees increases monotonically until regular retirement.
230 of 1000 people retire at age 62, another 150 retire at age 63 and another 370 at age 64,
leading to 750 retirees at age 64.
Diﬀerent Consumers
We studied the impact of the TDA and early retirement for a speciﬁc type of consumer with
e15,000 of initial wealth, leisure preference parameters θ = (1.5, 3.0) and time preference
β = 0.96. The reaction, utility and tax eﬀect diﬀer among consumers. This section reviews
the eﬀects on the main solutions of our model for individuals with diﬀerent preferences and
initial levels of wealth. Each time we look at the optimal decisions, in particular average
consumption and leisure in both life phases, the average contribution rate, the percentage
of people participating in the TDA in the ﬁrst life phase and the percentage of early retirees
in the potential early retirement phase. We also investigate the costs, the lost taxes for the
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government, and beneﬁts, the utility increase for consumers.
Diﬀerent initial wealth levels W0. Figure 4.8 summarizes our solutions as we vary
the level of initial wealth. Figure 4.8(a) depicts average consumption, labor supply and TDA
contributions in each life phase as a function of initial wealth. Changes in initial wealth
aﬀect consumption and leisure in a positive manner in the ﬁrst life phase. In the second
life phase these variables are largely unaﬀected. Interestingly, the average contribution rate
is also independent of initial wealth. The same holds for the percentage participants over
age, which is presented in Figure 4.8(b). The level and the slope of this proﬁle are almost
identical for all initial wealth levels. The percentage of retirees is also invariant to initial
wealth (see Figure 4.8(c)). These results illustrate that the individual is too impatient to
put parts of his initial wealth aside for old age.8
Column 1 in Table 4.4 contains the percentage increase of ﬁnal wealth from the model
without to a model with a TDA. For the benchmark parameters it remains fairly stable,
around 2%-3%, for all initial wealth levels. We can therefore conclude that the small income
eﬀect we observed before is stable over initial wealth. In line with these observations,
certainty equivalent consumption due to the introduction of TDAs is also robust to changes
in initial wealth as the second column in Table 4.4 demonstrates.
W0 ΔWT (in %) CEQ (in %)
0 3.00 1.22
15 3.02 1.24
45 2.07 1.24
80 3.16 1.24
Table 4.3: Sensitivity of Final Wealth Balance Diﬀerences and Utility Gains (Stochastic)
This table contains the percentage diﬀerence in average ﬁnal wealth balance between a model with and without a
TDA and the percentage of certain consumption that the individual without the TDA needs to receive to be as well
oﬀ as the individual with a TDA (Certainty Equivalent Consumption, CEQ) for several values of initial wealth W0.
Diﬀerent time preferences β. The eﬀect of diﬀerent time preferences is depicted
in Figure 4.9. A higher discount factor, in particular such that Rβ > 1, as in case of
β = 0.99, leads to a higher preference for future consumption, leisure and retirement wealth.
Accordingly, current consumption and leisure should decrease and savings increase. As a
result, future consumption and leisure should increase. Figure 4.9(a) is in line with the
deduction. The increasing labor supply and TDA contributions in the ﬁrst life phase imply
that the tax advantage of the TDA becomes larger the more patient a consumer is. This
also aﬀects the percentage of people participating in the TDA positively. The participation
8For β = 0.99, the main message is unaltered. The contribution rate to the TDA remains independent
of initial wealth. Consumption and Leisure in the second life phase increase slightly.
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proﬁle over age in Figure 4.9(b) shifts to the left as β increases. More patient individuals
thus start to save earlier in life. The repercussions on early retirement are less systematic.
As Figure 4.9(c) shows, most people retire at the earliest early retirement age 62 if β
(= 0.99) is largest. At age 63 and 64, the percentage of early retirees is lowest for the
highest β (= 0.99) and highest for the lowest β (= 0.93). We can therefore conclude that
the fraction of three-year early retirees increases with β. However, the fraction of one or
two-year early retirees decreases with β.
CEQ (in %) Δ taxes (in %) ΔWT (in %)
θ/β 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.99
1.25 1.02 1.41 1.49 -10.69 -6.17 -1.78 -6.71 3.28 3.32
1.50 1.06 1.24 1.35 -17.91 -14.18 -4.55 -19.01 3.02 4.84
1.75 0.85 1.03 1.21 -24.99 -23.07 -10.64 -15.96 -0.58 7.14
2.00 1.14 1.03 0.87 -29.06 -30.36 -17.28 -19.58 -8.68 6.39
CEQ (total disc e1000) Δ taxes (total disc e1000) ΔWT (total disc e1000)
θ/β 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.99
1.25 3.80 6.98 10.06 -7.26 -15.17 -28.85 -0.83 0.73 1.83
1.50 3.61 5.63 8.36 -6.24 -11.97 -23.11 -1.88 0.46 2.01
1.75 2.67 4.29 6.93 -5.29 -9.77 -18.32 -1.33 -0.07 2.18
2.00 3.32 3.97 4.67 -4.66 -8.34 -14.99 -1.70 -0.95 1.49
Table 4.4: Utility gains and Tax Losses due to TDAs (Stochastic)
This table contains a measure of utility increase due to the TDA introduction to assess individuals’ gain (CEQ) of
it in the ﬁrst panel, the change in taxes due to the introduction of the TDA in the second panel and the diﬀerence
in ﬁnal wealth balances between a model with and without a TDA in the third panel for the stochastic model. The
upper panel contains this information in percentage terms, the lower panel in discounted eterms over the lifetime.
These numbers are reported for several leisure preference θ (along the columns) and discount factor β (along the rows)
values. Initial wealth = e15,000 and risk aversion γ = 1.5.
Table 4.4 summarizes the CEQ consumption gains, the tax losses and the changes in
ﬁnal wealth for several β and θ combinations. Given an initial wealth level and leisure
preference, WT increases as we move to the right, that is as patience becomes stronger. As
individuals value the future more, the marginal utility of saving increases and thus they have
a stronger motive to save more. In line with the previous observations, CEQ consumption
in percentage of annual discounted consumption becomes larger with β except for the case
where θ = 2. In eterms though, CEQ consumption increases always with β. The same
patterns can be observed for the changes in taxes due to the TDA. Keeping θ = 1.5, lifetime
discounted CEQ consumption increases from e3,610 (β = 0.93) to e8,360 (β = 0.99) and
lifetime discounted losses increase from e6,240 (β = 0.93) to e23,110 (β = 0.99). In the
last case, the government ﬁnances almost a whole year of early retirement while individuals’
utility gain is only a third of annual early retirement consumption. The main reason for
the diﬀerences lies in the deﬁnition of CEQ consumption. As the word says, it provides a
consumption stream with certainty which is valued more than the actual sum by risk-averse
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people. Consequently, individuals feel less well oﬀ than the government’s losses imply (in
eterms).
Diﬀerent leisure preferences θ. The eﬀect of diﬀerent leisure preferences is depicted
in Figure 4.10. Consumption, labor supply and savings are reduced with θ. The preference
for early retirement also increases with θ. Whether individuals actually save enough to
retire early is a trade-oﬀ between current and future leisure. Figure 4.10(a) captures a clear
declining trend in most decision variables as θ increases. Consumption and labor supply
decrease in both life phases while the contribution rates are roughly constant with respect to
leisure preferences. Also, there is no trend visible in the percentage of participants in Figure
4.10(b). Despite invariant contribution and participation rates, Figure 4.10(c) demonstrates
that people with higher leisure preferences retire early more commonly. The higher leisure
preferences make lower consumption possible. Therefore, individuals need fewer savings per
year of early retirement and the same savings rate as in the lower leisure preference cases
suﬃce.
We can observe a negative relationship between leisure and the percentage diﬀerence of
ﬁnal wealth between a model with and without TDA in Table 4.4. Given an initial wealth
level and patience, the diﬀerence becomes more negative as we increase θ. Individuals with
higher θs have a larger preference for leisure versus ﬁnal wealth compared to individuals
with lower θs. Consequently, individuals with high leisure preferences spend their savings
rather than on retirement. This motive is stronger for people with a TDA because leisure
is much cheaper than ﬁnal wealth due to the nature of taxes. As the left half of Table 4.4
shows, there is no clear trend in the CEQ consumption percentage and the percentage tax
change. The discounted lifetime evalues however exhibits a negative trend. Individuals gain
less certain consumption and the government pays less as the leisure preference becomes
stronger.
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(a) Consumption, Labor Supply and TDA Contribution Sensitivity
(b) Participation Sensitivity
(c) Retirement Sensitivity
Figure 4.8: Sensitivity with respect to Initial Wealth
Given all realizations for the benchmark parameters, this ﬁgure illustrates the behavior as we vary the initial wealth level W0. 4.8(a)
depicts average consumption (in the ﬁrst and second life phase) on the left axis and average labor supply (in the ﬁrst and second life
phase) and TDA contributions on the right axis as a function of W0. 4.8(b) illustrates how the the fraction of the thousand realizations
that lead to participation in the TDA as a function of age varies with W0. TDA participation is deﬁned as contributing more than 1%
of gross income NtYt. 4.8(c) shows how the fraction of the thousand realizations that lead to early retirement as a function of age vary
with W0. Early retirement is deﬁned as 0 labor supply, Nt = 0.
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(a) Consumption, Labor Supply and TDA Contribution Sensitivity
(b) Participation Sensitivity
(c) Retirement Sensitivity
Figure 4.9: Sensitivity with respect to β
Given all realizations for the benchmark parameters, this ﬁgure illustrates the behavior as we vary the patience parameter β. 4.9(a)
depicts average consumption (in the ﬁrst and second life phase) on the left axis and average labor supply (in the ﬁrst and second life
phase) and TDA contributions on the right axis as a function of β. 4.9(b) illustrates how the the fraction of the thousand realizations
that lead to participation in the TDA as a function of age varies with β. TDA participation is deﬁned as contributing more than 1% of
gross income NtYt. 4.9(c) shows how the fraction of the thousand realizations that lead to early retirement as a function of age vary
with β. Early retirement is deﬁned as 0 labor supply, Nt = 0.
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(a) Consumption, Labor Supply and TDA Contribution Sensitivity
(b) Participation Sensitivity
(c) Retirement Sensitivity
Figure 4.10: Sensitivity with respect to θ
Given all realizations for the benchmark parameters, this ﬁgure illustrates the behavior changes as we vary the leisure parameter θ.
4.10(a) depicts average consumption (in the ﬁrst and second life phase) on the left axis and average labor supply (in the ﬁrst and
second life phase) and TDA contributions on the right axis as a function of θ. 4.10(b) illustrates how the the fraction of the thousand
realizations that lead to participation in the TDA as a function of age varies with θ. TDA participation is deﬁned as contributing more
than 1% of gross income NtYt. 4.10(c) shows how the fraction of the thousand realizations that lead to early retirement as a function
of age vary with θ. Early retirement is deﬁned as 0 labor supply, Nt = 0.
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4.5 Conclusion
Providing TDAs makes people better oﬀ. As explained in the modeling section (4.2), people
can save most taxes by contributing to a TDA when the marginal income tax is high
and withdrawing when it is low. Additionally, we show that it can still be beneﬁcial for
the individual to contribute to the TDA when marginal income taxes are the same upon
contribution and withdrawal if he contributes early in his life. This result is mainly driven
by the wealth tax, which is speciﬁc to the Netherlands. In the deterministic setting we see
that people indeed invest in the TDA if they make optimal decisions. The tax advantages
are higher if people retire early than if they do not because they can spread the withdrawals
over several periods, thereby reducing each withdrawal balance and accordingly the marginal
tax rate. These results still hold in the stochastic setting, where the individual contributes
at the highest marginal tax rates and withdraws at the next lower ones.
Independent of whether people have access to a TDA, we observe that people typically
start saving in their late 40s. This late start of retirement savings has been noted earlier
by Gourinchas and Parker (2002). From the 40s until potential early retirement, the saving
rate increases. Shocks to income are mostly taken out on savings. This does not necessarily
mean that people save less in the TDA. On the contrary, our results show that positive
income shocks can also lead to more TDA savings. As people become older the proportion
of TDA participants increases until age 61. Many of them retire early.
The ﬁnal wealth balances are similar for individuals, who may use a TDA, and for
individuals, who cannot. The former is only 3% higher larger in the benchmark stochastic
case. For less patient (lower β) or more leisure preferring (higher θ) people, the change
can be negative. This means that people mostly shift their wealth from the regular to the
TDA and create only few, or less in case of a negative diﬀerence, additional savings. In line
with Attanasio et al. (2004), our results suggest that a TDA such as the life-course savings
scheme in the Netherlands mainly lead to a substantial substitution eﬀect and only to a
minor income eﬀect. At intermediate ages, total wealth is much larger for TDA participants
than for non-participants. This diﬀerence is largely eliminated upon regular retirement
because the TDA-participants consume more savings during their early retirement because
they work less.
Our results demonstrate that diﬀerent initial wealth levels and leisure preferences lead to
the sample participation proﬁles over age. Only more patience lead to higher participation
proﬁles. We see that this translates into equal early retirement patterns for all initial wealth
levels but higher early retirement patters for higher leisure preferences. More patience
increases the proportion of three-year early retirees and less patience the proportion of one-
year retirees. Finally, providing a TDA increases people’s utility by a certainty equivalent of
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1.24% of annual consumption in the benchmark case. This CEQ percentage becomes larger
as we increase β, except if people have the highest leisure preference. The 1.24% increase
correspond to a lifetime consumption increase of e5,630 while the government loses e11,970
(a percentage decrease of about 15%). The cash diﬀerence highlights that the increased
happiness of the people due to the life-course savings scheme costs the government more
than twice as much. Compared to the times of generous state early retirement schemes, it
is probably cheap. However, compared to a situation without any early retirement schemes
it may be expensive relative to the eﬀect on people’s happiness.
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4.A Appendix A: Dutch Tax Parameters
The Dutch tax system distinguishes between ordinary income and capital income. Both have
separate provisions for the life-course savings scheme. Ordinary income tax is progressive.
The marginal rate varies between 33.6% and 52%. The top marginal rate is reached at
annual taxable income of e53,860 (numbers from 2008). A second progressive element is
the age-dependent tax credit for everyone active in the labor market. Taxable income is
deﬁned as Z = NY −Q−D, where NY is labor income, Q are TDA contributions and D
is an age dependent tax credit. Ordinary income tax is piecewise linear in taxable income,
T Y =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 Z ≤ 0
τ1Z 0 < Z ≤ I1
τ2Z − (τ2 − τ1)I1 I1 < Z ≤ I2
τ3Z − (τ2 − τ1)I1 − (τ3 − τ2)I2 I2 < Z
(4.1)
where the τj parameters are the marginal tax rates and Ij the income thresholds. Parameter
values for τj , Ij and D are summarized in Table 4.A5. The table is a slight simpliﬁcation
of the actual Dutch tax code. Some details on the tax credits and marginal rates that are
inessential for the model have been omitted.
age D j τj Ij
< 57 1,594 1 0.336 17,579
57-59 1,848 2 0.420 53,860
60-61 2,100 3 0.520
> 61 2,352
Table 4.A5: Income tax parameters (2008)
Capital income is taxed on an accrual basis at a rate of τW = 1.2% of wealth (marked to
market every year) and zero rates on dividend and interest income. For a household with
two adults the ﬁrst e46,300 of wealth is tax-exempt (numbers from 2008). The capital
income tax is thus also piecewise linear,
T Wt =
{
0 if Wt ≤ 46, 300
τW (Wt−1 − 46, 300) else
(4.2)
We assume that the tax parameters are adjusted annually to remain constant in real terms.
The TDA provides four diﬀerent tax beneﬁts. First, contributions are made from pre-
tax income. Second, it is not subject to the wealth tax. For households with wealth
above the tax-exempt threshold it is thus beneﬁcial to add further savings to the TDA.
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Third, individuals receive a lump-sum tax credit when withdrawing funds from the TDA
in years without ordinary income, i.e. during early retirement. Fourth, a bonus is paid on
contributions to the TDA. The latter eﬀect is more symbolic than of real ﬁnancial value,
since it is capped at a maximum of e191 per year.
4.B Appendix B: Pensions and Final Wealth
The Dutch pension system has three pillars: state, occupational and private pensions. State
pensions provide a ﬁxed amount to everyone independent of income. Private retirement
provision is in form of an annuity and thus a function of wealth at the retirement age.
Occupational pensions are still mostly of the deﬁned beneﬁt type and related to the
average lifetime real earnings per year. For computational reasons we avoid using average
lifetime earnings as an additional state variable. We therefore follow Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) and relate pensions to the permanent component of the ﬁnal wage, which would be
close to most older Dutch pension arrangements. The permanent component xT is already
a state variable in the model. With ﬁnal permanent income equal to
Y PT = N¯ exp (f(T ) + xT ) ,
we assume that the sum of occupational and state pension provides a replacement rate of
65% of the after-tax ﬁnal permanent income,
CB = (0.65)
(
Y PT − T Y (Y PT )
)
(4.1)
We make the simplifying assumption that occupational and state pensions can be aggre-
gated and are both independent of labor supply decisions during the active working life.
Income is calculated at the average working week N¯ = 38. This assumption simpliﬁes
the computational aspects, since it allows us to start the modeling at age 40, ignoring all
earnings at younger age. It also avoids feedback from labor supply decisions on pensions
payments. In the model labor, supply decisions only aﬀect the amount of private wealth.
In the utility function we approximate the utility of pension income by a term involving
ﬁnal wealth WT . We assume that the agent has the base pension of CB units of consump-
tion in every period beyond age T . His private wealth WT is converted into an annuity
which provides a perpetual consumption stream CA = rAWT , with rA a fair annuity rate
determined as
rA =
⎛⎝ ∞∑
j=1
pT+jR
−j
⎞⎠−1 (4.2)
where pt is the survival probability through age t (fraction alive at time t). The contribution
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of consumption after age T to the lifetime utility thus becomes
UT =
∞∑
j=1
βT+jpT+j
(CA + CB)
1−γ
1− γ
=
∞∑
j=1
βT+jpT+j
(rAWT + CB)
1−γ
1− γ
= βTφ
(WT +BT )
1−γ
1− γ (4.3)
with
φ = r1−γA
∞∑
j=1
pT+jβ
j ,
BT = CB/rA
Adding WB to the ﬁnal wealth in the utility function reduces the incentive for individual
savings. Much of the pension provision is exogenous to the model.
4.C Appendix C: Numerical Optimization
To solve the problem we apply standard dynamic programming on a discretized state space.
The state variables are Pt, Wt, Lt, xt and t, where Pt indicates the retirement status (0/1).
It is set to 0 prior to age 62. Unfortunately, we cannot reduce the number of state variables.
The progressive income tax scheme leads to a problem that is non homothetic in wealth and
permanent income. As tax incentives are crucial to the solution, we accept this reduced
numerical speed. The grid is a cartesian product of the grids for the individual state
variables. For wealth and tax deferred savings we use an exponential grid varying between
0 to 160 in 40 steps. We adopt a recombining tree structure for the permanent income
component with the number of branches equal to the number of scenarios per state.
The recursion consists of repeatedly solving a state dependent optimization problem
in the variables consumption Ct, labor Nt and contributions Qt. The optimal solution is
determined by a grid search over Qt and Ct. Nt is deﬁned by the ﬁrst order conditions (see
Section 4.2 (4.16)). Thereafter, we repeat the grid search twice over a ﬁner grid around the
optimal solution of the initial decision grid. For the evaluations of the continuation value
we interpolate linearly.
The ﬁgures are constructed by using monte carlo simulation to draw random income and
return paths and applying the optimal decisions to obtain the values for the state variables.
Note that the plotted paths correspond to those paths that lead to 25th, 50th and 75th
percentile of lifetime utility.
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Chapter 5
A Reduced Form Analysis of a
Reform in Dutch Early Retirement
Arrangements
5.1 Introduction
Ageing societies threaten the stability of pension systems all over the world due to their
ﬁnancial insustainability (Gruber and Wise 1997). For the last decade, researchers and
policy makers have therefore looked for new pension system arrangements that mitigate
the rupturing ﬁnancial pension gap. In January 2006, the Dutch government has put
amendments forward to adapt the Dutch pension system to an aging society, which provides
an ideal natural experiment. The Dutch initiative reduced the nation’s ﬁnancial burden at
the expense of shifting more responsibility to individuals. We will investigate how much
individuals are capable of carrying this responsibility.
Pension systems generally have three pillars. The ﬁrst consists of public pensions, to
which basically everyone is entitled once he turns 65 (the “AOW” (=Algemene Ouderdom-
swet Wet) in the Netherlands), the second of occupational pensions, for which employees
and employers are responsible and the third of private or individual pension income. In
the Netherlands the average distribution among the pillars was 50%, 30% and 20% in 2001
(van Riel, Hemerijck and Visser 2003). On top of the already large share of the ﬁrst pillar,
Kapteyn and de Vos (1997) showed that there is a sudden drop in labor force participa-
tion once the Dutch turn 55. Most of these early retirees were also ﬁnanced by the state
through a generous early retirement arrangement, the “VUT” (=Vervroegde UitTreding).
The amendments in 2006 aimed at shifting the ﬁnancial burden from the state to private
retirement arrangements (from pillar 1 to pillar 3). Accordingly, the “VUT” was abolished
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for individuals born after 1950. At the same time, the reforms introduced the life-course
arrangement (Vervroegde UitTreding) as part of the third pillar to encourage individual
responsibility for, especially early, retirement.
This life-course arrangement (LLR) enables individuals to retire early in agreement with
their employer. Initially, it has been intended to ﬁnance sabbatical leave during individuals’
working life as maternity leave for instance. Since most Dutch participate in the LLR to
retire early (NIBUD 2007), this paper will focus on this LLR aspect. When working,
individuals can make contributions to an individual LLR account. The size of the premium
is left to the individual’s discretion but may not exceed 12% of gross annual salary (except
for individuals born between 1950 and 1955). Moreover, participants face tax incentives
when retiring early with the LLR as opposed to retiring early using normal private savings
as demonstrated in the previous chapter. Once the account holds more than 210% of annual
taxable labor income, further contributions are not allowed. The early retirement period
starts with the transformation of the accumulated LLR wealth into an annuity, which is
then paid out as labor income over the early retirement years. This accumulated LLR
wealth should be consumed within the early retirement years.
In the Netherlands another employee savings scheme, the Spaarloonregeling (SLR), also
exists. It has turned out to be the LLR’s ﬁercest competitor when looking at the partici-
pation rates. If people decide to participate in the SLR, they can save up to e613 (2007
value) every year and withdraw their savings tax free four years later. The two savings
schemes are mutually exclusive. Individuals have to decide in the beginning of each year
whether they would like to make contributions to the LLR or to the SLR. While the LLR
has the pre-deﬁned goal of early retirement (or unpaid leave in general), SLR wealth can be
cashed out after four years for any reason. Due to the ﬁnancial superiority of the LLR over
the SLR for retirement purposes and our motive to investigate the choices that the Dutch
make with regard to retirement, we ignore the SLR.
To model the choice that a Dutch faces regarding the LLR decision, we set up a stylized
life-cycle model. Every period, an individual chooses how much to consume, whether to
work, and how much to save, given some wage path. As savings vehicles, he has the
choice between a regular wealth account and the LLR account. Our model goes beyond a
simple life-cycle model, because we model taxes. As Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004), we
augment the life-cycle framework by introducing a model that diﬀerentiates between the
taxable (the regular wealth account) and the tax-deferrable but illiquid (the LLR account)
account. Evidently, there is a trade-oﬀ between staying liquid and incurring higher taxes
in the taxable account and vice versa in the tax-deferrable account, which has an impact
on the LLR-participation decision.
This paper has two parts. The ﬁrst part will consider the theoretical and empirical
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decision whether to participate in the LLR, while the second part covers the theoretical and
empirical investment point of view conditional on participation. The paper hence proceeds
by introducing the theoretical life-cycle model, which mimics the choice a Dutch individual
faces regarding LLR participation, and illustrates the trade-oﬀs inherent in the model.
Subsequently, the model will be transformed into a reduced and empirically implementable
form such that, after presenting our data in Section 5.3, in Section 5.4 we can analyze
which type of individual indeed decides to participate. The second part will begin with an
introduction of the investment opportunities within the LLR in Section 5.5. We then give
a recap of theoretical considerations concerning investment decisions, and continue with an
empirical analysis of the subject in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The LLR-Participation Decision in a Life-Cycle Model
We develop a stylized intertemporal life-cycle model for a Dutch individual, who, next to
regular risk-free saving, has the opportunity to invest in a tax-deferred LLR account. We
restrict our analysis for the LLR to ﬁnance up to three years of early retirement. Thus, the
individual works at least until his 62nd birthday and at most until his 65th, when the regular
pension starts. We model LLR participation as a yes/no decision. The individual may
annually decide upon consumption, LLR participation (and contribution) and, implicitly,
regular savings, given a labor income path.
Since the LLR account can only be used to ﬁnance early retirement, the individual must
have a strong preference for leisure in order to engage in the LLR because he foregoes up to
three years of labor income. The complete set of preferences over consumption and leisure
is given by
max
{C,N,}
Qt(Wt, Yt, Xt) = Et
[
64∑
s=t
βsu(Cs) +
64∑
s=62
(1−Ns)βsθ(Xs) + β65v(W65)
]
, (5.1)
where t is current age, Cs is consumption; Ns the working state; Ys income; s the contri-
bution to the LLR as a percentage of Ys; Xs a set of household characteristics; Ws liquid
ﬁnancial wealth (hence, excluding wealth in the LLR account); u(·) the utility of consump-
tion; β the individual’s time preference; v(W65) the indirect utility of retirement wealth; and
θ(Xs) the preference for leisure as a function of Xs. Lifetime utility Q thus consists of three
components: The ﬁrst one is the utility from consumption. The second component is the
preference for leisure. In this stylized model we do not model the trade-oﬀ between labor
supply and leisure during the working life. Individuals have no choice but to work full-time
until their 62nd birthday. Instead of modeling consumption in the retirement phase, we
include a utility of wealth at T=65.
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The individual’s choice until age 62 is subject to budget constraints for liquid wealth
and the LLR account,
Ws+1 = Rs+1(Ws + (1− s)Ys − τ ((1− s)Ys,Ws) +Bs(s, (1− s)Ys)− Cs), (5.2)
Ls+1 = Rs+1(Ls + sYs), (5.3)
where Rs is the gross return on invested wealth; s the contribution to the LLR account as
a percentage of gross income Ys; τ ((1− s)Ys,Ws) are taxes as a function labor income Ys
and liquid wealth Ws; Bs(s, (1− s)Ys) tax credits for employees as a function of their age
s and labor income; and Ls the accumulated wealth in the LLR account. The gross return
Rs on liquid wealth and on the LLR account wealth are assumed to be the same.
For an individual who has participated in the LLR and retires at age T < 65 the budget
equation for liquid wealth changes to
Ws+1 = Rs+1(Ws+As(L62)−τ(As(L62),Ws)+τBs(s, 62−t, As(L62))−Cs), T ≤ s ≤ 64
(5.4)
where As(L62) are the annuity payments from the LLR account such that it is depleted
at age 65; Bs(s, 62 − t, As(L62)) is a tax credit, which depends again on age, but also
on the number of LLR-contribution years and As(L62). Since As(L62) is treated as labor
income it is also subject to the tax credit for employees. To understand the trade-oﬀs that
are involved in the LLR-participation decision, one should realize that there are in fact
three basic options: to not retire early (stay in labor force until 65), to retire early with
the LLR, and to retire early without the LLR. Hence, the LLR has some characteristics
that are advantageous over both alternatives but also some that are only superior over
one alternative. Without going into the complexities of the Dutch tax law, there are four
ﬁnancial incentives that play a role in the LLR-participation decision.
1. As the LLR annuity, As(L62), is treated as (taxable) labor income, LLR early retirees
are also entitled to the employee tax credits, which amounts up to maximally e2138
(in 2007 Euro) tax free labor income per year. The same applies to the individuals,
who decide to keep working. Early retirees without the LLR retire using their liquid
wealth and do not get these tax cuts. This is modeled in Bs.
2. LLR participants receive an additional of max e188 (in 2007 Euro) tax credit in real
terms per contribution year when they take leave. Neither the ones who do not retire
early nor the early retirees without the LLR are entitled to this advantage. We refer
to this in Bs as well.
3. There is a ﬂat rate wealth tax of 1.2% per year (above a threshold) that applies to
the liquid wealth account but not to the LLR account. Wealthy early retirees without
the LLR are especially exposed it.
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4. The marginal tax rate on regular income is increasing from 34% to 52%. Except for
the very rich and very poor the eﬀective tax rate on the deferred payments As(L62)
will be substantially less than on the contributions sYs.
Contributions to the LLR account are limited to 12% of labor income per year. Also,
no further contributions can be made when the account is larger that 210% of income,
0 ≤ s ≤ 0.12
s = 0 if Ls−1 ≥ 2.1Ys−1.
(5.5)
To get an intuition for the LLR-contribution period, consider an individual who wants to
acquire 210% of his annual wage. If he saves at the upper bound of LLR contributions of
12%, it takes him 15 to 20 years. The exact time period depends on a range of parameters
as labor income and return on the LLR fund.1
A number of additional inequality constraints limit the choice of the individual. First,
we assume that the individual cannot borrow against future labor income, such that liquid
wealth Ws must always be non-negative. The liquidity constraint forces individuals to
retain a positive amount of ﬁnancial wealth. In case of uncertain labor income, individuals
with low initial wealth and/or labor income and/or high income uncertainty are less likely
to participate in the LLR because of the precautionary savings motive. The LLR is more
restrictive, since the money in the account cannot be used to smooth out temporary income
shocks. Once a suﬃcient wealth and/or income level is attained the LLR becomes a feasible
option and participation then depends on the intensity of the ﬁnancial advantages and
especially the preference for leisure. The tax credit and the wealth tax excepted nature of
the LLR account, make the LLR account the preferred account from a return perspective.
The tax advantage of LLR participation can be large, but cannot compensate the loss
of three years of labor income. To engage in the LLR the individual therefore needs to have
a preference for leisure X(θ), which must be large enough to accept the ﬁnancial loss. In
1994, 50% of the male Dutch were retired at the age of 60 (Kapteyn and de Vos 1998),
indicating a strong preference for leisure at least when subject to the generous “VUT”.
According to Hurst (2003), preferences for leisure are related to age, marital status and
work related factors. Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004) have shown that retirement decisions
are highly dependent among household-partners in the Netherlands and that singles and
couples behave diﬀerently. They report that single household heads have higher transition
rates into early retirement than household heads that have a partner despite the ﬁnancial
disadvantages of the former over the latter. Thus, singles seem to have a higher preference
for leisure at retirement.
1Solving this model, requires numerical optimization and many more assumptions as shown in the previous
chapter.
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The reduced form of the LLR-participation decision will depend on income Yt, wealth
Wt, leisure preference characteristics θ(Xt) as well as the current age t.
t = f(t, Yt,Wt, θ(Xt)) (5.6)
Wealth and wage both empirically have a positive eﬀect on the probability to engage in the
LLR because of liquidity constraints. Age will also have a positive eﬀect, since individuals
are commonly impatient and therefore prefer consumption rather today than tomorrow.
Derived from the ﬁndings of Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004), we expect the marital status to
have a negative eﬀect on the LLR participation decision. The sign of the age coeﬃcient in
leisure preference is somewhat ambiguous. However, there is evidence that it increases over
age (Gustman and Steinmeier 2005). The assumptions that our model hinges on are thus
the ﬁnancial incentives and that individuals have to work at least until age 62. Leisure is
only able to aﬀect utility in early retirement years.
5.3 Data
This research relies on cross-sectional data from 2006, which includes individuals who work
in the civil service sector in the Netherlands, a total of 779,570 observations. We drop
individuals, whose age, gender, birth year or income is unknown (2754) and those who were
born before or in 1950 (another 97,215). We exclude those born before or in 1950 because
they are still entitled to the VUT, which renders the LLR hardly useful for them. Further-
more, we drop employees of the ﬁre brigade (5745) as diﬀerent retirement patterns apply
to these employees and their employer strongly encourages LLR participation by setting
the default to participation, yielding a participation rate of 96%. We have information on
gross annual wages, hours of work per week, employer, age, presence of partners, area of
residence, when they received an LLR-information package, the type of LLR-information
package, LLR participation and the asset allocation within the LLR account. The hours of
work per week are important because we have to acknowledge the possibility that part-time
workers have another job outside the civil service sector, which we do not know. Thus, we
only observe the wage that an individual earns within the civil service sector and have no
information about household income.
Additional to this data set, we obtained income-ZIP-code proﬁles from 2005 from the
Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands for most of the ZIP-codes. We take this
information as a proxy for wealth in order to complement the wage measures because income
and wealth are closely linked. Missing income-postcode proﬁles and unknown sectors lead to
dropping another 65,656 observations. Lastly, we drop those whose annual income exceeds
e200,000 or is e0 (59) because they are untypical in the civil service sector. This results
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in 608,151 observations.
AGE %LL N INCOME %LL N
< 25 5.16 16232 < 10 4.56 241
[25, 30) 4.85 43674 [10, 20) 6.77 8494
[30, 35) 5.47 52233 [20, 30) 3.70 106489
[35, 40) 5.49 64002 [30, 40) 5.51 157883
[40, 45) 5.65 84022 [40, 50) 8.79 134106
[45, 50) 6.94 106023 [50, 60) 8.98 45980
[50, 55) 9.10 108220 [60, 70) 11.44 12741
≥ 55 42.16 1008 [70, 80) 12.19 5061
[80, 90) 13.82 1831
[90, 100) 12.56 788
[100, 110) 10.02 549
[110, 120) 6.84 351
≥ 120 6.11 900
GENDER PARTNER
Male 8.76 229306 Yes 7.49 324555
Female 4.72 246108 No 4.91 150859
TOTAL 6.67 475414
For each category the table reports the percentage of people
who participate in the Levensloopregeling (%LL) and the number
people that are in this category (N). Income is in thousands of
euro per year. We only consider the response to the ﬁrst oﬀer.
Table 5.1: Descriptives: LLR Participation
Table 5.3 gives a ﬁrst impression about LLR participants. We are only looking at
the result of the ﬁrst oﬀer that people received, which reduces the data set further to
475,414 observations. LLR participation increases with age until it peaks in age category
[50, 55) as expected. This oldest age group is close to retirement but is not entitled to the
VUT anymore. As a transition measure they are allowed to cross the 12% upper bound
on yearly premia. Almost half of them react with a positive response to the ﬁrst oﬀer.
The youngest group constitutes an outlier because their motive to engage in the LLR is
probably a sabbatical or maternity leave. As survey results from NIBUD (2007) show, there
are about 27% (36%) of the Dutch population (women) that participates in LLR because
of maternity leave. The majority, 67%, invest with the goal to retire early. The percentage
of LLR participants by income behaves similar to the one by age. Ignoring the ﬁrst two
income categories, the participation rate is hump-shaped and peaks in income category
[80, 000; 90, 000).
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Moving on to the gender categories in Table 5.3, it is striking to ﬁnd women participating
only half as much as men. Barber and Odean (2001) have shown that men prefer riskier and
higher turnover investments compared to women. Further evidence for higher participation
rates in pension plans of women stems from Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang (2007). Their
results show that women are 6.5% more likely to participate in 401(k) plans than men.
As the LLR is rather characterized to be a low turnover investment and a pension plan,
it should suit women’s preferences more than men’s. The part-time factor is very likely
to play a role in our descriptive counterintuitive evidence. Women with a low part-time
factor are ﬁnancially more constrained and might not be able to participate in the LLR.
We will therefore continue with the results of the regression analysis, where we can control
for various factors and return to this issue later.
5.4 The LLR-Participation Decision empirically
In the empirical analysis we run cross-sectional regressions to estimate the reduced form
participation behavior of individuals in the ﬁrst year that the life-course arrangement was
operating. The dependent variable Ii is equal to one if individual i participates and zero
otherwise. We run a Probit of the following form:
Ii = α0 + α1 ln (wagei) + α2agei + α3age
2
i + α4agei ln (wagei) + α5age
2
i ln (wagei)+
+ α6 ln(Wi) + α
′
7Zi + i.
(5.7)
The functional form for the age and wage eﬀects has been obtained by a preliminary speci-
ﬁcation search, where the interaction between the two variables proved to be an important
element. This interaction can also be explained by a life-cycle model; people with higher
income may reach the precautionary wealth buﬀer at younger ages than low income indi-
viduals.
To control for various other inﬂuences, we add a number of control dummies Zi. Among
these is the type of LLR-information package that the individual received, the sector he
works in and GDP per capita of the year when he was 22 years old. As Browning and
Lusardi (1996) note, the level of per capita income at age 22 can serve as a proxy for cohort
eﬀects when analyzing savings behavior. To avoid a potential bias arising from unobserved
additional wages, we a include part-time dummy if people work less than 60%.
The model does not account for all aspects of the LLR-participation decision. The ﬁrst
simpliﬁcation we make is to ignore the SLR in the participation decision. Since the SLR has
an upper bound on its contributions of e613 and its savings become liquid after four years,
the people who chose the SLR are not the ones with an early retirement motive, which is the
subject of our interest. Therefore, we do not expect a bias from this simpliﬁcation. Another
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simpliﬁcation we undertake is to assume that the decision to participate in the LLR and
the decision in which LLR product to invest conditional on participation are independent
as we analyze them separately.
In order to disentangle the eﬀects that play a role in Table 5.3, we estimate (5.7) as a
probit for the whole sample. The reference group are the full-time male employees at the
national government.
Variable Regression All Regression ≥ 45 Regression ≥ 45
Coef T-Ratio Coef T-Ratio Coef T-Ratio
log inc 3.59 16.37 0.68 0.13 0.67 38.84
age 1.25 11.27 -0.14 -0.06 -0.32 -3.53
age2 -0.01 -9.98 0.00 0.01 0.00 3.90
ageloginc -0.13 -12.25 -0.02 -0.08
age2loginc 0.00 11.06 0.00 0.16
log wealth 0.03 1.06 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12
log cohortgdp 0.03 1.74 0.14 2.62 0.13 2.49
dumless60 -0.28 -3.55 -0.26 -2.42 -0.26 -2.45
gender 0.06 8.68 0.07 6.58 0.07 6.59
partner -0.11 -13.57 -0.09 -6.87 -0.09 -6.85
controls
R2 0.15 0.20 0.20
N 475414 215251 215251
Table 5.2: Regression Results: LLR Participation
This table contains the coeﬃcient estimates and their T-Ratios from regression equation (5.7).
Columns 1-2 contain the results based on the whole sample; Columns 3-4 those based on the sample
that is restricted to people older than or equal to 45; Columns 5-6 those based on the sample that
is restricted to people older than or equal to 45 but without agewage interaction terms. In all cases
we only consider the response to the ﬁrst oﬀer. See Appendix for the complete regression output.
The left half of Table 5.4 shows the results of our reduced form model. The coeﬃcients
of age and age*wage from this regression help us to calculate the change of the likeliness to
participate due to changes in age for given wage:
age eﬀect = φ(αμ(Xi))(α2 + α3age + α4 ln(wage) + 2α5age ln(wage)), (5.8)
for wage = {10, 000, 20, 000, ..., 110, 000, 120, 000}
for age = {20, 30, 40, 50, 60},
where φ is the standard normal density, α the column vector coeﬃcients and μ(Xi) the
row vector of explanatory variable means.
The graph resulting from (5.8) is plotted in Figure 5.1 for a single full-time male employ-
ees. For each age, we plot the age eﬀect by income. Positive values imply an increase in the
chance to participate. A positive slope implies that this positive impact becomes stronger
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Figure 5.1: Age Eﬀect on LLR Participation by Income
This ﬁgure plots the marginal eﬀect of age on the likeliness to participate in the LLR. Given the
outcome of regression (5.7) for the whole sample, we compute the marginal eﬀects according to (5.8).
They are conditioned on speciﬁc age (20, 30, 40, 50, 60) and income (10,000; 20,000; . . . ; 120,000)
levels. The lightest line (solid yellow) depicts the age eﬀect for the youngest people (age 20); the
darkest (dotted blue) depicts the age eﬀect for people who are 60 years old.
as income increases. We can observe this eﬀect for older people (dark lines). However, for
people younger than 40 (light lines), the age eﬀect on participation is negative and down-
ward sloping in income. Under the assumption of early retirement motivation, this negative
relationship does not make sense. If, however, the motive for the LLR participation was
maternity leave or a sabbatical, it is straightforward that one is less likely to participate the
older one becomes. We will thus reestimate (5.7), excluding individuals who are younger
than 45 years.2
Based on the estimates in middle half of Table 5.4, which exclude everyone younger than
45, we can calculate the new age eﬀect on participation. This is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Again, the lightest line (light green) depicts the age eﬀect of the youngest in this sample
(age 45) and the darker ones the ones of the older people. In contrast to Figure 5.1, there
are hardly any negative age eﬀects in Figure 5.2. Thus everyone’s likeliness to participate
in the LLR increases with age. The reason for this diﬀerence hence lies in the motives
for LLR. It is typically the younger generation that saves for a sabbatical or maternity
leave, and the elderly that save for the latter motive. Once we eliminate the youngest and
hence most of the sabbatical motive of the LLR, we see the positive age eﬀect on LLR
participation which supports the early retirement motive. Thus, savings motives evidently
2We picked age 45, because this is the ﬁrst age that renders the age*wage interactions insigniﬁcant.
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Figure 5.2: Age Eﬀect on LLR Participation by Income
This ﬁgure plots the marginal eﬀect of age on the likeliness to participate in the LLR. Given the
outcome of regression (5.7) for the sample that is restricted to people being older than or equal to
45, we compute the marginal eﬀects according to (5.8). They are conditioned on speciﬁc age (45, 50,
55 and income (10,000; 20,000; . . . ; 120,000) levels. The lightest line (solid green) depicts the age
eﬀect for the youngest people (age 45); the darkest (dotted blue) depicts the age eﬀect for people
who are 55 years old.
play a big role in the analysis of LLR participation. The second observation to be made is
that, prior to an income of e85,000 the lines become darker from the bottom to the top
as in the previous ﬁgure. Thus, people are more likely to participate in the LLR the older
they become. The last observation to be made is that for people younger than 50, the age
eﬀect becomes stronger the higher their income. For the people older than 50, the age eﬀect
becomes weaker the higher their income.
As we are interested in decisions that individuals take with respect to retirement, we
ignore the youngest generation in the rest of this section and focus on individuals older than
45 to circumvent the sabbatical motive. The results of the reestimation of (5.7) without the
interaction terms and without the young people are presented in the right half of Table 5.4.
Most variables are signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance level. Higher wages and getting older,
yield a higher LLR-participation probability, as predicted by our structural life-cycle model
and supported by Figure 5.2. The higher the salary, the looser the liquidity constraint, and
hence one can aﬀord to put money into the LLR. The elderly are more likely to participate,
because it is more urgent for them to ﬁnance their early retirement if desired. The cohort
eﬀect is positive, indicating that people who started working at higher per capita income
levels (the younger cohorts) are more inclined to save (via the LLR). Wealth is insigniﬁcant
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in our analysis, indicating that wage levels are more present in individuals’ minds. The
part-time dummy is negative. For part-timers the additional leisure during retirement is
less than for full-timers. Thus, their preference for additional leisure may be smaller and
reduce the probability to participate in the LLR. Moreover, we ﬁnd that individuals with
a partner are more likely to engage in the LLR as indicated by the descriptive evidence in
Table 5.3. Once we correct for income and part-time eﬀects, we see females having a higher
probability of participating than their equivalent males.
5.5 The LLR-Investment Decision in a Life-Cycle Framework
Conditional on participation, individuals have to chose between three products that the
LLR oﬀers: a bond fund, a life-cycle fund and an equity fund. The prospective clients
receive brochures via regular mail and email or ﬁnd the necessary information about the
LLR and its products online. From a risk-return perspective, the general LLR brochure and
the ﬁnancial leaﬂets present the bond fund as the safest investment, yielding a predeﬁned
guaranteed return on the bond fund of approximately 4.5% in 2006 and 2007. The equity
fund is described as a risky investment because capital is only invested in equity. This capital
the individual cannot even be sure to receive back upon the end of the contract. People
can download a mandatory risk leaﬂet, which placards the worst case scenario. The most
complicated product is the life-cycle (LC) fund. It is designed such that the proportion
of risky assets is decreased by the insurer towards the contract end. Contributions are
guaranteed to the investor as a minimum return upon completion of his contract. Apart
from the risk-return perspective, the insurer also draws the attention to the investment
horizon. This moves especially the equity fund into a better light, which is now presented
as being suitable for investment horizons of longer than eight years, depending on the
individuals’ risk preferences. For individuals, who aim at utilizing their LLR wealth after
eight years and are rather risk averse, the bond fund is recommended. For intermediate
cases, the LC fund is suggested.
Campbell and Viceira (2001) derive that investors should increase the position in safer
assets (bonds) as the they get older and likewise have a larger position in riskier assets
(stocks) when younger. These tendencies critically hinge on the assumption of riskfree (non-
tradable) human capital, which is equal to the expected discounted stream of labor income,
and no or low correlation between shocks to unexpected stock returns and unexpected
permanent labor income. In this case, labor income is treated as a riskfree asset and
therefore reduces the proportion of safe assets (bonds). As soon as labor income carries too
much risk, i.e. becomes an implicit risky asset, these optimal strategies break down and
young and old individuals are better oﬀ tilting towards safer assets.
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Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2007) elaborate on the repercussions of a cor-
relation or even cointegration between human capital and the stock market. They ﬁnd
evidence for cointegration between the labor income and stock dividends for the years 1929
to 2004. Based on the latter assumption they set up a model, calibrate it closely in line
with Campbell and Viceira (2001), and demonstrate that the age proﬁle of stock market
participation is rather hump shaped. In the early stage of life, people possess a lot of hu-
man capital, which is cointegrated with stock market returns. Due to this characteristic,
individuals are overly exposed to risk and should compensate by going short in stocks and
long in bonds early in life. As they get older, their human capital decreases and hence their
risk exposure, which should then be compensated by reducing the amount of bonds and
likewise increase the amount of stock.
Given the special, quite secure nature in the civil service sector we expect the size of
the correlation between labor income and stock returns to be negligible and hence to ﬁnd
evidence in favor of Campbell and Viceira (2001).
5.6 The LLR-Investment Decision empirically
Following the argument in the previous section, we expect that the position of the bond
fund should increase and the position of the equity fund decrease with age in the LLR
account. As the LC fund is a life-cycle product that is adjusted automatically it should be
invariant to age. Table 5.3 below reports the percentage of individuals holding a positive
fraction of a certain LLR product by age. It demonstrates that our descriptives are, apart
from the middle column, in line with life-cycle theory.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5.3 refers to the safest LLR product, the bond fund. The
fraction of individuals holding the bond fund is increasing with age by approximately 140%:
starting with youngest participants with 40% and increasing up to 99% for the 55 year olds.
Furthermore, note that the means from all but the youngest are statistically diﬀerent from
the means of the next age groups. Thus, the proportion of bond-fund holders increases
signiﬁcantly. Looking at the means for the riskiest product, we can ﬁrstly observe that
hardly anyone invests in this fund. Next, we see the proportion of equity-fund holders to
decrease with age as suggested by life-cycle theory. It amounts to a reduction of about 80%
between age 45 and age 55. The life-cycle fund also exhibits a downward trend of about 95%
and hence behaves opposite to the age invariant nature as suggested by life-cycle theory. If
individuals understood this product, they would not alter this position with age. We will
investigate the partial eﬀect of age in the regression analysis further below.
Table 5.4 is the counterpart to Table 5.3, presenting the fraction of individuals having
a positive position in the respective product by wage. There are hardly any trends visible.
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Age bond fund>0 LC fund>0 equity fund>0 N
100% bonds bonds and stocks 100% stocks
45 0.404 0.764 0.057 1266
46 0.389 0.776* 0.055 1372
47 0.418 0.750 0.056** 1490
48 0.424*** 0.739** 0.041 1530
49 0.469*** 0.702*** 0.035 1704
50 0.522*** 0.645*** 0.027 1869
51 0.616*** 0.524*** 0.022** 1923
52 0.707*** 0.405*** 0.012 2010
53 0.777*** 0.311*** 0.010 2076
54 0.906*** 0.153*** 0.006 1970
55 0.986*** 0.033*** 0.012 425
all LL part 0.596 0.537 0.029 17635
Table 5.3: Descriptives: Product Choice of LLR Participants by Age Categories
This table contains the percentage of participants, who are older than or equal to 45, investing in
one of the three LLR fund products by age (N = 17, 633). Column 1 contains the percentage of
participants investing in the bond fund; Column 2 those investing in the LC fund; and Column 3
those investing in the equity fund. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10 indicate the signiﬁcance
level of the diﬀerence between the respective mean and its successor. We only consider the response
to the ﬁrst.
income bond fund>0 LC fund>0 equity fund>0 N
100% bonds bonds and stocks 100% stocks
<10 0.333 0.833 0.000*** 6
[10, 20) 0.563 0.571 0.045 112
[20, 30) 0.501*** 0.604*** 0.019*** 1034
[30, 40) 0.567*** 0.552*** 0.034 3172
[40, 50 0.633*** 0.499*** 0.032*** 8359
[50, 60) 0.568 0.578 0.017 3020
[60, 70) 0.591 0.554* 0.023 1047
[70, 80) 0.570 0.602 0.038** 495
[80, 90) 0.581 0.557 0.014* 210
[90, 100) 0.618 0.579* 0.066 76
[100, 110) 0.500 0.727** 0.023 44
[110, 120) 0.667 0.389 0.056 18
≥ 120 0.548 0.595 0.024 42
all LL part 0.596 0.537 0.028806 17635
Table 5.4: Descriptives: Product Choice of LLR Participants by Wage Categories
This table contains the percentage of participants, who are older than or equal to 45, investing in
one of the three LLR fund products by thousands of income (N = 17, 633). Column 1 contains the
percentage of participants investing in the bond fund; Column 2 those investing in the LC fund; and
Column 3 those investing in the equity fund. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10 indicate the
signiﬁcance level of the diﬀerence between the respective mean and its successor. We only consider
the response to the ﬁrst.
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The bond position seems to increase slightly while mixed fund position decreases slightly.
The equity position remains very low.
To disentangle all eﬀects, we turn to regression analysis. Except for the age wage
interaction terms, the explanatory variables are the same as in (5.7). Some control variables
are dropped due a lack of observations in some categories. The LLR participant has to
decide upon investing in the three fonds simultaneously. Since the allocations are related,
we estimate the likeliness to hold the respective LLR product as a multivariate probit model,
which allows for correlation among the residuals of the three equations:
Iij = α0j + α1j ln (wagei) + α2jagei + α3jage
2
i + α6j ln(Wi) + α
′
7jZi + ij
for j = {bond fund, LC fund, equity fund}
(5.9)
To analyze the age eﬀect, we calculate the total eﬀect for a full-time male employee
according to (5.10) and plot the likeliness to invest in a certain product due to changes in
age in Figure 5.3.
age eﬀect = φ(αμ(Xi))(α2 + 2α3age), (5.10)
where φ is the standard normal density, α the column vector coeﬃcients and μ(Xi) the
row vector of explanatory variable means.
Figure 5.3: Age Eﬀect on Product Positions
This ﬁgure plots the marginal eﬀect of age on the likeliness to invest in the bond fund, the LC
fund and the equity fund. Given the outcome of regression (5.9) for the sample that is restricted to
people being older than or equal to 45, we compute the marginal eﬀects according to (5.10). They
are conditioned on speciﬁc age (45, 50, 55) levels. The marginal eﬀect with respect to the equity
fund is depicted on the right y-axis due to its small scale in comparison to the eﬀects on other two
funds.
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The likeliness to invest in the bond fund the older one is is positive as of age 47 as the
dotted blue line illustrates. Thus, there is an increasing number of people older than 47 who
invest in the bond fund. As it is upward sloping until age 52, the eﬀect becomes stronger
the older the people. Consequently, the chance that a 52 year old invests in the bond fund
is much larger than that of a 47 year old. After age 52 the adjustment process slows down.
Because of the decreasing human capital over age, the LLR participants’ choice to invest
more in bonds the older they become adheres to standard life-cycle theory. The results of
the equity fund are the opposite and hence also in line with life-cycle theory. The equity
fund (solid green line) lies in the negative quadrant as of age 47, indicating the people are
less likely to invest in the equity fund the older they become and it is downward sloping
until age 49, indicating that the this trend becomes more extreme. The adjustment slows
down again thereafter. Overall, the elderly decrease their risk exposure as a response to
fewer riskless human capital. Contrary to life-cycle theory, the people are less likely to
invest in the LC fund as they age as the dashed red line visualizes. It is mostly negative
and downward sloping as the equity fund although it is constructed as an age invariant
fund. Again, the LLR participants do not seem to understand this product.
The coeﬃcient of the logarithm of wage in Table 5.5 is positively signiﬁcant at the 1%
level for the bond and the equity fund. We also ﬁnd a positive but insigniﬁcant income
eﬀect for the LC fund. As the likeliness to invest in all funds increases with income, people
spread their LLR contributions more the more they earn but unrelated to the level of
implicit risk in their human capital. According to the behavioral ﬁnance literature, there
is a diﬀerence in selected risk-exposure between men and women. Based on an American
Online Broker Account data set Barber and Odean (2001) conclude that men are more
prone to risky investments and higher turnover than women. Our research indicates that
this tendency also holds for the Netherlands and choice of pension investments. As Table
5.5 demonstrates, Dutch females in the civil service sector are also in favor of safer assets
while the males have a higher chance to allocate some LLR wealth to the LC fund.
Until now we have shown that our sample behaves in accordance with the life-cycle
model regarding the holdings of a risky and safe asset but fails to meet the life-cycle model
implications concerning the holdings of the LC product. We continue by investigating
the portfolio weights of individuals’ LLR accounts. We estimate least squares regressions
simultaneously for the LLR products to supplement our previous ﬁndings:
yij = α0j + α1j ln (wagei) + α2jagei + α3jage
2
i + α6j ln(Wi) + α
′
7jZi + ij
for j = {bond fund, LC fund, equity fund}
(5.11)
Due to the additivity property of our dependent variable, it will only be once estimated for
the bond fund and the life-cycle fund and obtain the equity fund by the identity
∑
j yij = 1.
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Variable Bond Fund LC Fund Equity Fund
log inc 0.11 2.60 0.02 0.53 0.44 3.99
age -3.12 -13.61 3.10 14.88 1.88 3.24
age2 0.03 14.08 -0.03 -15.42 -0.02 -3.38
log wealth 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.84 0.03 0.15
log cohortgdp 0.52 4.28 -0.41 -3.44 -0.47 -1.63
dumless60 -0.18 -0.59 0.26 0.91 0.35 0.40
gender 0.21 7.27 -0.24 -8.55 -0.11 -1.36
partner -0.03 -0.97 0.03 0.89 0.16 2.29
genderdumless60 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.03 -0.24 -0.57
partnerdumless60 0.10 0.70 -0.19 -1.36 0.16 0.36
sector code2 -0.03 -0.18 -0.20 -1.05 1.45 3.05
sector code3 -0.11 -1.73 0.07 1.21 0.64 2.26
sector code4 0.16 0.44 0.36 0.97 -1.15 -1.33
sector code5 -0.18 -0.52 -0.25 -0.72
sector code6 0.03 0.45 -0.08 -1.32 0.71 2.33
sector code7 -0.08 -0.77 0.08 0.79
sector code8 0.18 1.27 -0.26 -1.89
sector code9 0.05 0.60 -0.16 -1.88 0.68 1.68
sector code11 -0.03 -0.27 -0.06 -0.52
sector code15 -0.41 -2.49 0.27 1.57
sector code17 0.32 5.13 -0.33 -5.43
sector code1316 -0.07 -1.00 0.05 0.69
sector code1214 -0.06 -0.79 0.09 1.22 0.42 0.99
oﬀer type4 0.33 0.77 0.40 1.01 0.51 0.38
oﬀer type5 0.76 1.77 0.06 0.16 0.39 0.32
oﬀer type7 0.80 1.86 0.10 0.26 0.75 0.57
oﬀer type8 0.69 1.58 0.26 0.65 -2.28 -0.02
oﬀer type9 0.74 1.65 0.13 0.32 -2.28 -0.01
oﬀer type11 1.33 2.70 -1.06 -2.27 1.92 1.85
oﬀer date 0.00 -1.51 0.00 1.73 0.01 2.21
constant 84.59 6.09 -89.81 -6.58 -179.63 -2.90
N 17,633 17,633 17,633
Table 5.5: Regression Results: Portfolio Position of LLR Participants
This table contains the coeﬃcient estimates and their T-Ratios from multivariate probit regression
equation (5.9) based on participants older or equal to 45. Columns 1-2 contain the results for like-
liness to invest in the bond fund; Columns 3-4 those for the LC fund; Columns 5-6 those for the
equity fund. In all cases we only consider the response to the ﬁrst oﬀer. Oﬀer types 2-4 relate to the
birth cohorts; Oﬀer type 5 refers to people for whom the LLR would be integrated with the pension;
Oﬀer types 6-7 are standard brochures without any additional savings suggestions; Oﬀer types 8-9
are standard brochures with additional savings suggestions; Oﬀer type 11 was sent to employees of
the police. Industries 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 1316 and 1214 refer to employees in the Mili-
tary, Education, Police, Judiciary, Municipalities, Provinces, Water/Maintenance, Other, Voluntary
Participants, University Teaching Hospitals, Energy/Utility/Water industry, Research/Science and
Adult Education, and Academics and Higher Educational Services, respectively.
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Variable Bond Fund LC Fund Equity Fund
log inc 0.02 1.27 -0.03 -2.01 0.01 3.70
age -0.73 -12.17 0.68 11.42 0.05 4.49
age2 0.01 12.85 -0.01 -12.04 0.00 -4.81
log wealth -0.02 -0.78 0.02 0.80 0.00 -0.04
log cohortgdp 0.06 1.59 -0.02 -0.53 -0.04 -5.48
dumless60 -0.08 -0.92 0.06 0.66 0.02 1.34
gender 0.07 8.43 -0.07 -8.38 0.00 -0.73
partner 0.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.03 0.00 1.70
genderdumless60 0.02 0.48 -0.01 -0.22 -0.01 -1.35
partnerdumless60 0.03 0.64 -0.02 -0.58 0.00 -0.33
sector code2 0.02 0.33 -0.04 -0.66 0.02 1.68
sector code3 -0.02 -1.30 0.02 1.12 0.00 1.45
sector code4 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.53 -0.08 -3.33
sector code5 0.03 0.34 -0.03 -0.33
sector code6 0.03 1.47 -0.03 -1.64 0.00 1.17
sector code7 -0.01 -0.35 0.01 0.34
sector code8 0.07 1.60 -0.07 -1.61
sector code9 0.04 1.76 -0.05 -1.84 0.00 0.35
sector code11 0.02 0.47 -0.02 -0.48
sector code15 -0.09 -1.86 0.09 1.85
sector code17 0.12 6.55 -0.12 -6.56
sector code1316 -0.01 -0.67 0.01 0.63
sector code1214 -0.01 -0.51 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.30
oﬀer type4 0.08 0.60 0.02 0.18 -0.10 -4.04
oﬀer type5 0.21 1.64 -0.11 -0.87 -0.10 -4.02
oﬀer type7 0.20 1.60 -0.10 -0.83 -0.10 -4.04
oﬀer type8 0.16 1.27 -0.06 -0.49 -0.10 -4.05
oﬀer type9 0.19 1.41 -0.09 -0.65 -0.10 -3.97
oﬀer type11 0.46 2.98 -0.45 -2.97 -0.01 -0.19
oﬀer date 0.00 -1.92 0.00 1.69 0.00 1.28
constant 23.69 5.61 -20.92 -5.00 -1.77 -2.18
R2 0.25 0.25 0.04
N 17,633 17,633 17,633
Table 5.6: Regression Results: Portfolio Weights of LLR Participants
This table contains the coeﬃcient estimates and their T-Ratios from SURE regression equation
(5.11) based on participants older or equal to 45. Columns 1-2 contain the results for likeliness to
invest in the bond fund; Columns 3-4 those for the LC fund; Columns 5-6 those for the equity fund.
In all cases we only consider the response to the ﬁrst oﬀer. For additional table notes see Table 5.5.
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Again, note that some control variables have been dropped due a lack of observations in
some categories. The regression results can be found in Table 5.6.
Figure 5.4: Age Eﬀect on Portfolio Weights
This ﬁgure plots the marginal eﬀect of age on the likeliness to invest in the bond fund, the LC fund
and the equity fund. Given the outcome of regression (5.11) for the sample that is restricted to
people being older than or equal to 45, we compute the marginal eﬀects. They are conditioned on
speciﬁc age (45, 50, 55) levels.
Figure 5.4 plots the age eﬀect derived from the regression coeﬃcients on the portfolio
weights of the three funds. The dotted blue line is in the positive quadrant, which therefore
provides evidence for individuals to tilt towards safer products as they age. As in Figure 5.3,
it is also upward sloping, indicating that this eﬀect becomes more extreme as people age until
age 55. The LC fund (dashed red) and the equity fund (solid green) are predominantly in
the negative quadrant, implying that these weights decrease with people’s age. Both funds
are downward sloping as in Figure 5.3. We come to the same conclusion as before. The LLR
participants do not behave according to life-cycle theory when it comes to the LC fund.
The previous results suggest that individuals do not understand the age-invariant na-
ture of the life-cycle product. Viceira (2008) has recently elaborated on the augmentation
of Markowitz’ Theory to modern long term strategic asset allocation by relaxing the as-
sumptions of constant risk and return on investment opportunities and the independence
between wealth and income. From relaxing these assumptions, it follows that there is no
unique optimal portfolio for all investors as Markowitz and the mutual fund theorem im-
ply. There is rather one for each investor, which depends on the investor’s age and risk
preferences. He discusses the implications from several theoretical and empirical life-cycle
studies with regard to individuals’ 401(k) portfolio (mis-) allocations and encourages setting
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the default fund to a life-course fund. Furthermore the life-course fund should oﬀer some
alteration possibilities depending on the participants’ risk preferences. Since our results
indicated that individuals do not understand the life-cycle product, it would also be helpful
for the Dutch to set the life-cycle fund as a default within the LLR and explain its nature
better to people. Individuals can then still alter the allocation weights depending on their
risk preferences.
Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden (2003) investigate asset allocations in US 401(k) plans
from a behavioral perspective and ﬁnd that most people choose extreme positions, where
extreme refers to the case that the portfolio consists of one asset type only. In their sample,
around 48% of the people have no equity and around 22% have only equity. Hence, the
minority, only around 30%, diversiﬁes to some extent. This behavior is clearly at odds
with the standard life-cycle propositions. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) analyzed the use and
usefulness of the heuristic “1/n rule” in US 401(k) plans. Based on experiments with 401(k)
plan owners and their real-life accounts, they notice that on average individuals increase
their equity allocations with the number of available equity funds. The welfare costs are
in some cases substantial but hard to interpret ex post as well as ex ante. As displayed
in Table 5.7, our data constitutes some support for the Agnew et al.’s observed extreme
positions and less for Benartzi and Thaler’s heuristic rule.
position Bond fund LC Fund Equity Fund Total
1 0.458 0.386 0.003 0.847
0.5 0.078 0.078 0.078
0.5 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.5 0.005 0.005 0.005
neither full nor half 0.069
Table 5.7: Descriptives: Positions of LL participants
This table reports the fraction of participants older than 45 (N = 17, 633), who choose certain
portfolio weights. We only consider the response to the ﬁrst oﬀer.
More than 46% of our sample chooses an extreme position, where most of them decide in
favor of the safe and a few for the riskiest only. Since a 100% position in the life-cycle fund
does not count as non-diversiﬁed, the fraction of non-diversiﬁed portfolios in our sample is
lower than in the US case. Around 39% of the LLR participants invest in the LC fund.
Given the obvious misunderstanding of the LC fund it is doubtful whether these 39% chose
this product conscious of its diversiﬁcation. About 8% of the LLR participants allocate
their premia evenly over two of the products; 7% not according to typical weighting. These
allocations imply that about 54%, conscious or unconscious, diversify to some extent.
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5.7 Conclusion
This paper investigated whether individuals are capable of taking responsibility for ﬁnancial
retirement choices with the aid of the newly introduced life-course savings arrangement
(Levensloopregeling) in the Netherlands. We set up a structural life-cycle model, which
illustrates the trade-oﬀ between, on the one hand, leisure and tax advantages and, on the
other hand, three years of working. It became clear that the preference for leisure need to
be suﬃciently high for individuals to engage in the LLR. Moreover, due to human capital
considerations life-cycle models propose a shift towards safer investments, i.e. the bond
fund in the LLR, the older one gets and likewise towards riskier investments, i.e. the equity
fund, the younger one is and an age invariant investment behavior with regard to the LC
fund.
We ﬁnd savings motives to play an important role in the participation decision. Focus-
ing on the early retirement motive, the empirical evidence from the reduced form largely
supported the implications from theory. There are still not that many Dutch employees in
the civil service sector, who participate in the LLR, but those who do, do so in accordance
with the model predictions. Participation increases with age and wage after controlling for
other eﬀects. Most of their portfolio choices also comply with theory. Individuals invest
less in the bond fund the younger they are. For the life-cycle fund and the equity fund
it is exactly the opposite way around. The inconsistencies regarding the life-cycle fund
may be brought about by the ﬁnancial instruction leaﬂet of the product. The government
made information leaﬂets mandatory that present the equity fund, for instance, as a highly
risky investment and the LC fund as a risky investment. Financially illiterate individuals
could take this information for granted and rather refrain from this product choice. Thus,
we further have to help the individuals to understand the usefulness of the LLR and the
characteristics of the life-cycle funds or set it as a default fund as Viceira (2008) suggests.
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5.A Appendix A: Complete Regression Output of (5.7)
Variable Regression All Regression ≥ 45 Regression ≥ 45
Coef T-Ratio Coef T-Ratio Coef T-Ratio
log inc 3.59 16.37 0.68 0.13 0.67 38.84
age 1.25 11.27 -0.14 -0.06 -0.32 -3.53
age2 -0.01 -9.98 0.00 0.01 0.00 3.90
ageloginc -0.13 -12.25 -0.02 -0.08
age2loginc 0.00 11.06 0.00 0.16
log wealth 0.03 1.06 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12
log cohortgdp 0.03 1.74 0.14 2.62 0.13 2.49
dumless60 -0.28 -3.55 -0.26 -2.42 -0.26 -2.45
gender 0.06 8.68 0.07 6.58 0.07 6.59
partner -0.11 -13.57 -0.09 -6.87 -0.09 -6.85
partner*dumless60 0.09 3.31 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.31
gender*dumless60 0.06 1.57 0.12 2.56 0.12 2.59
oﬀer type3 0.50 4.06
oﬀer type4 0.76 7.57 0.78 6.02 0.77 5.98
oﬀer type5 0.55 5.42 0.51 3.97 0.51 3.93
oﬀer type7 1.00 9.89 1.10 8.52 1.09 8.49
oﬀer type8 1.01 9.68 1.01 7.64 1.01 7.61
oﬀer type9 1.57 13.50 1.67 11.43 1.66 11.39
oﬀer type11 1.76 17.48 2.01 15.89 2.00 15.88
oﬀer date 0.00 6.69 0.00 4.95 0.00 4.93
sector code2 -0.50 -11.29 -0.50 -8.43 -0.50 -8.42
sector code3 -0.06 -3.58 -0.07 -2.89 -0.07 -2.84
sector code4 -0.24 -4.66 -0.24 -2.82 -0.24 -2.80
sector code5 -0.13 -1.32 -0.19 -1.43 -0.20 -1.45
sector code6 -0.11 -6.09 -0.13 -5.40 -0.13 -5.37
sector code7 -0.03 -1.25 -0.02 -0.52 -0.02 -0.50
sector code8 -0.01 -0.26 -0.04 -0.73 -0.04 -0.71
sector code9 0.11 4.63 0.13 3.97 0.13 3.98
sector code11 -0.04 -1.28 -0.07 -1.53 -0.07 -1.53
sector code15 -0.66 -20.31 -0.74 -15.25 -0.74 -15.28
sector code17 0.90 48.37 1.02 39.97 1.02 39.98
sector code1316 -0.16 -8.08 -0.17 -6.16 -0.17 -6.12
sector code1214 -0.23 -11.17 -0.22 -7.73 -0.22 -7.68
constant -54.96 -16.01 -24.97 -0.46 -24.64 -5.19
Table 5.A1: Regression Output of (5.7)
This table contains the coeﬃcient estimates and their T-Ratios from regression equation (5.7). Columns 1-2 contain
the results based on the whole sample; Columns 3-6 those based on the sample that is restricted to people older than
or equal to 45; Columns 5-6 exclude the agewage interaction terms. In all cases we only consider the response to
the ﬁrst oﬀer. Oﬀer types 2-4 relate to the birth cohorts; Oﬀer type 5 refers to people for whom the LLR would
be integrated with the pension; Oﬀer types 6-7 are standard brochures without any additional savings suggestions;
Oﬀer types 8-9 are standard brochures with additional savings suggestions; Oﬀer type 11 was sent to employees of the
police. Industries 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 1316 and 1214 refer to employees in the Military, Education, Police,
Judiciary, Municipalities, Provinces, Water/Maintenance, Other, Voluntary Participants, University Teaching Hospi-
tals, Energy/Utility/Water industry, Research/Science and Adult Education, and Academics and Higher Educational
Services, respectively.
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Conclusion
Microeconomics teaches you simple economic principles. As the price for a good increases,
consumer demand decreases. Similarly, as the price for labor increases, individuals’ labor
supply increases while employers’ demand decreases. After years of studying economics, you
therefore believe that individuals take their decisions according to simple microeconomic
principles. After one month of analyzing the so-called “agents” using empirical data, you
realize that there is more than prices that trigger decisions of “agents”. The “agents”
are also called individuals – for a good reason! They are very individual. And putting a
thousand of them into one equation, where we aim to explain individuals’ choices on the
left hand side with the information we have about them on the right hand side, is hard. It
requires us empirical researchers to think beyond simple microeconomic principles. Once
we are able to explain a certain percentage of individuals’ decisions, we are happy and dare
to come to conclusions about individuals’ behavior.
In the introduction, I promised to provide some conclusions about the following ques-
tions.
1. How should and how do people save adequately?
2. When should and when do people retire given oﬃcial retirement regulation?
The second, fourth, and ﬁfth chapter of my dissertation deal with the ﬁrst, the third chapter
with the second question.
Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, we analyze individuals’ subjective ﬁnancial well-being at retirement in the
sense of retirement income adequacy in light of pension reforms in Germany. Since the
reforms decreased the real return to the public pension system across birth cohorts, we
hypothesize that younger cohorts feel worse ﬁnancially prepared for their retirement than
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older cohorts, given that they have not retired yet. Additionally, the people who have not
retired yet should acknowledge the importance of additional income sources more because
they will facilitate saving in the second and third pillar. Our analysis reveals that individuals
evaluate their ﬁnancial situation broadly in line with sophisticated life-cycle models; that
is, they are more optimistic about their (future) retirement income the more they earn
and the better educated and wealthier they are. The negative birth cohort eﬀect suggests
that people are aware of the demographic and political risk and the reform implications.
However, despite the awareness of a less prosperous position, the young cohorts do not put
more weight on additional income sources. These conclusions are in line with each other
because if individuals instead had additional income sources and appreciated them, thus
making an eﬀort to ﬁll the pension gap, they would not have to feel bad.
This chapter contributes to the empirical aspect of Question (1): How do people perceive
their retirement income and thus, implicitly, their savings? We can conclude that individuals
evaluate their ﬁnancial situation broadly in line with sophisticated life-cycle models and
that they are aware of the reform implications. However, despite the awareness of a less
prosperous position, the young cohorts do not put more weight on additional income sources.
Further research is necessary to investigate why young cohorts do not evaluate additional
income sources as more important for their future ﬁnancial situation. Is it because they
discount the future too much and / or procrastinate. Are there inertia? Or do they simply
try to earn more labor income?
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 builds on ﬁndings that women’s labor force participation has changed across
cohorts. Women are better educated, are more often divorced, give birth to fewer children,
and are more active in the labor force. The change is most accentuated for women in western
Germany. Their employment life-cycle pattern converges to that of men. Consequently, they
acquire more pension claims, which should aﬀect retirement behavior of women, at least in
western German. We investigate retirement behavior in the option value framework (Stock
and Wise 1990). Our results show that the choice of the dependent variable is important.
When taking employment exit we get a substantially higher preference for leisure than when
taking retirement entry. We also see that there is a diﬀerence in this preference between men
and women and people in eastern and western Germany. When plotting the option value
and social security wealth, we see 1) regular drops in one year increments, which visualize
the increasing eligibility for women and 2) the level rather higher for younger than for older
cohorts despite the institutional advantage of the latter, which indicates that women have
indeed gathered higher pension claims.
In our retirement explaining regression, we also include cohort trends that are related
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to the opportunity cost of work (number of children and the proportion of university grad-
uates) to analyze the impact of the changing female employment patters. We learn that
these trends are signiﬁcant in determining the age at which someone leaves work or enters
retirement. The trend related to education indicates later retirement while the trend related
to kids indicates earlier retirement of later born cohorts in western Germany. In eastern
Germany, we can only identify the latter regularity. As previous research by Hanel (2009),
we also observe the time between labor force exit and retirement entry to widen for later
born cohorts in western Germany. This does not hold in eastern German. Thus, overall
we do not ﬁnd strong evidence that increasing female labor force participation when young
also leads to overall higher labor force participation of women. Younger western German
women tend to leave the labor force earlier while younger eastern German women tend to
postpone labor force exit. However, their behavior is still inﬂuenced strongly from market
transition during the 1990s.
With regard to Question (2) we learn that cohort trends that are related to the oppor-
tunity cost of work are signiﬁcant in determining the age at which someone leaves work or
enters retirement. However, these trends only allow us to explain at most 1.9% more of
the variation in retirement. In the future, it will be interesting to extend our analysis of
retirement behavior to future cohort in order to see how recent changes in labor and child
policies will inﬂuence labor market participation later in life. It would also be helpful to
merge the data set with another one as SHARE to include indicators of private wealth and
household income. Concerning the construction of SSW and the OV, one may consider to
model uncertainty. Especially for younger people it is not certain that they are able to reach
a certain retirement age without getting unemployed or sick in the meantime. To allow for
this aspect could set up multiple pathways that take account of interrupted working lives.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 highlights the importance of tax incentives in the optimal savings decisions.
We solve a life-cycle model to determine optimal consumption, labor and savings for early
retirement. This model is set up to mimic the Dutch Levensloopregeling that serves, amongst
others, as an early retirement scheme. The agent therefore has a choice to save his money in
a regular wealth account or in a tax-deferrable account (TDA). We show analytically that
there is a contemporaneous relationship between consumption and leisure, which depends
on the income tax incentives. If an agent hits one of the kinks in the income tax schedule
by choosing a speciﬁc labor supply, he only adjusts his consumption to improve his utility.
Furthermore, we point out that the TDA becomes ﬁnancially more attractive relative to
the regular wealth account the higher the wealth tax in the regular wealth account and
the higher the marginal income tax rate upon saving relative to upon withdrawing. Given
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moderate patience, our results show that the agents save more in the TDA as they age. Our
simulations demonstrate that the TDA facilitates early retirement after age 61. At age 62,
about 20% of TDA users and not TDA users retire early. At age 63 and 64, the percentage
of early retired TDA users is much larger than that of not TDA users. Consequently,
the TDA helps to achieve a longer early retirement period. In terms of certainty equivalent
consumption, the TDA increases the agent’s utility by 1.24% (e5,600 of certain consumption
over the lifetime) in the benchmark scenario. At the same time, however, the government
foregoes about 14% (e12,000 over the lifetime) of taxes compared to someone who is not
using the TDA. Thus, there is an obvious mismatch.
With regard to the normative aspect of Question (1), this allows us to conclude that
people should save in a TDA when it is oﬀered to them. Depending on their time preferences
they should start saving in the TDA at diﬀerent ages. Given imperfect substitution between
consumption and leisure, individuals do not need a higher savings rate in order to ﬁnance
early retirement. At the same time, our simulations show that tax incentives to trigger
individuals’ saving can be costly for the government. Since it is often said that the Dutch
Levensloopregeling is especially useful for high income earners, it would be interesting to
vary the level and riskiness of income to see which type of income earner beneﬁts most
from the TDA. In the Netherlands, there are also debates concerning the applicability of
the TDA. It is criticized that it cannot be used during times of unemployment for instance.
Another interesting extension of this model may thus be to allow for unemployment risk
and at the same time alleviate the illiquidity of the TDA during these times.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 investigates the participation and investment decision that the Dutch have to
make with regard to the Levensloopregeling empirically. The analysis of the participation
and asset allocation decision in this chapter shows that the Dutch indeed adhere to the
implications from the previously solved life-cycle model. Moreover, we ﬁnd that our samples
make their investment decision with regard to bonds and equities broadly in line with life-
cycle theory: Conditional on participation, the likeliness to invest in a bond fund increases
and the one to invest in an equity fund decreases with age. However, when it comes to the
life-cycle fund, which is automatically adjusted to the age of the participant, the participants
do not behave in line with life-cycle theory.
With regard to the empirical aspect of Question (1), we ﬁnd that the savings mo-
tive makes a diﬀerence for the behavior. The younger people, who are probably more
interested in a sabbatical or maternity leave, are more likely to invest in the LLR the
younger they are. Moreover, young people with low income are more likely to invest in
the LLR than young people with higher income. The older they become the larger the
136
income eﬀect. The most evident question left is, why do not more people use the Lev-
ensloopregeling? A survey in the future can shed light on this. It may also be useful
to analyze these questions in a panel data framework to be able to identify time trends.
It remains a challenge to put a thousand individuals into one equation – or into a normative
life-cycle model for that matter. However, if we carefully construct (possibly) complicated
structural life-cycle models we get reasonably close to actual human behavior. And if we
deduce reduced forms from the structural model and estimate them on the basis of the
individuals, we realize that individuals, on average, get a lot of ﬁnancial decisions right.
And if it were much easier – what would our challenge lie in then?
137
Chapter 6 Conclusion

Bibliography
Agnew, J., Balduzzi, P. and Sunden, A.: 2003, Portfolio choice and trading in a large 401(k)
plan, The American Economic Review 93(1), 193–215.
Alessie, R. and Kapteyn, A.: 1999, Wealth and savings: data and trends in the Netherlands,
Serie Research Memoranda 0046, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics,
Business Administration and Econometrics.
Ammermu¨ller, A., Weber, A. M. andWesterheide, P.: 2005, Die Entwicklung und Verteilung
des Vermo¨gens privater Haushalte unter besonderer Beru¨cksichtigung des Produk-
tivvermo¨gens - Abschlussbericht zum Forschungsauftrag des Bundesministeriums fu¨r
Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung, Accenture and Institute of Insurance Economics,
University of St. Gallen.
Antolin, P. and Scarpetta, S.: 1998, Microeconometric analysis of the retirement decision,
OECD Economics Department Working Paper 204.
Attanasio, O., Banks, J. and Wakeﬁeld, M.: 2004, Eﬀectiveness of tax incentives to boost
(retirement) saving: Theoretical motivation and empirical evidence, IFS Working Pa-
pers (W04/33), Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, UK.
Ba¨cker, G., Bispinck, R., Hofemann, K. and Naegele, G.: 2008, Sozial-politik und soziale
Lage in Deutschland, O¨konomische Grundlagen, Einkommen, Arbeit und Arbeitsmarkt,
Arbeit und Gesundheitsschutz, Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden.
Banks, J., Blundell, R., Disney, R. and Emmerson, C.: 2002, Retirement, pensions and the
adequacy of saving: A guide to the debate, Open Access publications from University
College London, University College London.
Barber, B. and Odean, T.: 2001, Boys will be boys: Gender, overconﬁdence, and common
stock investment, Quaterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 261–292.
Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R.: 2001, Naive diversiﬁcation stragegies in retirement saving
plans, American Economic Review 91(1), 79–98.
139
Bibliography
Benzoni, L., Collin-Dufresne, P. and Goldstein, R.: 2007, Portfolio choice over the life-cycle
when the stock and labor market are cointegrated, Journal of Finance 62, 2123–2167.
Berkel, B. and Bo¨rsch-Supan, A.: 2004, Pension Reform in Germany: The Impact on
Retirement Decisions,, FinanzArchiv 60, 393–421.
Berkovec, J. and Stern, S.: 1991, Job exit behavior of older men, Econometrica 59, 189–210.
Biewen, M.: 2000, Income inequality in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s, Review of
Income and Wealth 46(1).
Blanchﬂower, D. G. and Oswald, A.: 2008, Is well-being u-shaped over the life cycle?, Social
Science and Medicine 66(6), 1733–1749.
Blau, D. M. and Riphahn, R. T.: 1999, Labor force transition of older married couples in
Germany, Labour Economics 6, 229–251.
Bloom, D., Canning, D. and Graham, B.: 2003, Longevity and life-cycle savings, Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics 105(3), 319–338.
Bonoli, G.: 2003, Two worlds of pension reform in Western Europe, Comparative Politics
35(4), 399–416.
Borghans, L., Dohmen, T. and Golsteyn, B.: 2009, De invloed van maatschappelijke on-
twikkelingen op de inrichting van onderwijs, Technical report, Ministerie van Onderwijs,
Cultuur en Wetenschap.
Borghans, L. and Nelen, A.: 2009, Learning on the job, the composition of tasks and the
earnings of older workers, Technical report, Research Centre for Education and the
Labour Market, Maastricht University.
Borghans, L. and Ter Weel, B.: 2002, Do older workers have more trouble using a computer
than younger workers?, The Economics of Skills Obsolescence 21, 139–173.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A.: 1992, Population aging, social security design, and early retirement,
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148, 533–557.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A.: 2000a, Incentive eﬀects of social security on labor force participation:
Evidence in Germany and across Europe, Jounal of Public Economics 78, 25–49.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A.: 2000b, A model under siege: A case study of the German retirement
insurance system, The Economic Journal 110, 24–45.
140
Bibliography
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A.: 2001, Incentive eﬀects of social security und an uncertain disability
option, in D. Wise (ed.), Themes in the Economics of Aging, University of Chicago
Press, pp. 281–310.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A., Brugiavini, A. and Enrica, C.: 2008, The role of institutions in European
patterns of work and retirement, DSE Working Papers 44.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Ju¨rges, H.: 2006, Early retirement, social security and well-being in
Germany, Working Paper 12303, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Reil-Held, A.: 1998, Retirement income: Level, risk and substitution
among income components, AWP Maintaining Prosperity in an Aging Society 3.7,
OECD, Paris.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A., Reil-Held, A., Rodepeter, R., Schnabel, R. and Winter, J.: 2001, The
German savings puzzle, Research in Economics 55, 15–38.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Schnabel, R.: 1998, Social security and declining labor-force partici-
pation in Germany, AEA Papers and Proceedings 88, 173–178.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Schnabel, R.: 1999, Social security and retirement in Germany, in
J. Gruber and D. A. Wise (eds), Social Security and Retirement Around the World,
University of Chicago Press, pp. 135–180.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A., Schnabel, R., Kohnz, S. and Mastrobuoni, G.: 2004, Micro-modeling
of retirement decisions in Germany, in J. Gruber and D. Wise (eds), Social Security
Programs and Retirement Around the World, University of Chicago Press, pp. 285–343.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Wilke, C. B.: 2004, The German public pension system: How it was,
how it will be, Working Paper 10525, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Wilke, C. B.: 2005, Reforming the German Public Pension System,
Paper Prepared for the AEA Meetings, Boston, January 6, 2006.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and Wilke, C. B.: 2006, Gratwanderungen zwischen Generationenvertrag
und Eigenvorsorge: Wie Europa die Herausforderungen des demographischen Wandels
annimmt, Deutsches Institut fu¨r Altersvorsorge (DIA).
Bovenberg, A. and Wilthagen, A.: 2008, On the road to ﬂexicurity: Dutch proposals for a
pathway towards better transition security and higher labour market mobility, Open
Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University.
Browning, M. and Crossley, T. F.: 2001, The life-cycle model of consumption and saving,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(3), 3–22.
141
Bibliography
Browning, M. and Lusardi, A.: 1996, Household saving: Micro theories and micro facts,
Journal of Economic Literature 34(4), 1797–1855.
Campbell, J. and Viceira, L.: 2001, Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-
Term Investors, Oxford University Press.
Carroll, C. D. and Weil, D. N.: 1994, Saving and growth: A reinterpretation, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 40, 133 – 192.
Crimmins, E. M., Hayward, M. D., Hagedorn, A., Saito, Y. and Brouard, N.: 2009, Change
in the disability-free life expectancy for americans 70 years old and older, Demography
46(3), 627–646.
Dammon, R. M., Spatt, C. S. and Zhang, H. H.: 2004, Optimal asset location and allocation
with taxable and tax-deferred investing, The Journal of Finance 59(3), 999–1037.
Deaton, A.: 1985, Panel data from time series of cross-sections, Journal of Econometrics
30, 109–126.
Diener, E. and Biswas-Diener, R.: 2002, Will money increse subjective well-being?, Social
Indicators Research 57, 119–169.
Diener, E. and Seligman, M.: 2004, Beyond money: Toward an economy of well-being,
Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5, 1–31.
Dimson, E., Marsh, P. and Staunton, M.: 2002, The Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years
of Global Investment Returns, Princeton University Press.
Fitzenberger, B., Schnabel, R. and Wunderlich, G.: 2004, The gender gap in labor mar-
ket participation and employment: A cohort analysis for west Germany, Journal of
Population Economics 17(1), 83–116.
Fornero, E., Lusardi, A. and Monticone, C.: 2009, Adequacy of Saving for Old Age in
Europe, CeRP Working Papers, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies,
Turin (Italy).
Gomes, F., Kotlifkoﬀ, L. and Viceira, L.: 2008, Optimal life-cycle investing with ﬂexi-
ble labor supply: A welfare analysis of life-cycle funds, American Economic Review
98(2), 297–303.
Gourinchas, P.-O. and Parker, J.: 2002, Consumption over the life-cylce, Econometrica
70(1), 47–89.
142
Bibliography
Gruber, J. and Wise, D.: 1997, Social security programs and retirement around the world:
Introduction and summary, Working Paper 6134, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search. Phase 1 of the NBER’s International Social Security Project.
Gruber, J. and Wise, D.: 2002, Social security programs and retirement around the world:
Micro estimation, Working Paper 9407, National Bureau of Economic Research. Phase
2 of the NBER’s International Social Security Project.
Gruber, J. and Wise, D.: 2005, Social security programs and retirement around the world:
Fiscal implications, Working Paper 11290, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Phase 3 of the NBER’s International Social Security Project.
Gruber, J. and Wise, D. (eds): 1998, Social Security and Retirement Around the World,
University of Chicago Press.
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L.: 1986, A structural retirement model, Econometrica
54, 555–584.
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L.: 2004, Social security, pensions and retirement
behavior within the family, Journal of Applied Econometrics 19, 723–737.
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L.: 2005, The social security early retirement entitle-
ment age in a structural model of retirement and wealth, Journal of Public Economics
89, 441–463.
Hanel, B.: 2009, Financial incentives to postpone retirement and further eﬀects on employ-
ment - evidence from a natural experiment, Labour Economics pp. 1–13.
Headey, B.: 1993, An economic model of subjective well-being: Integrating economic and
psychological theories, Social Indiciators Research 28, 73–116.
Horan, S.: 2005, Tax-Advantaged Savings Accounts and Tax-Eﬃcient Wealth Accumulation,
Research Foundation of CFA Institute.
Huberman, G., Iyengar, S. and Jiang, W.: 2007, Deﬁned contribution pension plans: Deter-
minants of participation and contribution rates, Journal of Financial Services Research
31, 1–32.
Hurst, E.: 2003, Grasshoppers, ants, and pre-retirement wealth: A test of permanent
income, Working Paper 10098, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Jansen, A., Ku¨mmerling, A. and Lehndorﬀ, S.: 2009, Unterschiede in den Bescha¨ftigungs-
und Arbeitszeitstrukturen in Ost- und Westdeutschland, IAQ Report 3.
143
Bibliography
Ja¨ntti, M. and Sierminska, E.: 2007, Survey estimates of wealth holdings in OECD coun-
tries, Working Papers 17, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-
WIDER).
Kalmijn, M. and Alessie, R.: 2008, Life course changes in income: An Exploration of age-
and stage eﬀects in a 15-year panel in the Netherlands, Panel paper 10, NETSPAR.
Kapteyn, A. and de Vos, K.: 1997, Social security and retirement in the Netherlands,
Working Paper 6135, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kapteyn, A. and de Vos, K.: 1998, Social security and labor-force participation in the
Netherlands, The American Economic Review 88(2), 164–167.
Lumsdaine, R., Stock, J. and Wise, D. A.: 1992, Three models of retirement: Computation
complexity versus predictive validity, in D. A. Wise (ed.), Topics in the Economics of
Aging, University of Chicago Press, pp. 21–60.
Lusardi, A. (ed.): 2008, Overcoming the Saving Slump: How to Increase the Eﬀectiveness
of Financial Education and Savings Program, University of Chicago Press.
Maas, G.: 2009, Een nieuwe rol voor de levensloopregeling, Rabobank Themabericht
2009/21.
Mastrogiacomo, M., Alessie, R. and Lindeboom, M.: 2004, Retirement behaviour of Dutch
elderly households, Journal of Applied Econometrics 19, 777–793.
Mathers, C. D., Sadana, R., Salomon, J. A., Murray, C. J. and Lopez, A. D.: 2001, Healthy
life expectancy in 191 countries, 1999, The Lancet 357, 1685–1691.
Meghir, C. and Pistaferri, L.: 2004, Income variance dynamics and heterogeneity, Econo-
metrica 72(1), 1–32.
Meghir, C. and Whitehouse, E.: 1997, Labour market transitions and retirement of men in
the UK, Jounal of Econometrics 79, 327–354.
NIBUD: 2007, Goed geregeld - geldzaken nu en later.
Ottnad, A. and Wahl, S.: 2005, Die Renditen der gesetzlichen Rente, Deutsches Institut fu¨r
Altersvorsorge GmbH, Ko¨ln.
Radl, J.: 2007, Individuelle Determinanten des Renteneintrittalters - Eine empirische Anal-
yse von U¨berga¨ngen in den Ruhestand, Zeitschrift fu¨r Soziologie 36, 43–64.
144
Bibliography
Riphahn, R. T.: 1997, Disability retirement and unemployment - substitute pathways for
labour force exit? An empirical test for the case of Germany, Applied Economics
29, 551–561.
Rust, J.: 1987, A dynamic programming model of retirement behavior, Working Paper
2470, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rust, J. and Phelan, C.: 1997, How social security and medicare aﬀect retirement behavior
in a world of incomplete markets, Econometrica 65, 781–831.
Sachversta¨ndigenrat: 2004, Jahresgutachten 2004/ 2005 zur gesamtwirtschaftlichen En-
twicklung, Bundestagsdrucksache 934/04.
Schmidt, P.: 1995, Die Wahl des Rentenalters—Theoretische und Empirische Analyse des
Rentenzugangsverhaltens in West- und Ostdeutschland, Lang, Frankfurt/M.
Seghieri, C., Desantis, G. and Tanturri, L.: 2006, The richer the happier? An empirical
investigation in selected European countries, Social Indicators Research 79, 455–476.
Siddiqui, S.: 1997, The pension incentive to retire: Empirical evidence for west Germany,
Population Economics 10, 463–486.
Stock, J. H. and Wise, D. A.: 1990, Pensions, the option value of work, and retirement,
Econometrica 58, 1151–1180.
Thaler, R. H. and Sunstein, C. R.: 2008, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth,
and Happiness, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Tigges, P., Rieger, A., Jonitz, L., Brengelmann, J. and Engel, R. R.: 2000, Risk behavior of
east and west Germans in handling personal ﬁnances, Journal of Behavioral Finance
1(2), 127–134.
van Praag, B. and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, F.: 2004, Happiness Quantiﬁed: A Satisfaction Cal-
culus Approach, Oxford University Press.
van Riel, B., Hemerijck, A. and Visser, J.: 2003, Is there a dutch way to pension reform?,
in G. L. Clark and N. Whiteside (eds), Pension Security in the 21st Century, Oxford
University Press, chapter 3, pp. 64–92.
Viceira, L. M.: 2008, Life-cycle funds, in A. Lusardi (ed.), Overcoming the Saving Slump:
How to Increase the Eﬀectiveness of Financial Education and Saving Programs, The
University of Chicago Press, chapter 5, pp. 140–177.
145
Bibliography
Wilke, C. B.: 2005, Rate of return of the German PAYG system - How they can be measured
and how they will develop, Discussion Paper 097-05, Mannheim Research Institute for
the Economics of Aging.
Winter, J.: 1999, Strukturelle o¨konometrische Verfahren zur Analyse von Rentenein-
trittsentscheidungen, Working Paper 99-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504.
146
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Otto von Bismarck was de eerste die een nationaal sociaal zekerheidssysteem introduceerde,
bestaande uit een zorg-, ongevallen-, arbeidsongeschiktheids- en pensioenvoorziening. In
eerste instantie kon men pas aanspraak maken op de pensioenverzekering vanaf een leeftijd
van 70 jaar, maar dit werd al snel aangepast naar 65 jaar. In het begin van de twintigste
eeuw was de levensverwachting voor mannen en vrouwen respectievelijk 45 en 47 jaar. De
pensioenvoorziening was zodoende alleen bedoeld voor mensen die niet in de gelegenheid
waren om te werken. Veel Europese landen volgden het voorbeeld en ontwikkelden ook een
dergelijk sociaal zekerheidssysteem in het begin van de twintigste eeuw.
De Europese sociale zekerheidssystemen werden genereuzer in de jaren zeventig, ondanks
de stijging in de gemiddelde levensverwachting. Een opmerkelijk ontwikkeling was het
vervroegd pensioen. Hiermee konden werkenden twee tot vijf jaar eerder met pensioen dan
de referentie leeftijd van 65 jaar, zonder actuarile gevolgen. Vervroegde pensioenuitkeringen
stegen ook door het gemakkelijk toekennen van arbeidsongeschiktheidsstatus aan mensen
vanaf 55 jaar (Gruber and Wise 1997). De bewustwording kwam pas begin jaren negentig.
Een stijgende levensverwachting en dalende vruchtbaarheid leidden tot een hogere ratio
tussen gepensioneerden en werkenden. Beleidsmakers begonnen zich te realiseren dat het
pensioensysteem onhoudbaar werd. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat er een sterk verband is tussen
institutionele prikkels en het gedrag van individuen. Hierdoor zal een hervorming naar een
actuarieel rechtvaardig systeem leiden tot een hogere pensioensgerechtigde leeftijd en een
lagere belastingdruk.
In 1992 heeft Duitsland een normale pensioengerechtigde leeftijd ingesteld door mid-
del van actuarile aanpassingen. In 2001 introduceerde Duitsland het pijlersysteem. Dit
pijlersysteem bestond reeds in Nederland. Maar men hanteerde te genereuze bepalingen
om vervroegd met pensioen te gaan. In 2006 heeft de Nederlandse overheid het vervroegd
pensioen afgeschaft . Hiervoor in de plaats kwam de levensloopregeling: een persoonlijk
spaarplan.
Om een beeld te krijgen van de consequenties van de beoogde hervormingen, gebruikten
overheden de resultaten van zorgvuldig uitgevoerd onderzoek. Maar omdat de wereld blijft
veranderen blijft goed onderzoek naar gevolgen van dit soort hervormingen nodig. In dit
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proefschrift analyseren we hoe individuen omgaan met pensioenhervormingen en hoe ze om
zouden moeten gaan met het sparen voor het pensioen.
In hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen het ﬁnancile welzijn van gepensioneerden in de context van de
Duitse pensioenhervormingen. Omdat de hervorming een verlaging van het reel pensioen-
rendement betrof, verwachtten we dat jongeren zich ﬁnancieel slechter voorbereid voelen
op hun pensioen dan nog niet gepensioneerde, oudere cohorts, gezien de daling van de rele
pensioenopbrengst. Verder verwachtten we dat mensen die nog niet gepensioneerd zijn, het
belang van additionele inkomensbronnen onderschrijven en derhalve investeren in sparen
via de tweede en derde pijler van het systeem. Onze analyse laat zien dat de manier waarop
individuen hun ﬁnancile situatie evalueren, overeenkomt met de beslissing van een rationale
agent die zijn gehele levenscyclus ﬁnancieel modelleert. Dit houdt in dat individuen met
een hoger inkomen en opleidingsniveau optimistischer zijn over hun (toekomstig) pensioen.
Het negatieve eﬀect van de cohorten laat zien dat men zich bewust is van de gevolgen van
de hervormingen en van de demograﬁsche en politieke risico’s. Het feit dat jongere co-
horten zich bewust zijn van hun ongunstige positie heeft echter niet tot gevolg dat ze meer
waarde hechten aan aanvullende bronnen van inkomsten. De twee voorgenoemde conclusies
zijn met elkaar in overeenstemming aangezien individuen die wel actief bezig zijn met het
aanvullen van het pensioen ook optimistischer zijn over hun pensioen.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat dieper in op het gegeven dat de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van vrouwen
veranderd is door de jaren heen. Vrouwen zijn tegenwoordig zijn hoger opgeleid, vaker
gescheiden, brengen minder kinderen ter wereld en zijn actiever op de arbeidsmarkt. Deze
veranderingen zijn vooral goed zichtbaar bij vrouwen in West-Duitsland. Het patroon van
hun arbeidscyclus convergeert naar dat van de man. Hierdoor maken zij ook meer aanspraak
op pensioenvoorzieningen, wat het pensioengedrag van vrouwen in West-Duitsland ben-
vloedt. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken wij het pensioengedrag binnen de ’optiewaarde’ be-
nadering (Stock and Wise 1990). Als we de optiewaarde uitzetten tegen het vermogen van de
sociale zekerheid zien we 1) periodieke dalingen in de jaarlijkse toename, welke de stijgende
pensioengerechtigheid voor vrouwen weergeeft en 2) vooral voor jongere cohorts een hoog
niveau, ondanks het institutionele voordeel van de oudere cohorts, wat ook duidt op het feit
dat vrouwen in toenemende mate aanspraak hebben gemaakt op hun pensioengerechtigheid.
Bij de verklaring van het pensioengedrag nemen we ook cohorttrends mee die gerela-
teerd zijn aan de ’opportunity costs’ van werken, zoals het aantal kinderen en het aandeel
universitair afgestudeerden, om het eﬀect van veranderende arbeidspatronen van vrouwen
te onderzoeken. We leren hieruit dat deze trends een signiﬁcant eﬀect hebben op de leeftijd
waarop iemand stopt met werken of met pensioen gaat. In West-Duitsland leidt het stij-
gende opleidingsniveau tot later pensioen en het dalend aantal kinderen tot eerder pensioen
voor de jongere cohorten. Voor Oost-Duitse cohorten kunnen we alleen het laatste con-
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cluderen. Echter, het toevoegen van deze cohorttrends verklaart slechts 1,9% extra van het
pensioengedrag. Net als in eerder onderzoek (Hanel 2009) zien we dat de tijd tussen het
stoppen met werken en het met pensioen gaan langer wordt voor jongere cohorts in West-
Duitsland. Dit geldt niet voor Oost-Duitsland. We concluderen dat er geen sterk bewijs
is dat een stijgende arbeidsmarktparticipatie voor vrouwen op jonge leeftijd leidt tot een
algemene stijging in arbeidsmarktparticipatie van vrouwen.
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 analyseren we het gedrag van individuen naar aanleiding van de
in Nederland gentroduceerde levensloopregeling. Door deze regeling verschuift de verant-
woordelijkheid voor het pensioen van de staat naar het individu. De staat stimuleert de
levensloopregeling door uitstel van belasting, belastingverlaging en subsidies. Mensen ge-
bruiken deze regeling bijvoorbeeld om te sparen voor zwangerschap- of ouderschapverlof,
sabbatsverlof of om eerder met pensioen te gaan. In de volgende twee hoofdstukken focussen
wij op de mogelijkheid om eerder met pensioen te gaan. Een jaar na introductie van de
levensloopregeling was de deelname nog niet hoger dan 5,5%.
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft het belang van belastingprikkels bij het maken van optimale
spaarbeslissingen. We modelleren de levensloopregeling met een levenscyclusmodel om de
optimale hoeveelheden consumptie, arbeid en spaargeld te bepalen voor een vervroegd pen-
sioen. Een individu heeft hierbij de keuze om te sparen via een normale spaarrekening of via
een levenslooprekening. Over het saldo op de levensloopregeling hoeft vermogensbelasting
te worden betaald en inkomensbelasting wordt pas betaalde bij opname. Onze resultaten
laten zien dat individuen meer sparen op de levenslooprekening naar mate ze ouder worden.
De levensloopregeling stelt hen in staat om op 61 jarige leeftijd met vervroegd pensioen
te gaan. Enerzijds leidt de levensloopregeling gemiddeld tot een 1,24% stijging in het nut
van een individu (5.600 euro aan extra consumptie over een leven). Anderzijds leidt dit tot
een daling van de inkomensbelasting van 14% (12.000 euro over een leven). De stijging in
individueel nut weegt dus niet op tegen de vermindering in het overheidsinkomen.
In hoofdstuk 5 bekijken we de levensloopdeelname en investeringsbeslissing in Nederland
empirisch. Nederlanders blijken wat betreft deelname en beleggingskeuze in obligatiesfond-
sen en aandelenfondsen rationeel te handelen, in lijn met eerdere genoemde levenscyclus
modellen. Naarmate men ouder wordt, investeert men meer in obligaties en minder in aan-
delen . Echter, bij het zogenaamde life-cycle fonds, dat zich automatisch aanpast aan de
leeftijd van de deelnemer, is het gedrag van de deelnemer niet in overeenstemming met de
levenscyclustheorie.
Het is erg moeilijk om het gedrag van individuen weer te geven in n enkele vergelijking.
Hoe meer we nadenken over het idee achter levenscyclusmodellen hoe beter we het feitelijk
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menselijk gedrag kunnen benaderen. Ondanks dat de mens zich vaak niet gedraagt als een
rationele econoom, is hij gemiddeld genomen toch niet volledig onbekwaam als het gaat om
het maken van wijze ﬁnancile beslissingen.
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